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This paper highlights the dark side of power imbalance regarding its consequences in agri-food supplier–buyer relationships. We report on findings from two studies. The first study is based on a sample of 105 key informants, while study 2 is based on a sample of 444 key informants, all from the cocoa agri-food supply market of Ghana. While the first study focuses on the antecedents of power imbalance and its consequences, the second study explores the role of cooperatives/collective action in minimizing supplier exploitation. Data from these studies were analysed using the partial least squares technique (SmartPLS). Analysis of these findings shows switching costs’ impact on power imbalance to be curvilinear, while power imbalance has a curvilinear relationship with opportunism. The negative consequences of power imbalance are further exacerbated by dependency and the lack of joint action. Furthermore, we found the negative impact of power imbalance on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members, while, counterintuitively, we found the positive impact of economic satisfaction on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members.

Small suppliers often face challenges to obtain financing for their operations. Especially in developing economies, traditional financing methods can be very costly or unavailable to such suppliers. To reduce channel costs, large buyers have recently begun implementing their own financing methods that intermediate between suppliers and financing institutions. In this paper, we analyze the role and efficiency of buyer intermediation in supplier financing. Building a game-theoretical model, we show that buyer intermediated financing can significantly improve channel performance, and can simultaneously benefit both supply chain participants. Using data from a large Chinese online retailer and through structural regression estimation, we demonstrate that buyer intermediation lowers interest rates and wholesale prices, increases order fill rates, and boosts supplier borrowing. Based on counterfactual analysis on the data, we predict that the implementation of buyer intermediated financing will improve channel profits by 13.05%, increasing supplier and retailer profits by more than 10% each, and yielding approximately $44 million projected savings for the retailer. The online supplement is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2863 . This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

Building on the network theory and the concept of organizational ambidexterity, we investigate the impact of structural characteristics of a firm’s whole buyer–supplier network: network density, betweenness centralization, and average clustering coefficient on its international business (IB) performance. We also explore the moderating roles of average path length and PageRank centrality. Using a manually-collected dataset and a robust empirical methodology, we find that, while network density is negatively related, betweenness centralization and average clustering coefficient have an inverted U-shape and a U-shaped relationship with IB performance, respectively. We also find significant moderation effects, and, in the process, we show the economic importance of firms’ whole buyer–supplier network to their IB performance. We contribute to the international business and whole buyer–supplier network literature.

The revolution in information availability and the advances in novel interaction technologies have ushered in two major shifts that call into question the traditional assumptions of buyer–seller interactions. First, buyer–seller information asymmetry has greatly decreased in many interactions. Second, face-to-face communication is no longer the main format of buyer–seller interactions. In this article, the authors review empirical research on how these shifts have changed buyer–seller negotiations, an important type of buyer–seller interactions. Several insights arise from this review. First, the shifts have caused fundamental changes in buyers’ and sellers’ roles, power, and aspirations and information processing. Second, the shifts and these fundamental changes together cause major changes in buyer–seller interactional processes and outcomes, including (1) change in buyers’ attitude and behavior, (2) change in sellers’ effectiveness in interacting with buyers, and (3) change in buyer–seller interactional processes. Based on these insights, the authors develop a research agenda to guide the reexamination of existing theories and the development of new theories of buyer–seller interactions.

The legal basis for investigations into the model and means of direct protection of the subjective rights of buyers and holders of cryptoassets in Polish law is the provisions of the MiCA Regulation and the provisions of the Polish Act on Cryptoassets, assuming that the draft law will be adopted in the form known on 31 December 2024. Summarizing the normative solutions already in force and planned in Polish law which are devoted to the means of direct protection for the subjective rights of purchasers and holders of cryptographic assets is a source of limited optimism. In the current legal situation, the model of protecting the subjective rights of buyers and holders of cryptographic assets is not effective, and the means of direct protection of these subjective rights are not sufficient or fully effective.

