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With respect to scale economies and capital costs, the definitions of Bain (1956) and Stigler (1968) are at variance, which has resulted in controversy among economists and antitrust lawyers, both over the definition of an entry barrier, and the question of whether scale economies and capital costs each constitute one. The present article is an attempt to resolve the controversies concerning the concept of barriers to entry. The paper begins by contrasting the definitions of an entry barrier proposed in the economics literature. It then introduces a classification system to clear up the existing confusion, and the paper employes it to assess the nature of the barriers posed by scale economies and sunk costs.

This study assesses the impact of the development of financial technology (FinTech) on the market power of traditional banks. We analyze the relationship between FinTech companies and traditional banks based on the barriers-to-entry theory, and verify the resulting hypothesis by using panel data from 155 Chinese commercial banks from 2013–2018. The benchmark results show that FinTech has a significant U-shaped effect on the market power of banks. Furthermore, the U-shaped effects remain robust when we focus on the technology and business innovation channels that affect banks. These effects vary across banks with different ownership structures and business segments. Specifically, municipal commercial banks are more likely to be influenced by business innovation than by technological innovation. By contrast, state-owned banks have advantages in using technological innovation to reacquire market power through loan services. Private banks, meanwhile, struggle to acquire any market power under intense competition from FinTech companies. Given that the FinTech may enable some banks overly dominate the banking industry at certain development stages, regulators and practitioners need to prevent monopoly-related problems and promote the digital transformation of small and medium-sized banks. First published online 30 August 2022

Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971) proposed that regulation benefits politically influential interest groups rather than advancing the public interest. The Stiglarian perspective predicts that regulation raises barriers to entry that limit competition and creates economic rents for incumbents. Apart from the direct economic harm of such policies, regulation generates additional consequences. One hypothesized consequence ushered by anticompetitive rules is the widening of income disparities. This article therefore surveys the growing empirical literature that studies whether regulation ultimately exacerbates income inequality. Beginning with the literature on entry and start-up regulation, we find that these rules, as predicted by Stigler, limit entry and dampen entrepreneurship. Moreover, recent studies also indicate that these regulations are associated with higher income inequality. We also review the literature on occupational licensure. Consistent with Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971), the literature chronicles widespread use of barriers to entry in labor markets, which have documented regressive effects on the distribution of income. Finally, we review research on financial regulation, in which studies have shown that some financial regulations are associated with less entrepreneurship and higher income inequality. Taken together, the recent empirical literature buttresses and extends the implications in Stigler (Bell J Econ Manag Sci 2:3–21, 1971). Regulation tends to benefit incumbents by limiting entry of economic participants, be it firms or workers, and exacerbates income inequality.

This article aims to establish halal branding in the international trade of edamame products and to describe the company's positioning using halal branding in the international trade of edamame products. This research used qualitative research methods with a phenomenological approach to explore business people's experiences with halal branding on their products. The data analysis findings indicate that the company's halal branding has the potential to outperform competitors in the global market. Through halal branding, it is possible to transform the resulting outcome of differentiated products with a value chain that complies with halal standards. Halal branding can serve as a deterrent to competitors entering international markets. Up to this point, the barriers to market entry have been limited to legal and economic barriers. This article contributes to developing a new theory on trade based on competitive advantage. This paper additionally highlights safety barriers as a type of entry barrier within the context of barriers to entry. Safety barriers to entry in global competition refer to obstacles related to product quality, safety, halal standards, and health, spanning the entire production process to the final delivery to consumers. These barriers serve as a hindrance for new entrants seeking to compete in the international market.

Incumbents can enjoy a cost advantage vis-à-vis new entrants and so deter new firm entry by establishing and leveraging connections with the judicial system. Connected firms may in fact avoid fully complying with the costly norms implied by a law, a regulation, or a contract. At the same time, they can also credibly threaten to sue new entrants. Therefore, a change in the institutional environment that diminishes the ability of incumbent firms to establish judicial connections—i.e., an increase in judicial independence—can promote entrepreneurship. Exploiting reforms that change the way in which U.S. state judges are selected, we confirm that this is the case, and we show that this effect is more salient in states and industries where the likelihood of entering into a business dispute is higher. The paper also sheds some light on the mechanisms behind this effect. Data and the online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2794 . This paper was accepted by Toby Stuart, entrepreneurship and innovation.

The emergence of large technology platforms has raised fundamental questions about antitrust enforcement. These questions, which are the subject of this RIO special issue, are now challenging scholars and policy makers. The topics covered here include the role of economics and the consumer welfare standard in antitrust; lessons from historic antitrust cases; the role of big data in antitrust analysis; antitrust analysis of multi-sided markets; and the interplay between competition and privacy regulation.

Using bank-level data, we apply the Panzar and Rosse (1987) methodology to estimate the extent to which changes in input prices are reflected in revenues earned by specific banks in 50 countries' banking systems. We then relate this competitiveness measure to indicators of countries' banking system structures and regulatory regimes. We find systems with greater foreign bank entry and fewer entry and activity restrictions to be more competitive. We find no evidence that our competitiveness measure negatively relates to banking system concentration. Our findings confirm that contestability determines effective competition especially by allowing (foreign) bank entry and reducing activity restrictions on banks.

What definitions of \"barriers to entry\" should be used in US antitrust decision-making? In addressing this question, the paper takes as a given the objectives of US antitrust policy and the role that the analysis of entry conditions plays in US antitrust decision-making. It is argued that US antitrust is concerned with consumers' surplus, not overall economic welfare, and that this choice of objective has important implications for the proper definition and assessment of \"antitrust barrier to entry\".

In Hawai‘i and across much of Oceania, Pacific Islanders celebrate the connections between our islands and the ocean that surrounds us. Since the beginning of time, we have relied upon precise observations of marine and celestial realms to intentionally navigate thousands of miles across vast expanses of open ocean. Through our migrations, we have created—and continue to create—purposeful relationships by observing the movements of swells, weather patterns, celestial bodies, and marine life. In direct opposition to colonial Western thought, we view Oceania as a metaphorical road that connects rather than separates island people (Hau’ofa, 1994). As descendants of the ocean, the dearth of Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders (NHPIs) in ocean science seems inconsonant. We wonder, where are all our island people in the ocean sciences? In better defining the persistent, systemic, and collective barriers that NHPIs face within Western society and the academy, we identify gaps that conventional professional development programs aimed at minoritized groups in the geosciences have been unsuccessful in filling. We share lessons learned from building two wa‘a (canoes) in programs that center oceanic ways of knowing.