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Multiple states have enacted statutes to govern procedures when a state seeks to execute a person who may be incompetent to understand why s/he is being so punished, an area of the law that has always been riddled with confusion. The Supreme Court, in Panetti v. Quarterman , sought to clarify matters, ruling that a mentally ill defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness “obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State’s reason for his execution.” However, the first empirical studies of how Panetti has been interpreted in federal courts painted a dismal picture. Only a handful of defendants have ever been successful in federal courts in seeking to enforce the Panetti ruling, and the authors of this abstract have characterized the relief ostensibly offered by that case as nothing more than an “illusion” or a “mirage” in a federal context. The issues of believability of experts, allegations of malingering, and “synthetic competency” dominate these decisions. In this paper, we seek to expand this inquiry to determine (1) how defendants in state courts seeking to assert Panetti claims have fared, and (2) the extent to which state statutes have made any meaningful difference in the way such cases have been decided. We also investigate the significance of the fact that the caselaw in this area has totally ignored the teachings of the school of legal thought known as therapeutic jurisprudence and offer some conclusions and recommendations (based on therapeutic jurisprudence principles) that, if implemented, can (at least partially) ameliorate this situation.

Mark Graber looks at the history of abortion law in action to argue that the only defensible, constitutional approach to the issue is to afford all women equal choice--abortion should remain legal or bans should be strictly enforced. Steering away from metaphysical critiques of privacy, Graber compares the philosophical, constitutional, and democratic merits of the two systems of abortion regulation witnessed in the twentieth century: pre-Roe v. Wadestatutory prohibitions on abortion andRoe'sban on significant state interference with the market for safe abortion services. He demonstrates that beforeRoe,pro-life measures were selectively and erratically administered, thereby subverting our constitutional commitment to equal justice. Claiming that these measures would be similarly administered if reinstated, the author seeks to increase support for keeping abortion legal, even among those who have reservations about its morality. Abortion should remain legal, Graber argues, because statutory bans on abortion have a history of being enforced in ways that intentionally discriminate against poor persons and persons of color. In the years beforeRoe, the same law enforcement officials who routinely ignored and sometimes assisted those physicians seeking to terminate pregnancies for their private patients too often prevented competent abortionists from offering the same services to the general public. This double standard violated the fundamental human and constitutional right of equal justice under law, a right that remains a major concern of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.