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This paper discusses the idea of the functioning of an independent fiscal institution (IFI) in Poland according to the EU’s requirements. The first section provides an overall description of the institution. Section 2 provides theoretical insights into possible institutional models of IFIs which are established in the EU: the purpose is to discern what lessons can be learnt from IFI models in other EU countries. Section 3 discusses the legal basis of and standards in this area of public-sector control; section 4 addresses how that adoption would look in Poland. The objective of the article is to determine what the challenges in the Polish state fiscal policy are.

While it is recognised that effective state institutions are pivotal for economic development, their origins and what explains their cross-country differences are not well understood. We focus on the quality of budgetary institutions in developing economies, as efficient public financial planning in such countries is crucial for public goods and services provision. We argue that political institutions, seen as the system of checks and balances on the executive, are a key ingredient for building such capacity.Exploiting a recent database on public financial management performance in developing economies and an instrumental variable strategy, we generally find that stronger constraints on the executive have a positive effect on the ability of states to design, implement and monitor their budget. Our findings are robust to different specifications, controls and estimation methods.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether efficiency in public service provision is affected by political and budgetary institutions, fiscal capacity, and democratic participation. In order to address this issue we take advantage of a new global efficiency measure for Norwegian local governments. We find that high fiscal capacity and a high degree of party fragmentation contribute to low efficiency. In addition there is some evidence that democratic participation increases efficiency, while a centralized top-down budgetary procedure is associated with low efficiency.

Abstract The effectiveness of annual investments in US wildfire management programs has been subject to public criticism. One source of inefficiency may arise from a fragmented budgeting process. In the United States, federal budgets for wildfire management operations are not determined simultaneously by a single decision rule but instead independently by separate criteria. This paper investigates the conditions under which fragmented budgeting will constrain the fire management organization from the attainment of a socially optimal allocation. To accomplish this, we extend the standard model of wildfire economics to account for a sequential decision process inherent to a fragmented budgeting procedure. It is shown that when incident commanders weight the dual objectives of mitigating fire damage and suppression costs evenly, a fragmented budgeting structure does not constrain the fire management organization from reaching a socially optimal allocation. However, with the availability of supplementary suppression funds and the added public pressure to limit wildfire damage, incident commanders may weigh the goal of damage mitigation more heavily than the goal of lowering costs when requesting suppression resources. In this case, incident commanders fail to internalize the full costs of suppression and this creates a circumstance where fragmented budgeting leads to program inefficiency.

We analyze how budgetary institutions affect government budget deficits in member states of the European Union during 1984-2003 employing new indicators provided by Hallerberg et al. (2009). Using panel fixed effects models, we examine whether the impact of budgetary institutions on budget deficits is conditioned by political fragmentation (i.e., ideological differences among parties in government) and size fragmentation (i.e., the effective number of parties in government or the number of spending ministers). Our results suggest that strong budgetary institutions, no matter whether they are based on delegation to a strong minister of finance or on fiscal contracts, reduce the deficit bias in case of strong ideological fragmentation. In contrast, the impact of budgetary institutions is not conditioned by size fragmentation.

. Purpose – the aim of the study was to assess the impact of digital technologies on the organization of control over tax liability settlements of state-financed institutions in the general fiscal discipline system. Research methodology – specific methods of accounting and control of tax liabilities were used: Pareto analysis; cluster analysis of EU countries by fiscal discipline level. Findings – the study proved a direct relationship between the extent at which digital technologies are applied in the control of tax liabilities and the level of fiscal discipline in the country. The clustering of the EU-27 countries confirmed the cophenetic correlation between the fiscal discipline violation rate and the total averaged amount of taxes. Research limitations – caused by a large number of budgetary institutions and the difference in the territorial structure of the EU-27 countries, due to which federal Germany and unitary Bulgaria have different levels of subordination of budgetary institutions. Practical implications – the study is analytical and managerial in nature; its results assess the contribution of the digital component in the overall decision-making system. Originality/Value – the study is particularly useful for analysing the achievements, challenges and opportunities for digital transformation of the tax control system of the EU-27 in the field of control over public finance management.

La Constitución de 1991 buscó profundizar la descentralización fiscal en las regiones. Sin embargo, treinta años después, persisten las brechas en el desempeño fiscal entre departamentos y municipios. ¿Por qué algunos logran desarrollar una gestión fiscal eficiente mientras otros no, pese a estar sujetos a las mismas instituciones formales? ¿Qué papel han desempeñado las normas informales, incluidas las relaciones de poder, en el desempeño fiscal de las regiones? Este artículo demuestra que, además de las instituciones formales, las normas informales que emergen de las negociaciones presupuestarias entre los poderes ejecutivo y legislativo, los acuerdos entre partidos políticos, las asimetrías socioeconómicas y el conflicto armado, juegan un papel determinante en la persistencia de las disparidades en el desempeño fiscal de las regiones.

Purpose - This paper aims to show the aligned development that took place in public administration and public financial management toward serving public values. By analyzing the mode of institutions' interaction, the paper attempts to pinpoint the changing trends in budget institutions in Egypt, probing the extent to which they can be read from an administrative perspective and the possibility of enhancing budgetary outcomes under the existing administrative arrangements. Design/methodology/approach - An analytical framework for public management administrative and budgetary institutions' alignment is presented. A ladder analysis is developed to highlight the consistency of rationale between the two sets of institutions. The alignment is demonstrated at three consecutive levels: control and discipline, efficiency and effectiveness and openness and communication. Findings - The international experience reveals that the alignment of administrative and budgetary institutions is both theoretically traceable and practically applicable in the case of developed economies. Whereas, in the case of Egypt, both sets of institutions have been exposed to best practices; yet, they are not seen as complementary and enforcing each other. The internalization of the benefits of reforms in the two tracks into an integrated public management context in the case of Egypt is not reached. Practical implications - Egypt needs to ensure the alignment of both dimensions to maximize the benefits of reform. Originality/value - The ladder approach sorts the developments in both administrative and budgetary institutions into three levels to help assessing the maturity and conformity in countries' public management systems.

This volume provides an analytical framework and operational approaches needed for the implementation of results-based accountability. The volume makes a major contribution to the literature on public management and evaluation. Major subject areas covered in this book include: performance based accountability, e-government, legal and institutional framework to hold government to account; fighting corruption; external accountability and the role of supreme audit institutions on detecting fraud and corruption.