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Critics frequently accuse China of acting as a patron for autocratic states. But does Chinese engagement actually increase the stability of authoritarian clients? This article demonstrates that Chinese bilateral interactions have little effect on the longevity of autocratic regimes. Analyses of different forms of Chinese bilateral engagement between 1993 and 2008—including state visits, arms trading, aid projects, economic cooperation, and trade dependence—show that only export dependence on China may increase the likelihood of survival for autocratic regimes while doing little to stabilize their democratic counterparts.

Cooperation helps states realize mutual gains, but mistrust and disagreements over institutional design inhibit cooperation. This article develops a network explanation for how states achieve cooperation in the face of persistent coordination and collaboration problems. The analysis focuses on bilateral cooperation agreements, a vast body of treaties spanning multiple issue areas. Bilateral agreements constitute an evolving network of cooperative ties. This network defines the strategic environment in which states bargain over new agreements, endogenously influencing subsequent bilateral endeavors by revealing strategically valuable information about states’ trustworthiness and preferences over institutional design, while also generating externalities that incentivize bilateral partnerships. Inferential network analysis shows that states are more likely to create bilateral agreements if they (1) share agreements with common third parties, (2) accede to more agreements in general, and/or (3) share important exogenous characteristics with current bilateral partners. These network dynamics drive bilateral cooperation in everything from commodities to cultural exchange to fisheries.

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are the primary legal mechanism protecting foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world. BITs are thought to encourage FDI by establishing a broad set of investor's rights and by allowing investors to sue a host state in an international tribunal if these rights are violated. Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical literature connecting BITs to FDI flows has produced conflicting results. Some papers have found that BITs attract FDI, while others have found no relationship or even that BITs repel FDI. I suggest in this paper that these results stem from statistical models that do not fully capture the causal mechanisms that link BITs to FDI. Extant literature has often suggested that BITs may encourage investment from both protected and unprotected investors, yet the literature has not allowed for a full evaluation of this claim. This paper explores the theoretical underpinnings and empirical implications of an institution that works in these direct and indirect ways, and offers a statistical test that is capable of distinguishing between the two. The results indicate that: (1) BITs attract significant amounts of investment; (2) BITs attract this investment from protected and unprotected investors; and (3) these results are obscured by endogeneity unless corrected for in the statistical model.

The incidence of bilateral trade costs is calculated here using neglected properties of the structural gravity model, disaggregated by commodity and region, and re-aggregated into forms useful for economic geography. For Canada's provinces, 1992-2003, sellers' incidence is on average some five times higher than buyers' incidence. Sellers' incidence falls over time due to specialization, despite constant gravity coefficients. This previously unrecognized globalizing force drives big reductions in \"constructed home bias,\" the disproportionate predicted share of local trade; and large but varying gains in real GDP.

In East Asia the United States cultivated a \"hub and spokes\" system of discrete, exclusive alliances with the Republic of Korea, the Republic of China, and Japan, a system that was distinct from the multilateral security alliances it preferred in Europe. Bilateralism emerged in East Asia as the dominant security structure because of the \"powerplay\" rationale behind U.S. postwar planning in the region. \"Powerplay\" refers to the construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally's actions. The United States created a series of bilateral alliances in East Asia to contain the Soviet threat, but a congruent rationale was to constrain \"rogue allies\"—that is, rabidly anticommunist dictators who might start wars for reasons of domestic legitimacy and entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory, which held that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. The administrations of Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower calculated that they could best restrain East Asia's pro-West dictators through tight bilateral alliances rather than through a regionwide multilateral mechanism. East Asia's security bilateralism today is therefore a historical artifact of this choice.

This study revisits the association between bilateral relations and trade based on rare-event data from Integrated Data for Event Analysis (IDEA). Our results suggest that a country imports more from another if the two countries are friendlier. We further argue that states face two constraints when attempting to manipulate trade. First, they are constrained by domestic institutions such as elections and congress. Second, they are constrained by international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Our results show that the imports of authoritarian countries follow the flag of politics, but democratic countries’imports are less likely to be affected by bilateral relations. Moreover, WTO membership can gradually restrict democratic states from intervening on imports but has little impact on authoritarian governments.

