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The aim of the paper is to look into the processes of organizing censuses and to analyze them as a form of public policy reflecting but also shaping social relations. The paper acknowledges the challenges inherent in the running of censuses at the decentralized level and administered by different institutions. The content analysis of the census forms is used to track the changes introduced within the last decades and differences between censuses across the United Kingdom. The changes in the census questionnaires are presented as affected by external, sociodemographic factors, concurrent legislation, and political considerations.

The key to the United Kingdom’s global role after Brexit was an international tilt towards the Indo-Pacific. In foreign and security policies, it was considered essential to build or reinforce strategic ties with like-minded regional partners, such as Australia and New Zealand, as well as the Pacific Islands Countries (‘PICs’) that are members of the Commonwealth. Achieving the position of Global Britain through engaged presence in the region was hindered by the consequences of Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. Rishi Sunak’s government has prioritized relations with European countries, at the same time attempting to remain a leading Euro-Atlantic power. The purpose of this article is to analyze the post-global foreign policy of the United Kingdom in view of the ‘new normal’ signaled in the Integrated Review Refresh and what it means for relations with the indicated countries of the Indo-Pacific.

The article constitutes an attempt to deal with the paradox contained in the West Lothian Question (known also as the English Question) which remains one of the greatest anomalies of the British constitutional system. Since the 1970s (when this question was asked for the first time) there have been many legal and political disputes over that issue, and even the idea of ‘English votes for English laws’ (EVEL) was implemented by the British parliament. The purpose of the article is to analyze and evaluate the potential impact of Brexit on that issue. By applying the historical method as well as the institutional and legal analysis method, the author verifies the hypothesis that Brexit will not be a breakthrough in finding an optimal solution to this legal and constitutional conundrum, even though in the post-Brexit reality this issue will keep returning, gaining a completely new meaning in the eyes of the British.

Brexit creates deep challenges for the UK’s structure of governance; not least concerning the degree and manner in which powers are devolved within one of the most centralised countries in the world. Departing from the EU is likely to exacerbate regional inequalities and possibly social divide, while at the same time leading to further centralisation of powers, at least in the short term. Most Brexit analysis looks at the reorientation of the UK’s external relationships, but the most significant impact may be on its internal constitutional affairs. While it is generally agreed that the UK needs more devolution, there is little discussion about how and why it sometimes succeeds, but also sometimes falls short of expectations. Ever since Adam Smith it has been known that economic prosperity, justice, and social cooperation are mutually reinforcing. Therefore, policy must be built around community and a sense of belonging, rather than a collection of anonymous individuals. The Core Design Principles set out by Elinor Ostrom provide a framework to transform governance structure at every level from the smallest communities all the way to parliament. Necessary institutional changes include giving local authorities much greater control over revenue-raising powers and therefore the services they wish to support. National legislatures must have the power to borrow for investment without limit, but with sole responsibility for repayment, to enhance local political accountability. A statutory body should be established, including representatives of the devolved assemblies and English regions, to address regional disparities, and there should be a much stronger regional presence in decision-making by HM Treasury and the Bank of England.

In this article, we ask how Conservative Euroscepticism was able to transform over the years from a more-or-less reasonable critique of the terms of the Maastricht Treaty to a trenchant opposition to British association with the EU. We argue that policy radicalism is accelerated by a lack of power over policy outcomes, such that political claims (assumptions, policies) cannot be implemented and thus cannot be tested against the harsh light of reality. We argue that stints in opposition, in coalition, and in a state of severe internal division can all lessen the responsibilities of governing and thus remove the onus on political actors to own – and be held accountable for – their policies. This is reinforced by high levels of external interdependence, the instrumental use of policy pronouncements, and hand-tying strategies by governments, all of which diminish any expectation that policies will need to be delivered. Empirically we demonstrate our argument by charting the evolution of Conservative Euroscepticism from the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 to the present day, drawing on a number of elite interviews with current and former Conservative politicians.

After Brexit, the UK must show that it has a voice. It will need to re-earn international respect, and in particular establish the concept of a ‘global Britain’ on the basis of performance, not rhetoric. That means re-establishing a strong network of relationships around the world in support of its security and economic health, but also continuing to play a leading role in support of the international rules-based order. For example, it should make the most of its continuing status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council to act as a problem-solver and system-enhancer in the collective interest. An early, first-order priority will be establishing a new, mutually beneficial partnership with the European Union, which continues to form our economic and political neighbourhood. Reconstructing a modern relationship with the United States is not secondary to that, but cannot substitute for it and must be undertaken in recognition of the differing interests and instincts of the two sides. A further challenge is building the right relationship with China based on mutual interest in trade, peace, and international respect and on confronting expansionist or opportunistic practices. With Russia, too, it is possible to design a predictable set of behaviours on either side, and with both countries good communication channels will need to be maintained. Brexit gives the UK the scope to construct a more deliberate diplomatic approach to the rest of the English-speaking world than was explicitly possible as an EU member – notably in working with Canada, Australia and New Zealand to promote the international rules-based order. But this should be complemented by more effective outreach to non-English-speaking countries, notably in support of trade and investment opportunities with emerging nations. But with them as with all the UK’s interlocutors, the need to earn its place, and to show that it realises that, will be vital. In defence and security, the UK will continue in its commitment to the strength of NATO as its essential alliance under US leadership, while also liaising carefully with EU Member States as they seek to improve their own capacities to contribute to European security. But it cannot simply rely on old institutional structures. It needs to lead, for example by playing a stronger role in the control of non-military forms of aggression, such as cyber warfare, economic sanctions, rivalry in space, and commercial espionage. A strategy for realising the UK’s interests in the international arena will require the Prime Minister’s constant attention, but also a specific mandate for a very senior minister to supervise the interlinked policy areas of foreign affairs, international development, and international trade within a single government department.

Discussion of the UK’s housing crisis is of long date, and tends to focus on a simple story about a mismatch in housing supply and demand and the consequent need to build more homes. Yet the reality is more complex with multiple sub-plots including social housing, stress in the private rented sector, benefits, subsidies and ultimately taxation of home ownership. At the bottom of the market, the crisis is real and acute, as manifested in a sharp increase in homelessness and rough sleeping. The inescapable answer is to increase the depleted stock of social housing and widen eligibility criteria. An increase of 100,000 social units a year in England would help address this problem, as well as alleviate the financial squeeze on tenants of the private rented sector, whose number has grown sharply in the past 15 years in tandem with a steep rise in the housing benefit bill. Recent efforts to curb housing benefit have further increased distress, so it will be necessary to consider increasing benefits again alongside regulatory interventions with private landlords. In the home ownership market, recent government intervention has taken the form of the much-criticised Help-to-Buy Equity Loan scheme. This market policy to support new-build homes should be wound down and replaced by a scheme to endow all young people with a capital sum that they could use for second-hand homes as well. More generally, a more sophisticated approach to planning home-building is needed, both for assessing overall numbers and their regional distribution and in financing the supporting infrastructure. But none of these measures is a panacea for a housing crisis that is in large part a symptom of problems in the wider economy, such as low relative wages for young people, a lack of clarity about environmental issues, and failing places. A successful policy package to address the distorted structure of the housing market must also grasp the most difficult nettle of all – namely the way the tax benefits of owner-occupation incentivise overconsumption of housing and a widening wealth gap between renters and home owners, and between owners in different parts of the country. If we spend more to help those who struggle to afford decent housing, then it is only just to raise more taxation from those who benefit from restrictions on housing supply – whether through reform to council tax, a wider wealth tax or a limited form of Capital Gains Tax on principal residences.