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4 result(s) for "Basel II (2004)"
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Engineering the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis has been blamed on reckless bankers, irrational exuberance, government support of mortgages for the poor, financial deregulation, and expansionary monetary policy. Specialists in banking, however, tell a story with less emotional resonance but a better correspondence to the evidence: the crisis was sparked by the international regulatory accords on bank capital levels, the Basel Accords. In one of the first studies critically to examine the Basel Accords,Engineering the Financial Crisisreveals the crucial role that bank capital requirements and other government regulations played in the recent financial crisis. Jeffrey Friedman and Wladimir Kraus argue that by encouraging banks to invest in highly rated mortgage-backed bonds, the Basel Accords created an overconcentration of risk in the banking industry. In addition, accounting regulations required banks to reduce lending if the temporary market value of these bonds declined, as they did in 2007 and 2008 during the panic over subprime mortgage defaults. The book begins by assessing leading theories about the crisis-deregulation, bank compensation practices, excessive leverage, \"too big to fail,\" and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac-and, through careful evidentiary scrutiny, debunks much of the conventional wisdom about what went wrong. It then discusses the Basel Accords and how they contributed to systemic risk. Finally, it presents an analysis of social-science expertise and the fallibility of economists and regulators. Engagingly written, theoretically inventive, yet empirically grounded,Engineering the Financial Crisisis a timely examination of the unintended-and sometimes disastrous-effects of regulation on complex economies.
Basel III liquidity regulation and its implications
Liquidity involves the degree to which an asset can be bought or sold in the market without affecting its price. The 2007 to 2009 financial crisis was characterized by a decrease in liquidity and necessitated the introduction of Basel III capital and liquidity regulation in 2010. In this book, we apply such regulation on a broad cross-section of countries in order to understand and demonstrate the implications of Basel III.This book summarizes the defining features of the Basel I, II, and III Accords and their perceived shortcomings as well as the role of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in promulgating international banking regulation. In addition, we compare the accords in terms of their ability to determine the capital adequacy of banks and assign risk-weights to assets.
United States:Financial Sector Assessment Program-Detailed Assessment of Observance on the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision
This paper discusses key findings of the Detailed Assessment of Observance of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) on the United States. The U.S. federal banking agencies have improved considerably in effectiveness. These improvements are reflected in the high degree of compliance with BCP in this current assessment. Shortcomings have been observed, particularly in the treatment of concentration risk and large exposures, but they do not raise concerns overall about the authorities' ability to undertake effective supervision. These shortcomings should, however, be addressed if the United States is to achieve the standards of supervisory effectiveness expected of one of the most systemically important financial systems in the world.