In the 1970s and 1980s, North and South Yemen appeared to be two states pursuing opposing, sometimes hostile, economic and political policies. Then, in 1990, they suddenly united. This article analyses sport diplomacy as an instrument in opening institutional contacts between the two governments and as a venue for conveying important socio-political and historical messages. Cross-border football contests reinforced the largely invented notion of a single Yemen derived from pre-Islamic kingdoms. This idea remains a foundation of Yemeni nationalism and a base of Yemeni national identity.

The article examines Austro-Hungarian policy towards Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1918 in the context of internal social strife and the Austro-Hungarian priorities vis-á-vis Germany and Ukraine. It, thus, shifts the perspective onto the truce and peace talks at Brest-Litovsk to examine the position and interests of the empire among the Central Powers that usually takes a backseat in research on World War I. While both Germany and Austria-Hungary did count on peace in the East, their separate interests and abilities to promote these interests were quite different. Contrary to traditional views onto the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary played its own game where its goals were not forever bound to Germany. While Germany was willing to put pressure on Soviet Russia from time to time, Austria-Hungary was more careful. For one, it was concerned about domestic public opinion and, in contrast to Germany, also did not make any territorial claims towards Bolshevik Russia. Austro-Hungarian negotiators instead focused on concurrent peace talks with newly independent Ukraine. As the author shows, their main goal was precisely peace with the Ukraine as Vienna hoped it would bring grain deliveries to the starving people of the Habsburg Monarchy. The article also goes beyond traditional considerations of Brest-Litovsk by examining Austro-Hungarian policy towards Soviet Russia and Ukraine in the spring and summer of 1918. It emerges that Vienna was more actively engaged with Ukraine where the hopes of massive deliveries of local crops etc. were fading only slowly, whereas in regards to Petrograd/Moscow it rather adjusted its position to the evolving dynamics of the talks and the situation at home.

The article examines Austro-Hungarian policy towards Soviet Russia between 1917 and 1918 in the context of internal social strife and the Austro-Hungarian priorities vis-á-vis Germany and Ukraine. It, thus, shifts the perspective onto the truce and peace talks at Brest-Litovsk to examine the position and interests of the empire among the Central Powers that usually takes a backseat in research on World War I. While both Germany and Austria-Hungary did count on peace in the East, their separate interests and abilities to promote these interests were quite different. Contrary to traditional views onto the Central Powers, Austria-Hungary played its own game where its goals were not forever bound to Germany. While Germany was willing to put pressure on Soviet Russia from time to time, Austria-Hungary was more careful. For one, it was concerned about domestic public opinion and, in contrast to Germany, also did not make any territorial claims towards Bolshevik Russia. Austro-Hungarian negotiators instead focused on concurrent peace talks with newly independent Ukraine. As the author shows, their main goal was precisely peace with the Ukraine as Vienna hoped it would bring grain deliveries to the starving people of the Habsburg Monarchy. The article also goes beyond traditional considerations of Brest-Litovsk by examining Austro-Hungarian policy towards Soviet Russia and Ukraine in the spring and summer of 1918. It emerges that Vienna was more actively engaged with Ukraine where the hopes of massive deliveries of local crops etc. were fading only slowly, whereas in regards to Petrograd/Moscow it rather adjusted its position to the evolving dynamics of the talks and the situation at home.

This article employs security dilemma theory to probe the geopolitical implications of state intervention in the digital realm. Its central argument is that with cross-border data flows being conducive to subversive actions, governments have grown wary of rival states leveraging control over data flows to advance strategic objectives. Therefore, when a government tightens its domestic regulation over data flows, its actions could trigger a spiral of suspicions and countermeasures with other states. Such a security dilemma fosters the technology rivalry between China and the United States. As Beijing became sensitive to unrestricted flows of information and data, it set out to exert tighter control over data flows within and across Chinese borders. But Beijing’s move aggravated US perceptions of subversive threats, prompting Washington to try to drive Chinese entities out of the US-centric technology ecosystem. Not surprisingly, Washington’s actions signaled hostile intent to China, which in turn decided to build alternative digital infrastructures. Given that state intervention in the digital realm could exacerbate great power rivalry, Web 3.0 will likely perpetuate security dilemma dynamics by shifting the battlefield from corporate platforms to protocol layers, from data ownership to infrastructure sovereignty.