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In contrast to most publications on the ethics of paying research subjects, which start by identifying and analyzing major ethical concerns raised by the practice (in particular, risks of undue inducement and exploitation) and end with a set of—more or less well-justified—ethical recommendations for using payment schemes immune to these problems, this paper offers a systematic, principle-based ethical analysis of the practice. It argues that researchers have a prima facie moral obligation to offer payment to research subjects, which stems from the principle of social beneficence. This principle constitutes an ethical “spine” of the practice. Other ethical principles of research ethics (respect for autonomy, individual beneficence, and justice/fairness) make up an ethical “skeleton” of morally sound payment schemes by providing additional moral reasons for offering participants (1) recompense for reasonable expenses; and (2a) remuneration conceptualized as a reward for their valuable contribution, provided (i) it meets standards of equality, adequacy and non-exploitation, and (ii) it is not overly attractive (i.e., it does not constitute undue inducement for participation or retention, and does not encourage deceptive behaviors); or (2b) remuneration conceptualized as a market-driven price, provided (i) it is necessary and designed to help the study achieve its social and scientific goals, (ii) it does not reinforce wider social injustices and inequalities; (iii) it meets the requirement of non-exploitation; and (iv) it is not overly attractive. The principle of justice provides a strong ethical reason for not offering recompenses for lost wages (or loss of other reasonably expected profits).

An overview of ethics and clinical ethics is presented in this review. The 4 main ethical principles, that is beneficence, nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, are defined and explained. Informed consent, truth-telling, and confidentiality spring from the principle of autonomy, and each of them is discussed. In patient care situations, not infrequently, there are conflicts between ethical principles (especially between beneficence and autonomy). A four-pronged systematic approach to ethical problem-solving and several illustrative cases of conflicts are presented. Comments following the cases highlight the ethical principles involved and clarify the resolution of these conflicts. A model for patient care, with caring as its central element, that integrates ethical aspects (intertwined with professionalism) with clinical and technical expertise desired of a physician is illustrated.

Just Doctoring draws the doctor-patient relationship out of the consulting room and into the middle of the legal and political arenas where it more and more frequently appears. Traditionally, medical ethics has focused on the isolated relationship of physician to patient in a setting that has left the physician virtually untouched by market constraints or government regulation. Arguing that changes in health care institutions and legal attention to patient rights have made conventional approaches obsolete, Troyen Brennan points the way to a new, more aware and engaged medical ethics. The medical profession is no longer isolated, even theoretically, from the liberal, market-dominated state. Old ideas of physician beneficence and altruism must make way for a justice-based medical ethics, assuming a relationship between equals more compatible with liberal political philosophy. Brennan offers clinical examples of many of today's most challenging medical problems--from informed consent to care rationing and the repercussions of the HIV epidemic--and gives his recommendation for a new ethical perspective. This lively and controversial plea for a rethinking of medical ethics goes right to the heart of medical care at the end of the twentieth century. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1991. Many titles in the Voices Revived program are also newly available as ebooks, offered at a discounted price to support wider access to scholarly work.

Informed consent is an ethical concept that is codified in the law and is in daily practice at every health care institution. Three fundamental criteria are needed for clinical informed consent: the patient must be competent, adequately informed and not coerced. Physician-patient interaction is rooted in the ethical concept of beneficence, but over the 19th and 20th centuries, case law and societal changes brought respect for autonomy and with it--informed consent. This article briefly reviews the basics of informed consent, when is it required, how did informed consent evolve into what it is today and what can the surgeon do to truly achieve informed consent. •The basics of clinical informed consent.•The ethical and historical foundations of clinical informed consent.•The legal foundation of clinical informed consent.•Discussion of barriers to informed consent.

Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory—‘ethical behaviourism’—which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively equivalent to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need to cross in order to be afforded significant moral status may not be that high and that they may soon cross it (if they haven’t done so already). Finally, the implications of this for our procreative duties to robots are considered, and it is argued that we may need to take seriously a duty of ‘procreative beneficence’ towards robots.

Neurodegenerative diseases (NDs) represent one of the most important public health problems and concerns, as they are a growing cause of mortality and morbidity worldwide, particularly in the elderly. Despite remarkable breakthroughs in our understanding of NDs, there has been little success in developing effective therapies. The use of natural products may offer great potential opportunities in the prevention and therapy of NDs; however, many clinical concerns have arisen regarding their use, mainly focusing on the lack of scientific support or evidence for their efficacy and patient safety. These clinical uncertainties raise critical questions from a bioethical and legal point of view, as considerations relating to patient decisional autonomy, patient safety, and beneficial or non-beneficial care may need to be addressed. This paper does not intend to advocate for or against the use of natural products, but to analyze the ethical framework of their use, with particular attention paid to the principles of biomedical ethics. In conclusion, the notable message that emerges is that natural products may represent a great promise for the treatment of many NDs, even if many unknown issues regarding the efficacy and safety of many natural products still remain.

