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"Bargaining"
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A system of pleas : social science's contributions to the real legal system
Social science research needs to expand beyond the courtroom and the jury room to address the multitude of factors involved in plea decisions and the influences at work on the various legal system players (e.g., defendants, defense attorneys, prosecutors, etc.). This work is both a culmination of the current state of plea bargaining research and a call to action for future researchers. All of the areas addressed - from innocents pleading guilty to prosecutor charging decisions to mass incarceration and felon disenfranchisement - merge to create a picture of our current criminal justice system as it really is, and how social science can move forward within it.
Book
A collective bargain : unions, organizing, and the fight for democracy
\"From longtime labor organizer Jane McAlevey, a ... call-to-arms in favor of unions\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Multilateral Bargaining and Downstream Competition
We examine multilateral bargaining in vertical supply relationships that involve an upstream manufacturer who sells through two competing retailers. In these relationships the negotiations are interdependent, and bargaining externality may arise across the retailers. In addition, the timing by which the manufacturer negotiates with the retailers becomes important. In simultaneous bargaining the retailers negotiate without knowing if an agreement has been reached in the other retail channel, whereas in sequential bargaining the retailer in the second negotiation is able to observe whether an agreement was reached in the first negotiation. We show that simultaneous bargaining is optimal for the manufacturer when the retail prices (and profitability) are similar, and sequential bargaining is preferred when the dispersion in the retail prices is sufficiently large. As a result of ex post renegotiations, the manufacturer may strategically stock out the less profitable retailer who charged a relatively low retail price and exclusively supply only the retailer who charged a relatively high retail price and maintained high channel profitability. Moreover, ex post multilateral bargaining can buffer downstream competition and thus lead to positive retail profits even in markets that are close to perfect competition.
Journal Article
From conflict to coalition : profit-sharing institutions and the political economy of trade
This book studies the conditions under which labor and capital collaborate in support of the same trade policies.
Book
Estimating Consumption Economies of Scale, Adult Equivalence Scales, and Household Bargaining Power
How much income would a woman living alone require to attain the same standard of living that she would have if she were married? What percentage of a married couple's expenditures are controlled by the husband? How much money does a couple save on consumption goods by living together versus living apart? We propose and estimate a collective model of household behaviour that permits identification and estimation of concepts such as these. We model households in terms of the utility functions of its members, a bargaining or social welfare function, and a consumption technology function. We demonstrate generic non-parametric identification of the model, and hence of a version of adult equivalence scales that we call \"indifference scales\", as well as consumption economies of scale, the household's resource sharing rule or members' bargaining power, and other related concepts.
Journal Article
Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining
I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.
Journal Article