Explore the vast range of titles available.

Real case studies on bribery and corruption written by expert fraud examiners Bribery and Corruption Casebook: The View from Under the Table is a one-of-a-kind collection of actual cases written by the fraud examiners who investigated them. These stories were hand-selected from hundreds of submissions and together form a comprehensive, enlightening and entertaining picture of the many types of bribery and corruption cases in varied industries throughout the world. Each case outlines how the bribe or corruption was engineered, how it was investigated, and how perpetrators were brought to justice Written for fraud investigators, auditors, compliance officers, and corporate lawyers Reflects the recent crackdown on bribery and prosecution of cases under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Also by Dr. Joseph T. Wells: Fraud Casebook, Principles of Fraud Examination, and Computer Fraud Casebook This book reveals the dangers of bribery and corruption and the measures that can be taken to prevent it from happening in the first place.

Corruption and thefts of public assets harm a diffuse set of victims, weakens confidence in public institutions, damages the private investment climate, and threatens the foundations of the society as a whole. In developing countries with scarce public resources, the cost of corruption is an impediment to development: developing countries lose between US

Corruption and thefts of public assets harm a diffuse set of victims, weakens confidence in public institutions, damages the private investment climate, and threatens the foundations of the society as a whole. In developing countries with scarce public resources, the cost of corruption is an impediment to development: developing countries lose between US$20 to US$40 billion each year through bribery, misappropriation of funds, and other corrupt practices. Corruption is by no means a \"victimless crime.\" This study aims to explore the standing of States and Government entities as victims and the possible recourse to private actions to redress public wrongs. States and Government entities may act as private litigants and bring civil suits to recover assets lost to corruption. The goal of this work is to promote knowledge and understanding as well as to increase the use of civil remedies and private lawsuits to recover stolen assets in the context of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) offences. The UNCAC, the global standard for the fight against corruption, does not contain a legal definition of corruption itself but lists an array of offences, including public and private sector bribery and the embezzlement of public and private sector funds. The study will mainly focus on these two types of corruption, namely bribery and embezzlement of funds. This study is not intended in any way to minimize the importance of criminal proceedings and confiscation in addressing acts of corruption. Rather, it will show that civil law remedies can effectively complement criminal penalties by attacking the economic base of corrupt activities both in the public and the private sectors. In fact, given the magnitude of the challenges, all avenues of asset recovery, be they criminal or civil, should be explored simultaneously in order to tackle corruption from each and every angle and achieve the goals of deterrence and enforcement. Hence, while criminal law expresses society's disapproval of the corrupt acts and aims at dissuasion, punishment, and confiscation of illicit proceeds, civil law focuses on victims' interests and aims at compensation and restitution. These procedures may occur sometimes in parallel, sometimes sequentially. An effective response to corruption very often requires concomitant use of both criminal and civil law remedies to achieve the desired result.

Sen. Robert Menendez (D-N.J.) and his wife have been indicted on bribery charges, Justice Department officials announced Sept. 22.

While the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Anti-Bribery Convention is often considered a success in the fight against global corruption, ensuring its implementation remains challenging. As evidenced by the sustained decline in Transparency International’s ratings, the Korean government does not actively enforce anti-bribery legislation against companies and individuals engaged in business activities abroad. To support this argument, this article reviews the Korean legal apparatus designed to control foreign bribery and examines why the relevant authorities have insufficiently enforced them. Specifically, this paper discusses the Foreign Bribery Prevention Act, its legislative history, how the Korean legislature has failed to implement the OECD Working Group’s recommendations in a timely manner, and the consequences of this failure. Through a case study, this paper compares the practices of Korean law enforcement authorities with those of their counterparts abroad, particularly in the United States. This paper also illustrates how the traditional leniency of Korean prosecutors and judges toward bribe giving, especially by large conglomerates, has affected the enforcement of the relatively new legal apparatus designed to combat bribery of foreign public officials. Furthermore, a cultural leniency toward bribery, coupled with the Korean government’s unwillingness to raise public awareness of foreign bribery crimes and their punishments, poses a significant challenge to combating foreign bribery.

PurposeSupply chain fraud is a significant global concern for firms, consumers and governments. Evidence of major fraud events suggests the role of supply chain structures in enabling and facilitating fraud, as they often involve several parties in complicated networks designed to obfuscate the fraud. This paper identifies how the structural characteristics of supply chains can play an important role in enabling, facilitating and preventing fraud.Design/methodology/approachThe research follows a theory elaboration approach. The authors build on structural holes theory in conjunction with a multiple case study research design to identify new concepts and develop propositions regarding the role of network structure on supply chain fraud.FindingsThis research shows how structural holes in a supply chain can create advantages for unscrupulous firms, a role we call tertius fraudans, or the cheating third. This situation is exacerbated by structural ignorance, which refers to the lack of knowledge about structural connections in the network. Both structural holes and structural ignorance can create information gaps that facilitate fraud, and the authors propose solutions to detect and prevent this kind of fraud.Originality/valueThis paper extends structural holes theory into the domain of fraud. Novel concepts including tertius fraudans, structural ignorance and bridge collapse are offered, alongside a series of propositions that can help understand and manage structural supply chain fraud.

The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are changing the way multinational enterprises (MNEs) engage with host governments. The SDGs offer MNEs a unique opportunity to build political influence by assisting governments in attaining a host country’s social needs. However, international business scholars have largely remained silent on how MNEs strategize to repurpose ‘doing good’ into political influence. Based on a multiple case study of four Western European MNE subsidiaries in Indonesia, we uncover the strategies that MNEs use to turn their SDG initiatives into political access and influence. Our study reveals three nonmarket strategies – SDG-directed cross-sector partnership, SDG-directed conflict management, and SDG-directed constituency building. These actionable strategies help MNEs manage the tensions arising from misaligned government priorities, high levels of perceived corruption, and skepticism toward foreign firms. Our findings advance the literature on international nonmarket strategy by explaining how MNE subsidiaries resolve these tensions and convert SDG-directed investments into political access and influence without succumbing to locally institutionalized norms of corruption. Finally, our study suggests that emerging-market governments may benefit from rewarding MNEs for their investments that contribute to the SDGs, as long as they provide clear guidance and multi-stakeholder platforms that foster effective collaborations with MNEs.