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This article aims to collate some United States of America actions directed to the implementation of its policies represented by nuclear Law Mc-Mahon with the events that surrounded the discussions and decisions on the international atomic sector represented by Atomic Energy Commission of UN.

For the last sixty years, American foreign and defense policymaking has been dominated by a network of institutions created by one piece of legislation--the 1947 National Security Act. This is the definitive study of the intense political and bureaucratic struggles that surrounded the passage and initial implementation of the law. Focusing on the critical years from 1937 to 1960, Douglas Stuart shows how disputes over the lessons of Pearl Harbor and World War II informed the debates that culminated in the legislation, and how the new national security agencies were subsequently transformed by battles over missions, budgets, and influence during the early cold war. Stuart provides an in-depth account of the fight over Truman's plan for unification of the armed services, demonstrating how this dispute colored debates about institutional reform. He traces the rise of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the transformation of the CIA, and the institutionalization of the National Security Council. He also illustrates how the development of this network of national security institutions resulted in the progressive marginalization of the State Department. Stuart concludes with some insights that will be of value to anyone interested in the current debate over institutional reform.

Most Americans believe that the Second World War ended because the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan forced it to surrender.Five Days in Augustboldly presents a different interpretation: that the military did not clearly understand the atomic bomb's revolutionary strategic potential, that the Allies were almost as stunned by the surrender as the Japanese were by the attack, and that not only had experts planned and fully anticipated the need for a third bomb, they were skeptical about whether the atomic bomb would work at all. With these ideas, Michael Gordin reorients the historical and contemporary conversation about the A-bomb and World War II. Gordin posits that although the bomb clearly brought with it a new level of destructive power, strategically it was regarded by decision-makers simply as a new conventional weapon, a bigger firebomb. To lend greater understanding to the thinking behind its deployment, Gordin takes the reader to the island of Tinian, near Guam, the home base for the bombing campaign, and the location from which the anticipated third atomic bomb was to be delivered. He also details how Americans generated a new story about the origins of the bomb after surrender: that the United States knew in advance that the bomb would end the war and that its destructive power was so awesome no one could resist it. Five Days in Augustexplores these and countless other legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral issues they have spawned.

In June 1994 the United States went to the brink of war with North Korea. With economic sanctions impending, President Bill Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea, and plans were prepared for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Jimmy Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details behind this story or perhaps realize the devastating impact it could have had on the nation's post-Cold War foreign policy. In this lively and authoritative book, Leon Sigal offers an inside look at how the Korean nuclear crisis originated, escalated, and was ultimately defused. He begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the United States and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Sigal pays particular attention to an American mindset that prefers coercion to cooperation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policymakers from the countries involved, he discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission, and the diplomatic deal of October 1994. In the post-Cold War era, the United States is less willing and able than before to expend unlimited resources abroad; as a result it will need to act less unilaterally and more in concert with other nations. What will become of an American foreign policy that prefers coercion when conciliation is more likely to serve its national interests? Using the events that nearly led the United States into a second Korean War, Sigal explores the need for policy change when it comes to addressing the challenge of nuclear proliferation and avoiding conflict with nations like Russia, Iran, and Iraq. What the Cuban missile crisis was to fifty years of superpower conflict, the North Korean nuclear crisis is to the coming era.

At 10 a.m. on September 19, 1957, a nuclear blast shook a mesa at the Nevada Test Site (NTS), located about sixty-five miles northwest of Las Vegas. Willard Libby, a member of the AEC, recalled that he and other observers who had positioned themselves about two and a half miles away heard “a muffled explosion” and felt “a weak ground wave.” The entire “mountain jumped about six inches,” a “ripple … spread over [its] face,” and some rocks rolled down the formation’s slopes. The explosion generated shock waves equivalent to those of an earthquake of approximately 4.6 on the Richter

The history of the attitude of the United States towards the spread of nuclear weapons has been one of continuous opposition, tempered now and then by the judgement of the government of the day as to whether in particular instances the exigencies of the moment outweighed the force of the general principle. The starting point or the rough first draft for the U.S. policy of hostility towards the spread of nuclear weapons is the Baruch Plan, presented in 1946 to the newly created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission by the U.S. representative on the Commission, Bernard M. Baruch. The Baruch Plan aimed to harmonise an anticipated widespread international interest in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower adopted a new anti-proliferation initiative at the end of 1953 in the form of Atoms for Peace. This chapter discusses U.S. policy on non-proliferation and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, counter-proliferation and U.S. President George W. Bush's Proliferation Security Initiative.

Dean Rusk and Nobuhiko Ushiba discuss Japanese concerns about co-sponsoring U.N. resolution in support of nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Dean Rusk and Nobusuke Kishi discuss Japanese concerns about Chinese nuclear program and draft nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Committee concludes that the Baruch Plan will provide maximum International security and that no other plan for the International control of nuclear energy is therefore acceptable; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Strategic Survey Committee provides guidance on military aspects of United States policy to be adopted in the event of a continued impasse in the international control of Nuclear energy having concluded that the Soviet Union does not intend to accept international control if the U.S. definition of controls and Nuclear safeguards is applied