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Using the timeliness of misstatement discovery as a proxy for audit quality, we examine the association between audit firm tenure and audit quality in a setting that alleviates the endogeneity problem endemic to this line of research. We find that longer audit firm tenure leads to less timely discovery and correction of misstatements, which is consistent with a negative effect of long auditor tenure on audit quality. In addition, using the non-voluntary auditor change following the demise of Arthur Andersen in 2002 as a natural experiment, we show that the misstatements of its former clients were discovered faster than those of comparable companies that retained their auditors throughout the misstatement. This finding speaks to the benefit of a fresh look by a new auditor. An extended analysis shows that longer auditor tenure also leads to misstatements of greater magnitudes, and that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has mitigated, but not eliminated, the negative effect of long auditor tenure. Last, we show that the negative association between auditor tenure and timely discovery of misstatements is mainly present in the first ten years of an audit engagement. Our study has implications for regulators who continue to express concern regarding lengthy auditor-client engagement.

We examine the response of informed market participants to the informational signal of auditor changes. Using propensity score matching and difference-in-differences research designs, we document that loan spreads increase by 22 percent on bank loans initiated within a year after auditor changes, increasing direct loan costs by approximately $6.6 million. We also find a significant increase in upfront and annual fees and the probability of pledging collateral, consistent with an increase in screening and monitoring by banks. The increase in spreads is significant for client-initiated auditor changes, with or without disagreements with the auditor, as well as for auditor resignations. Further, the significant increase in loan spreads is documented for upward, lateral, and downward auditor changes. Our results are robust to other proxies for financial reporting quality. Finally, we find no effect resulting from the forced auditor changes due to Arthur Andersen. Collectively, these results suggest that voluntary auditor changes increase information risk, which is priced in private credit markets.

This study investigates the impact of board characteristics and bank-specific factors on audit quality in Indian listed banks. The sample size consists of 38 banks listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. The data cover 10 years from 2010 to 2019. The study utilizes logistic panel regressions to estimate the findings. The results reveal that board independence and diligence have a significant negative impact on the selection a Big-4 auditor and auditor change. The results also indicate that board size and promoters are found to have a significant negative influence on selecting a Big-4 auditor. However, board independence change exhibits a moderating influence that weakens significantly and negatively the selection of a Big-4 auditor and switching from a non-Big-4 to a Big-4 auditor. The study makes a unique contribution to the existing literature by investigating the moderating effect of board independence change. The findings are grounded in agency and stakeholder theories, thereby enhancing our comprehension of how board independence change could influence information asymmetry and agency problems. Since there is limited knowledge and importance surrounding this issue, particularly within the context of India's financial institutions, this study is critical, as their business practices serve as a model for other corporations.

The purpose of this study is to examine the influences of external auditor firm type, auditor tenure, and external auditor changes on the quality of Saudi Arabian financial reports. In particular, this study examines the quality of financial reports of companies listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange using a widely accepted evaluation model modified by JonesThis study aims to determine whether Big Four and non-Big Four audit firms, auditor tenures of three or more years, and external auditor changes have any impact on the quality of financial reports of Saudi-listed companies. This study uses 175 firm-year observations of 35 companies listed on the Tadawul Saudi Stock Exchange between 2017 and 2021. Using discretionary accruals (DACC) as modified by Jones to measure the quality of financial reports, the findings illustrate that there is a significant negative relationship between Big Four audit firms and DACC. However, the study also shows a significant positive correlation between auditor tenure and DACC. The research revealed that there is no significant relationship between auditor change and DACC. These results have practical implications for policy development. According to the outcomes of this research, there are numerous ramifications for both companies and the government in Saudi Arabia in terms of enhancing the relationship between companies and audit firms and determining the most suitable auditor tenure to improve the quality of financial reports.

Purpose This study aims to examine whether the industry characteristics of homogeneity, product competition, high auditor competition and accounting standards complexity are associated with auditor changes. Design/methodology/approach Logistic regressions test for significance of the industry characteristics on resignations, dismissals and directional changes to and from Big 4 and nonBig 4 auditors after controlling for client, auditor and engagement factors. Findings The authors report a lower likelihood of auditor resignations with greater accounting standards complexity. The authors also report a greater likelihood of auditor dismissals with greater industry homogeneity, greater product competition and greater auditor competition. Results also show that accounting standards complexity is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig auditors, and industry homogeneity is associated with a greater likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig. Also, greater auditor competition is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from nonBig to Big auditors. Research limitations/implications Prior research has established the importance of industry characteristics to the market for audit services (Cairney and Stewart, 2015; Wang and Chui, 2015; Cahan et al., 2011; Bills et al., 2015). The authors report that industry characteristics also impact auditor changes. Second, previous research has used various methods that indicate general industry effects on changes. The paper contributes to this research by specifying industry characteristics. Limitations include the reliance on the self-reporting in 8-Ks to identify auditors resigning and firms dismissing auditors. Also, the paper relies on proxies for industry characteristics that were developed in prior research. Practical implications Regulators have expressed concern over the relatively low rates of auditor changes and the problem of lack of auditor choice. By demonstrating a significant effect of industry characteristics on changes, the authors indicate some levers that may be available to influence rates of auditor changes, especially realignments to nonBig. Originality/value This is one of the first studies to examine how specific industry characteristics impact auditor changes. The study may be of interest to academics who are interested in how industry factors influence auditor changes. It may also interest policymakers who could lever the characteristics of industries to address concerns about the low rates of auditor changes.

