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65,466 result(s) for "Bernanke, Ben"
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Ben Bernanke and Bagehot's Rules
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has claimed that the Fed's bank bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis were consistent with Walter Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort. This paper demonstrates Bernanke's claims to be mistaken. First, we outline Bagehot's doctrine for a classical lender of last resort. Next, we discuss Bernanke's theory of bank bailouts and his statements regarding the Fed's role in the 2008 bank bailouts. Finally, we examine the bailouts and demonstrate that, contrary to Bernanke's claims, the Fed's actions were not consistent with Bagehot's rules for a lender of last resort.
The alchemists : inside the secret world of central bankers
\"When the first rumblings of the coming financial crisis were heard in August 2007, three men who were never elected to public office suddenly became the most powerful men in the world. They were the leaders of the world's three most important central banks: Ben Bernanke of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Mervyn King of the Bank of England, and Jean-Claude Trichet of the European Central Bank. Over the next five years, they and their fellow central bankers deployed trillions of dollars, pounds and euros to try and contain the waves of panic that threatened to bring down the global financial system. Neil Irwin's The Alchemists is both a gripping account of the most intense exercise in economic crisis management we've ever seen, and an insightful examination of the role and power of the central bank. It begins in Stockholm, Sweden, in the seventeenth century, where central banking had its rocky birth, and then progresses through a brisk but dazzling tutorial on how the central banker came to exert such vast influence over our world. It is the story of how these figures and institutions became what they are - the possessors of extraordinary power over our collective fate. What they chose to do with those powers is the heart of the story Irwin tells. Irwin covered the financial crisis for the Washington Post, enjoying privileged access to leading central bankers and the people close to them. His account, based on reporting that took place in 27 cities in 11 countries, is the holistic, truly global story of the central bankers' role in the world economy we have been missing. It is a landmark reckoning with central bankers and their power, with the great financial crisis of our time, and with the history of the relationship between capitalism and the state. Definitive, revelatory, and riveting, The Alchemists shows us where money comes from--and where it may well be going.\"--Publisher's description.
Kindleberger, Mehrling y ese Premio Nobel
Este escrito sostiene que el premio “Nobel” de economía de este año celebra uno de los aspectos más débiles del pensamiento macroeconómico moderno: su limitada capacidad para entender la inestabilidad macrofinanciera del capitalismo moderno. En vez de desafiar la obstinada negativa de tomar en serio a los pensadores que afrontan la importancia esencial de las finanzas y sus peligros para el mundo moderno, como Hyman Minsky o Hyun Song Shin, hace alarde de la tendencia a ignorarlos. Y argumenta que si el Comité del premio hubiese querido galardonar a quienes procuran entender la dinámica del sistema financiero global moderno y sus interconexiones con la economía real, debería habérselo entregado al equipo del BIS, que se remonta a la época de William White, y a economistas académicos asociados al BIS como Hyun Song Shin.
Central Banking without Romance
Many economists, including former Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, believe that the gold standard generates poor economic outcomes including output volatility, price instability, financial panics, the spread of recessions via the exchange rate, and speculation-induced collapse. These problems, however, do not by themselves demonstrate the superiority of central banks over the gold standard. Comparative institutional analysis requires demonstrating that the relevant alternative, in this case a central bank, can improve upon these outcomes in practice. We use this standard to compare central banking and the gold standard in the United States. Recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that the Fed has not been able to measurably improve upon the gold standard even when it comes to these deficiencies.
Ben Bernanke versus Milton Friedman: The Federal Reserve's Emergence as the U.S. Economy's Central Planner
Chairman Bernanke agrees with Friedman that the Federal Reserve is largely to blame for the Great Depression, but he draws a different lesson from the central banks disastrous mistake. That difference helps explain Bernanke's eagerness for the Fed to play a larger role in centrally planning the U.S. economy. Adapted from the source document.
Monetary Policy When the Central Bank Shapes Financial-Market Sentiment
Recent research has found that monetary policy works in part by influencing the risk premiums on both traded financial-market securities and intermediated loans. Research has also shown that when risk premiums are compressed, there is an increased likelihood of a reversal that damages the credit-supply mechanism and the real economy. Together these effects create an intertemporal tradeoff for monetary policy, as stimulating the economy today can sow the seeds of a future downturn that might be difficult to offset. We draw out some implications of this tradeoff for the conduct of monetary policy.
Monetary policy under Bernanke: a variation on a redistributionist theme
The Bemanke Fed continues the long history of US monetary institutions being used as tools for enhancing the resources and power of the federal government. Historically, inflation has been the most common way of conducting this transfer of resources from the public to the state. Various regulatory interventions have accomplished the task as well. What differentiates the Bernanke Fed is that it has used powers obtained during a crisis to undertake policies that have redistributed wealth directly to banks and large financial institutions under the guise of monetary policy, and it has done so in ways that undermine the rule of law.
Financial Literacy: The Case of Poland
Financial literacy is a path to sustainability and has an important role in ensuring the financial sustainability of individuals, families, enterprises and national economies. The level of these economic indicators such as debt, payment discipline, savings and financial management all translate into prosperity or insolvency and bankruptcy and result partially from financial literacy. The higher the level of financial literacy, especially of young people, the more favourable the level of economic indicators, which translates into the economy and sustainable development. With this study we aim to determine the level of financial literacy of high school students in Poland and to determine whether financial literacy changes according to gender. The most important element that distinguishes our study from the others is that or study was carried out with a large sample of high school students with an average age of 15–16 years. In addition, the effect of gender on financial literacy at an early age was investigated, also comparing the wider themes to the so-called narrow themes. The results of the research demonstrated a good and partially very good, level of financial knowledge of the young people in Poland. 45.3% obtained an average level score and 43.8% achieved a high-level score in financial knowledge. This result shows that they can be rational in their financial decision making. However although, it is understood that gender makes a difference on financial behaviour and use of financial instruments, gender does not make any difference on the level of financial knowledge. Moreover, the financial literacy level of males is found to be higher than females.
The Real Effects of Disrupted Credit
Economists both failed to predict the global financial crisis and underestimated its consequences for the broader economy. Focusing on the second of these failures, this paper makes two contributions. First, I review research since the crisis on the role of credit factors in the decisions of households, firms, and financial intermediaries and in macroeconomic modeling. This research provides broad support for the view that credit market developments deserve greater attention from macroeconomists, not only for analyzing the economic effects of financial crises but in the study of ordinary business cycles as well. Second, I provide new evidence on the channels by which the recent nancial crisis depressed economic activity in the United States. Although the deterioration of household balance sheets and the associated deleveraging likely exacerbated the initial economic downturn and the slowness of the recovery, I find that the unusual severity of the Great Recession was due primarily to the panic in funding and securitization markets, which disrupted the supply of credit. This finding helps to justify the government’s extraordinary efforts to stem the panic in order to avoid greater damage to the real economy.