The marketing channel literature has paid limited attention to institutional environments that constrain buyer–supplier exchanges, though such institutions are fundamental determinants of transaction costs, and thus of the occurrence of opportunism in the buyer–supplier dyads. Drawing on transaction cost economics and institutional theory, this study uncovers the critical influence of formal and informal institutions (i.e., legal effectiveness and networking expenditure) on the use of governance in deterring opportunism, as well as the moderating role of government support on the efficacy of governance mechanism. The findings from a buyer–supplier dyadic survey and 2 secondary datasets reveal that legal effectiveness mitigates opportunism through increased use of both contractual and relational governance; in contrast, networking expenditure reduces opportunism through relational governance, yet increases opportunism via lowering contractual governance. In addition, contractual governance is more efficient in constraining opportunism when government support is high, whereas relational governance deters opportunism more when government support is low. These findings offer important implications for academic research and managerial practice.

I derive the incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that maximizes the sum of the buyers’ ex-ante expected utilities. I also show that this mechanism minimizes the seller’s revenue. When payments are required to be non-negative, my mechanism takes the form of an arbitrarily weighted lottery with no participation fees, and the resulting allocation is generally not ex-post efficient. This means that before learning their valuations and if side payments from the seller to the buyers are not allowed, buyers as a group would be better off if they gave up ex-post efficiency in order to avoid positive payments. When transfers are allowed, the optimal mechanism is a standard auction with no reserve price and where the seller’s income is redistributed back to the buyers. This mechanism is robust to speculators if a buyer with value 0 never partakes in the redistribution.

Prior empirical studies suggest repeated exchange develops increasing value in buyer–supplier relationships. A first order implication of this finding is that buyers will concentrate exchange among a relatively small number of suppliers to generate maximum value in relationships. However, buyers are equally concerned with value capture. By distributing rather than concentrating exchange, buyers may position themselves to capture more of the value created, leaving buyers potentially conflicted concerning the choice. We label this dynamic the second paradox of embeddedness, distinguishing it from Uzzi’s [Uzzi B (1997) Social structure and competition in inter-firmnetworks: The paradox of embeddedness. Admin. Sci. Quart. 42(1):35–67.] paradox driven by technological uncertainty. By examining the procurement activities of a large, diversified manufacturing company, we then test for supplier and buyer behavior consistent with the conditions that give rise to the second paradox and behaviors that result from it.

PurposeThe authors argue that the supplier’s perspective in managing buyers using relationship commitment is incomplete. The primary reasons for incompleteness are that: the effects of the two types of relationship commitment (i.e. affective and continuance) on buyer behaviors (i.e. individualized consideration and opportunism) are largely ignored from a supplier’s perspective; there is quandary regarding the effects of the two relationship commitment types in a relationship, whether they are favorable or not; and there is also ambiguity regarding the conditions under which relationship commitment types might serve as effective relational governance mechanisms. The paper aims to discuss this issue.Design/methodology/approachThe authors employ survey data obtained from 207 suppliers to test the hypotheses using structural equations modeling.FindingsThe authors extend contemporary knowledge on supplier relationship commitment by revealing that at high-levels of buyer-leverage, supplier affective commitment can induce buyer opportunism and supplier continuance commitment can induce buyer individualized consideration. Furthermore, buyer-leverage positively moderates the interaction effect of supplier commitment types to promote buyer opportunism.Research limitations/implicationsThe authors do not examine a buyer’s perspective, but from a supplier’s perspective, suppliers can maximize their benefits from their relationship commitment by embracing affective commitment while ensuring that buyers do not have excessive leverage.Originality/valueThe study presents a significant contribution to the extant literature on relationship commitment by probing the dual nature of supplier relationship commitment; albeit for specific configurations of commitment types and buyer-leverage.

Many cities have attracted a flurry of out-of-town (OOT) home buyers. Such capital inflows affect house prices, rents, construction, labor income, wealth, and ultimately welfare. We develop an equilibrium model to quantify the welfare effects of OOT home buyers for the typical U.S. metropolitan area. When OOT investors buy 10% of the housing in the city center and 5% in the suburbs, welfare among residents falls by 0.61% in consumption-equivalent units. House prices and rents rise substantially, resulting in welfare gains for owners and losses for renters. Policies that tax OOT buyers or mandate renting out vacant property mitigate welfare losses.