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Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is often justified by vague assertions that reorganizing troubled companies is in the \"public interest.\" There has, however, been surprisingly little effort to consider seriously what this public interest is, how it should be operationalized, or who should pay for it.

Does social enterprise end with insolvency? Is bankruptcy all about the bottom line? The answer to these questions begins with understanding the estate in bankruptcy and the fiduciaries that control its fate. Yet the law of fiduciary duties in bankruptcy is undertheorized, conflicted, and muddled. After almost fifty years of confusion, this Article provides the first comprehensive examination of the nature and source of fiduciary duties in bankruptcy. Although the Supreme Court has intoned \"maximize the value of the estate\" as a shorthand, this Article argues that the trustee's duty of obedience in reorganization cases gives rise to a \"duty to facilitate a plan\" or, as I call it, a \"duty to clear runway.\" It also concludes, based on 28 U.S.C. [section] 959, that the trustee must observe state law fiduciary duties that would otherwise have governed the debtor outside of bankruptcy. Trustees of benefit corporations, for example, must not pursue money-maximization above all else but must balance pecuniary interests against the public benefit set forth in the debtor's articles, such as preserving employment, protecting the environment, or supporting the local economy. For their part, creditors and debtors alike have opportunities to advocate for public-minded goals in bankruptcy cases as part of official committees or, in a novel twist, a \"benefit committee.\" And indeed, some creditors, like debtor-in-possession (\"DIP\") lenders, may step into a fiduciary relationship with the bankruptcy estate if they wield extraordinary control over the estate's decision-making. The timing is right for a rethinking: As the social enterprise ecosystem finds itself caught up in bankruptcy proceedings, creditors and debtors alike may wish to press for their vision of value. This vision for bankruptcy law is both capacious and controversial: It would allow for a wider range of values to be pursued during the plan negotiation process and could reshape bankruptcy practice for social enterprises.

Article 18, paragraph 1, of Law of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy gives the bankruptcy trustee the right to rescind the performance of executory contract. It also stipulates the time limit and legal effect, but it does not further set standards and restrict the rescission of specific contracts. The purpose of This Paper is to explore and establish norms for the exercise of bankruptcy trustee’s rescission rights under different situations to meet the practical needs. Based on the research results of domestic and foreign scholars, this paper puts forward the standard of “Special Interest Protection for Specific Creditors” to balance the interest conflicts between individual creditors, debtors and other creditors. Finally, this paper argues that it is necessary to set certain standards and make appropriate restrictions on the exercise of the bankruptcy trustee’s right to rescission the contract and improve the system.

Abstract Bankruptcy laws play a crucial role in regulating commercial transactions, which are inherently based on trust and credit. This paper provides a comparative analysis of how bankruptcy affects the “creditor community” under the laws of Iraq, Egypt and Algeria, with reference to internationally recognized standards and best practices for effective bankruptcy frameworks. Modern bankruptcy laws seek to balance the diverse interests of debtors, creditors and broader economic and social objectives. This paper examines the three jurisdictions’ main legal effects of bankruptcy on the creditor community. It also highlights similarities and differences in how these laws address the rights and obligations of the creditor community, in line with international best practices, especially the World Bank’s Principles for Effective Bankruptcy and Creditor/Debtor Regimes, which sets out key criteria for effective bankruptcy laws. The results indicate that while the legal systems of Iraq, Egypt and Algeria have common foundations, there are subtle differences in their approaches to empowering creditors and aligning with international best practices. This article provides insights for policymakers and scholars seeking to enhance the effectiveness and balance of bankruptcy systems, enhance commercial transactions, protect creditor rights and promote sustainable economic development.

Law A bankruptcy trustee wants a judge to toss a Cleburne County farmer's $38.8 million bankruptcy case. In the year before he filed for bankruptcy protection, Wilkison allegedly \"engaged in a pattern of transferring assets to and from related controlled business entities in an attempt to evade and conceal from creditors,\" according to the trustee's complaint by Joseph DiPietro of the Office of the United States Trustee in Little Rock. In November 2020, the bankruptcy court approved Hopkins to examine the legitimacy of Wilkison's books.

The board's fiduciary duties are the bedrock of corporate law. Bankruptcy trustees also owe fiduciary duties to the \"bankruptcy estate.\" But corporations in bankruptcy rarely worry about fiduciary duties, even those corporations in chapter 11 reorganization cases, when the company is supposed to act as if it were the bankruptcy trustee.

COVID-19 turned 2020 on its head. It caused state governments to implement lockdowns and quarantines, put many businesses out of commission, tanked the global economy, and forced Congress to pass federal spending bills providing aid to state economies. In its wake, many states had, or came close to having, their credits downgraded. Between February and April 2020, major rating agencies bumped the Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, and New York state municipal bond ratings from an investment grade to negative watches. At the beginning of the pandemic, Illinois was only weeks away from insolvency as it continued to spend more than it brought in, and California's state and local unfunded liabilities amounted to $1.5 trillion. Because states' deficit spending is currently unsustainable, intervention is vital to protect the national economy. Under the Tenth Amendment, state sovereignty allows states to choose whether to file for bankruptcy or default on their debts. No state has ever filed for bankruptcy and Congress has not amended the U.S. Code to include it.