This research investigates fraudulent financial reporting in non-financial companies listed on the IDX from 2018 to 2021. Statistical Product and Service Solution software version 17 is used in this study to conduct multiple linear regression analysis and moderated regression on data from 360 organizations. Research This demonstrates that financial targets, financial stability, and rationalization all have a beneficial effect on fraudulent financial reporting, however industry type and director change have no meaningful effect. The audit committee modifies the impact of external pressure and rationalization on fraudulent financial reporting, but has no affect on financial targets, stability, poor supervision, auditor turnover, industry type, or director change. T tests regularly reveal that certain variables, such as industry structure, director turnover, and audit committee oversight, have no significant effect on false financial reporting. These findings call into question conventional assumptions and provide useful insights into detecting and preventing financial fraud. This study specifically questions the agency hypothesis, which says that independent audit committees do not always decrease fraud in financial reporting. This new contribution invites a reassessment of audit committees' role and efficacy in combatting financial fraud, adding depth to previous research in this area.

Standard-setters worldwide have passed new audit reporting requirements aimed at making audit reports more informative to investors. In the UK, the new standard expands the audit reporting model by requiring auditors to disclose the risks of material misstatement (RMMs) that had the greatest effect on the financial statement audit. Using short window tests, prior research indicates that these disclosures are not incrementally informative to investors (Gutierrez et al. in Review of Accounting Studies 23:1543–1587, 2018). In this study, we investigate three potential explanations for why investors do not find the additional auditor risk disclosures to be informative. First, using long-window tests, we find no evidence that the insignificant short-window market reactions are due to a delayed investor reaction to RMMs. Second, using value relevance tests, we show that the insignificant market reactions are not due to auditors disclosing irrelevant information. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that RMMs lack information content because investors were already informed about the financial reporting risks before auditors began disclosing them in expanded audit reports.

The auditor change literature has generally concluded that clients from whom an audit firm resigns are risky clients, yet little is known about the period after a predecessor auditor has resigned from an engagement. We investigate a sample of resignations to determine why an audit firm chooses to accept the role of successor auditor on a presumably risky engagement and whether this decision is associated with a future adverse outcome. Consistent with prior studies, our results indicate that, relative to Non-Big N firms, Big N firms are more selective in accepting the successor auditor role when the predecessor auditor has resigned. Incremental to these prior studies, we find that Big N firms factor in two variables to help mitigate their potential risk—the timing of the predecessor audit firm's resignation and their own firm's expertise. Our analysis of future outcomes indicates that the resigned clients engaged by Non-Big N successor auditors are associated with weaker long-term financial ratios, shorter survival tenures, and a greater proportion of adverse outcomes compared with the resigned clients engaged by Big N successor auditors. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources indicated in the text.

Purpose - The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of industry specialization on the absorption and competitive pricing (or lack thereof) of audits of large Andersen clients (S&P 1500 companies) who switched to the remaining Big 4 international accounting firms in 2002 due to the demise of Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen). Did the audit clients pay a premium or discount in audit fees to their new auditor who specialized in their industry?Design methodology approach - Ordinary least squares regression is used to test hypothesis of a positive association between industry specialization and audit fees charged to former Andersen's audit clients in 2002 following Andersen's demise. This study provides more control over size effects by design. Test variables are constructed based on national market share of audit fees within an industry. Logistic regression is used to examine the likelihood of choosing new auditor that is an industry specialist.Findings - Results support hypothesis, consistent with auditor differentiation explanation. Proportion of clients that had engaged an industry specialist in 2001 increased from 38 percent (84 clients) to 48 percent (105 clients) in 2002. No evidence of price-gouging in 2002 although clients who aligned with industry specialist paid a 23.2 percent premium in audit fees. Large clients lost bargaining power to negotiate lower fees. Findings are robust to the inclusion of additional alternative measures of company size.Research limitations implications - Results of logistic regression analysis imply that large audit clients with former auditor of tarnished reputation, long auditor tenure and high leverage are more likely to switch to an industry specialist to possibly signal audit financial reporting quality. Large sample companies may limit the ability to generalize findings to smaller companies.Practical implications - Mandatory audit firm rotation (currently being debated in the profession) will have costly effect on the pricing of Big 4 audits for companies wanting to signal audit and financial reporting quality to affect market perception, and large companies would likely lose their ability to bargain for lower audit fees.Originality value - The paper focus on the alignment of Andersen clients and impact on audit fees with Big 4 industry specialists resulting from the sudden increase in audit market concentration. Prior to Andersen's collapse, evidence on the association of audit fees premium and industry specialists was mixed, and little attention has been given to the influence of auditor industry specialization on both audit fees and alignment of former Andersen clients with a Big 4 specialist. This paper fills that void.

This paper studies whether and how Big-4 firms provide higher-quality audits than non-Big-4 firms. Specifically, we first examine a Big-4 effect and then explore three sources of the Big-4 effect. To test the Big-4 effect, we use a unique data set of individual audit partners for a large sample of private companies and a novel research design exploiting the fact that auditees may follow the auditor who switches affiliation from a non-Big-4 firm to a Big-4 firm. Thus, we compare audit quality and audit fees of the same partner–auditee pairs before and after the switch. The results show that the Big-4 effect exists in the private-firm segment. More important, we find evidence for three sources of the Big-4 effect. First, Big-4 firms are able to recruit non-Big-4 partners who deliver higher audit quality than other non-Big-4 partners in the preswitch period. Second, enhanced learning has taken place after the switch. Third, the increased audit quality can also be attributed to stronger incentives/monitoring . These are new findings to the literature. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting .