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Guest et al discuss their study which outlines the benefits of the stock buyback practice, as stated by its proponents, and provides evidence that casts doubt on the alleged costs cited by its critics. Critics of buybacks typically make three arguments against the practice. First, they claim that share repurchases enable companies to manipulate the market either by increasing the demand for shares or by tricking naive investors by inflating earnings per share. Second, they allege that share repurchases enable insiders to benefit through compensation contracts or the sale of shares at inflated prices. And lastly, critics charge that share repurchases crowd out investment and thus sacrifice innovation and long-term economic growth. Through their analysis, they were able to systematically address each of the stated criticisms of stock buybacks. Overall, the results show an absence of correlation between share repurchases and price manipulation, return reversals, excess chief executive officer compensation, and underinvestment, which makes it highly implausible that economically significant causal effects of share repurchases still underlie the data.

Prior theory claims that buyback and revenue-sharing contracts achieve equivalent channel-coordinating solutions when applied in a dyadic supplier–retailer setting. This suggests that a supplier should be indifferent between the two contracts. However, the sequence and magnitude of costs and revenues (i.e., losses and gains) vary significantly between the contracts, suggesting the supplier’s preference of contract type, and associated contract parameter values, may vary with the level of loss aversion. We investigate this phenomenon through two studies. The first is a preliminary study investigating whether human suppliers are indeed indifferent between these two contracts. Using a controlled laboratory experiment, with human subjects taking on the role of the supplier having to choose between contracts, we find that contract preferences change with the ratio of overage and underage costs for the channel (i.e., the newsvendor critical ratio). In particular, a buyback contract is preferred for products with low critical ratio, whereas revenue sharing is preferred for products with high critical ratio. We show these results are consistent with the behavioral tendency of loss aversion and are more significant for subjects who exhibit higher loss aversion tendencies in an out of context task. In the second (main) study, we examine differences in the performance of buyback and revenue-sharing contracts when suppliers have the authority to set contract parameters. We find that the contract frame influences the way parameters are set and the critical ratio again plays an important role. More specifically, revenue-sharing contracts are more profitable for the supplier than buyback contracts in a high critical ratio environment when accounting for the supplier’s parameter-specification behavior. Also, there is little difference in performance between the two contracts in a low critical ratio environment. These results can help inform supply managers on what types of contracts to use in different critical ratio settings. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2015.2182 . This paper was accepted by Martin Lariviere, operations management .

This paper proposes a novel advanced buyback (ABB) contract to coordinate a supply chain that consists of one supplier and one retailer. The contract stipulates when a buyback contract is executed and the amount of buyback. We model the interaction of supply chain participants as a Stackelberg game and incorporate the participants’ reservation profits into the game to examine the effectiveness of the ABB contract with complete information. We demonstrate that the ABB contract can conveniently coordinate the supply chain, flexibly allocate profit, and facilitate avoidance of the aggressive overordering behavior of the retailer. This model is extended to the situation of information asymmetry, where the retailer holds private information about the cost of sales in discrete or continuous states. The optimal strategies of the supply chain and the participants are derived. Information asymmetry can damage the supplier but be beneficial to the retailer. The condition under which the supply chain achieves coordination is clarified. A numerical simulation is performed to verify and extend the results of the theoretical analysis. We show that the ABB contract always outperforms the ordinary wholesale price and buyback contracts with complete information. Supply chain coordination is more likely to be achieved if the demand variability is lower when weighing whether to share private information. Our findings can explain why retailers always have an incentive to inflate their cost of sales.

The announcement of a buyback informs the market about the company’s decision to repurchase its own shares. This announcement highlights the company’s price valuation and the inefficiencies that exist in the market. This study examines the share buyback announcement effect during the COVID-19 period. The study considered the stocks listed in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) that offered share buyback under tender offer mode during the pre-pandemic period between April 2016 and February 2020 and the post-pandemic period between March 2020 and March 2022. 75 firms in the pre-pandemic period and 43 in the post-pandemic period that announced share buyback under the tender offer method were analyzed. The event study methodology using a market model was employed to determine the presence of abnormal returns during the event period, which consisted of –21 days and +21 days. The findings of the study revealed the existence of abnormal returns in and around the announcement date. Besides, statistically significant cumulative abnormal average returns (CAAR) were also found on the event day, i.e., on Day 0. The study found that the impact of buyback announcements on stock returns significantly differed before and after COVID-19 for 10 and 21-day periods, with no significant differences for shorter periods. These insights can help traders and fund managers make informed portfolio adjustments during turbulent market periods surrounding buyback announcements. AcknowledgementThe authors express their sincere gratitude and special thanks to Dr. Krishna T.A., Assistant Professor, Department of Professional Studies, School of Commerce, Finance and Accountancy, CHRIST (Deemed to be University), Bangalore, India, for encouraging, motivating and providing all the required support throughout this empirical investigation and to accomplish this research task.

This article embarks on ethical trade-offs at the sustainability/finance interface by contrasting shareholders’ interest in short-term financial returns with society’s interest in counteracting ecological and social grievances. Scrutinizing share repurchases, we investigate a firm’s communicated sustainability orientation (i.e., its environmental and social value orientation) as well as its environmental and social sustainability performance. Our results are based on a large-scale panel dataset of 491 U.S. firms observed from 2004 to 2016. The dataset combines share buyback data with sustainability orientation scores from shareholder letters and sustainability performance ratings. The econometric models suggest no association between social value orientation and repurchase volumes, but a significantly negative relationship between environmental value orientation and buybacks in a cubic form. Executive stock options partially attenuate this relationship. Share repurchases in turn negatively affect future environmental and social performance. This study grasps the consequences of firms’ short-term shareholder satisfaction and discusses its ethical implications in the context of firms’ contribution to sustainable development, thereby providing important insights to the business ethics discourse.

We study contract design and coordination of a supply chain with one supplier and one retailer, both of which are capital constrained and in need of short-term financing for their operations. Competitively priced bank loans are available, and the failure of loan repayment leads to bankruptcy, where default costs may include variable (proportional to the firm’s sales) and fixed costs. Without default costs, it is known that simple contracts (e.g., revenue-sharing, buyback, and quantity discount) can coordinate and allocate profits arbitrarily in the chain. With only variable default costs, buyback contracts remain coordinating and equivalent to revenue-sharing contracts but are Pareto dominated by revenue-sharing contracts when fixed default costs are present. Thus, for general bankruptcy costs, contracts without buyback terms are of most interest. Quantity discount contracts fail to coordinate the supply chain, since a necessary condition for coordination is to proportionally reallocate debt obligations within the channel. With only variable default costs and with high fixed default costs exhibiting substantial economies-of-scale, revenue-sharing contracts with working capital coordination continue to coordinate the chain. Unexpectedly, for fixed default costs with small economies-of-scale effects, the two-firm system under a revenue-sharing contract with working capital coordination might have higher expected profit than the one-firm system. Our results provide support for the use of revenue-sharing contracts with working capital coordination for decentralized management of supply chains when there are bankruptcy risks and default costs. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management.

We are the first to document and study the use of Rule 10b5-1 preset repurchase plans. Though the rule’s original intent was to clarify conditions for enforcing insider trading laws, generally thought to apply to individuals classified as firm insiders, we find strong use of the rule at the firm level to repurchase company stock. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at the core of payout decisions—the trade-off between commitment and financial flexibility. Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibility and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption: Firms with alternative sources of financial flexibility are more likely to precommit to a repurchase plan, as are firms with a history of poor repurchase timing and firms constrained by blackout windows. Consistent with preset plans signaling commitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, Finance.

South Africa’s waste diversion rate from the landfills is low (11%) and leaves room for growth in the South African recycling industry to contribute to job creation, poverty alleviation, enterprise development and economic growth. The waste economy’s value chain is multi-layered with buyback centres (BBCs) as the point of convergence for informal and formal sector actors in the recycling economy. BBCs connect the informal sector actors of the recycling economy with the more formal activities. Despite this role, BBCs have not been a focus of research. This study investigated the facilitating role of BBCs as the link between the formal and informal sectors of the waste economy—using the City of Cape Town as a case study. A concurrent mixed-method design was chosen for this study. Fifty-three BBCs were surveyed in 2018. These BBCs employed 971 people and accepted material from approximately 5500 collectors, including an estimated 3000 waste pickers—supporting as many as 15,000 people. The BBCs collectively sold 17,100 tonnes recyclables in an average month, constituting about R25.7 million in material value and a monthly landfill airspace saving of 41,800 m3. BBCs facilitate informal livelihoods and contribute directly and indirectly to the formal waste economy. Two key areas for research were identified: the evolution and business models of BBCs and a holistic analysis of the waste management system and policies of cities such as Cape Town for policies to be more supportive and inclusive of BBCs.

The anomalous returns associated with net stock issues, accruals, and momentum are pervasive; they show up in all size groups (micro, small, and big) in cross-section regressions, and they are also strong in sorts, at least in the extremes. The asset growth and profitability anomalies are less robust. There is an asset growth anomaly in average returns on microcaps and small stocks, but it is absent for big stocks. Among profitable firms, higher profitability tends to be associated with abnormally high returns, but there is little evidence that unprofitable firms have unusually low returns.

Open market share repurchase announcements are commonly associated with equity undervaluation, but their signal about firm value can often be misleading. We conjecture that executives who buy shares of their firm before an announcement add credibility to the undervaluation signal. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that announcement returns are positively related to past insider purchases, especially for firms that are priced less efficiently. Firms whose insiders bought more shares are also more likely to complete their repurchase plans. Finally, we find that insider purchases predict post-announcement stock returns.