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13,962 result(s) for "Bank Supervision"
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Balancing the Banks
The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective,Balancing the Banksdraws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future. While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of anadaptiveprudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints. Offering a global perspective,Balancing the Banksshould be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.
Regulation and instability in U.S. commercial banking : a history of crises
\"The historical response to bank crises has always been more regulation. A pattern emerges that some may find surprising: regulation often contributes to bank instability. It suppresses competition and effective response to market changes and encourages bankers to take on additional risk. This book offers a valuable history lesson for policy makers\"-- Provided by publisher.
The Role of Prudential Supervision and Financial Restructuring of Banks During Transition to Indirect Instruments of Monetary Control
This paper proposes a stylized sequencing of banking supervision and bank restructuring measures designed to complement and expedite the adoption of indirect instruments of monetary policy. Appropriate sequencing reflects both operational considerations and macroeconomic effects of structural measures. It typically involves implementing initially a critical mass of reforms of prudential supervision and of financial structure of both banks and enterprises, and subsequently adapting and refining these measures in line with the evolution of markets and internal governance. This approach facilitates implementation because the initial cost of bank restructuring can be offset, partly, through the budgetary effects of improved enterprise finances.
ECB banking supervision and beyond : report of a CEPS Task Force
With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) sets the guidelines for world-wide regulation of banks. It is the forum for agreeing international regulation on the conduct of banking. Based on special access to the archives of the BCBS and interviews with many of its key players, this book tells the story of the early years of the Committee from its foundation in 1974/5 right through until 1997 - the year that marks the watershed between the Basel I Accord on Capital Adequacy and the start of work on Basel II. In addition, the book covers the Concordat, the Market Risk Amendment, the Core Principles of Banking and all other facets of the work of the BCBS. While the book is primarily a record of the history of the BCBS, it also provides an assessment of its actions and efficacy. It is a major contribution to the historical record on banking supervision.
People's Republic of China: Detailed Assessment Report: Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
In recent years, the IMF has released a growing number of reports and other documents covering economic and financial developments and trends in member countries
Supervisory Incentives in a Banking Union
We study the consequences for supervisors’ and banks’ behavior of a “hub-and-spokes” supervisory system where a centralized agency has authority over banks but relies on local supervisors to collect actionable information. The model entails a principal-agent problem between central and local supervisors that leads to tougher supervisory standards but less compliance on the side of the supervised banks. Centralization entails greater inspection effort by the local supervisor and less bank risk taking if the divergence in the intervention policy of the central and the local supervisors is sufficiently small, but less effort and riskier bank portfolios if the divergence is large. The model has implications for the design of supervisory frameworks within integrated economies. This paper was accepted by Karl Diether, finance .
The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises
In episodes of significant banking distress or perceived systemic risk to the financial system, policymakers have often opted for issuing blanket guarantees on bank liabilities to stop or avoid widespread bank runs. In theory, blanket guarantees can prevent bank runs if they are credible. However, guarantee could add substantial fiscal costs to bank restructuring programs and may increase moral hazard going forward. Using a sample of 42 episodes of banking crises, this paper finds that blanket guarantees are successful in reducing liquidity pressures on banks arising from deposit withdrawals. However, banks' foreign liabilities appear virtually irresponsive to blanket guarantees. Furthermore, guarantees tend to be fiscally costly, though this positive association arises in large part because guarantees tend to be employed in conjunction with extensive liquidity support and when crises are severe.
Distress in European Banks
The global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of early identification of weak banks: when problems are identified late, solutions are much more costly. Until recently, Europe has seen only a small number of outright bank failures, which made the estimation of early warning models for bank supervision very difficult. This paper presents a unique database of individual bank distress across the European Union from mid-1990s to 2008. Using this data set, we analyze the causes of banking distress in Europe. We identify a set of indicators and thresholds that can help to distinguish sound banks from those vulnerable to financial distress