Previous research on utilitarianism has focused predominantly on instrumental harm while neglecting the investigation of impartial beneficence. This study designed three progressive experiments (total n = 1378) to explore how impartial beneficence influences bystander cooperation behavior and to uncover the underlying mechanisms and boundary conditions. The findings indicate that (1) compared with a partial agent, an impartial agent reduces bystander cooperation behavior; (2) impartial beneficence affects bystander cooperation behavior by influencing bystanders’ perception of warmth rather than competence; and (3) a bystander’s impartial beneficence personality plays a moderating role in the mediation model, and this moderating effect occurs in the pathways from impartial beneficence to bystander cooperation behavior, perception of warmth, and perception of competence.

Background Healthcare providers have to make ethically complex clinical decisions which may be a source of stress. Researchers have recently introduced Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based applications to assist in clinical ethical decision-making. However, the use of such tools is controversial. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the reasons given in the academic literature for and against their use. Methods PubMed, Web of Science, Philpapers.org and Google Scholar were searched for all relevant publications. The resulting set of publications was title and abstract screened according to defined inclusion and exclusion criteria, resulting in 44 papers whose full texts were analysed using the Kuckartz method of qualitative text analysis. Results Artificial Intelligence might increase patient autonomy by improving the accuracy of predictions and allowing patients to receive their preferred treatment. It is thought to increase beneficence by providing reliable information, thereby, supporting surrogate decision-making. Some authors fear that reducing ethical decision-making to statistical correlations may limit autonomy. Others argue that AI may not be able to replicate the process of ethical deliberation because it lacks human characteristics. Concerns have been raised about issues of justice, as AI may replicate existing biases in the decision-making process. Conclusions The prospective benefits of using AI in clinical ethical decision-making are manifold, but its development and use should be undertaken carefully to avoid ethical pitfalls. Several issues that are central to the discussion of Clinical Decision Support Systems, such as justice, explicability or human–machine interaction, have been neglected in the debate on AI for clinical ethics so far. Trial registration This review is registered at Open Science Framework ( https://osf.io/wvcs9 ).

Background Integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into healthcare has raised significant ethical concerns. In pharmacy practice, AI offers promising advances but also poses ethical challenges. Methods A cross-sectional study was conducted in countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region on 501 pharmacy professionals. A 12-item online questionnaire assessed ethical concerns related to the adoption of AI in pharmacy practice. Demographic factors associated with ethical concerns were analyzed via SPSS v.27 software using appropriate statistical tests. Results Participants expressed concerns about patient data privacy (58.9%), cybersecurity threats (58.9%), potential job displacement (62.9%), and lack of legal regulation (67.0%). Tech-savviness and basic AI understanding were correlated with higher concern scores ( p  < 0.001). Ethical implications include the need for informed consent, beneficence, justice, and transparency in the use of AI. Conclusion The findings emphasize the importance of ethical guidelines, education, and patient autonomy in adopting AI. Collaboration, data privacy, and equitable access are crucial to the responsible use of AI in pharmacy practice. Highlights Pharmacy professionals in the MENA region express significant ethical concerns about integrating AI into pharmacy practice. Key ethical considerations for AI highlighted in the current study include the privacy of patient data, AI replacing non-specialized pharmacists, and a lack of legal regulation. Tech-savviness and basic understanding of AI are positively correlated with higher ethical concerns. Informed consent as a vital part of autonomy, beneficence, and justice are crucial ethical principles in the adoption of AI in pharmacy. Collaboration, education, and ethical frameworks are essential for the responsible use of AI in pharmacy practice.

How should we respond to extremist views that we know are false? This paper proposes that we should be intellectually humble, but not open-minded. We should own our intellectual limitations, but be unwilling to revise our beliefs in the falsity of the extremist views. The opening section makes a case for distinguishing the concept of intellectual humility from the concept of open-mindedness, arguing that open-mindedness requires both a willingness to revise extant beliefs and other-oriented engagement, whereas intellectual humility requires neither. Building on virtue-consequentialism, the second section makes a start by arguing that intellectually virtuous people of a particular sort—people with “effects-virtues”—would be intellectually humble, but not open-minded, in responding to extremist views they knew were false. We suggest that while intellectual humility and open-mindedness often travel together, this is a place where they come apart.