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7
result(s) for
"Biological warfare-United States-Safety measures"
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Giving Full Measure to Countermeasures
by
Sciences, Board on Life
,
Council, National Research
,
Medicine, Institute of
in
Antitoxins
,
Antitoxins-United States
,
Biological warfare
2004
In recent years, substantial efforts have been initiated to develop new drugs, vaccines, and other medical interventions against biological agents that could be used in bioterrorist attacks against civilian populations.
American Biodefense
by
Frank L. Smith III
in
Biological & Chemical Warfare
,
Biological warfare
,
Biological warfare -- United States -- Safety measures
2014
Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since
at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has
neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for
biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001,
the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on
medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most
of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human
Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S.
military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to
take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks?
In American Biodefense , Frank L. Smith III addresses this
puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and
national security.
Smith argues that organizational frames and stereotypes have
caused both military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense.
In the armed services, influential ideas about kinetic warfare have
undermined defense against biological warfare. The influence of
these ideas on science and technology challenges the conventional
wisdom that national security policy is driven by threats or
bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside the U.S.
military, Smith explains how the lessons learned from biodefense
can help solve other important problems that range from radiation
weapons to cyber attacks.
Biological weapons have threatened U.S. national security since
at least World War II. Historically, however, the U.S. military has
neglected research, development, acquisition, and doctrine for
biodefense. Following September 11 and the anthrax letters of 2001,
the United States started spending billions of dollars per year on
medical countermeasures and biological detection systems. But most
of this funding now comes from the Department of Health and Human
Services rather than the Department of Defense. Why has the U.S.
military neglected biodefense and allowed civilian organizations to
take the lead in defending the country against biological attacks?
In American Biodefense , Frank L. Smith III addresses this
puzzling and largely untold story about science, technology, and
national security.Smith argues that organizational frames and
stereotypes have caused both military neglect and the rise of
civilian biodefense. In the armed services, influential ideas about
kinetic warfare have undermined defense against biological warfare.
The influence of these ideas on science and technology challenges
the conventional wisdom that national security policy is driven by
threats or bureaucratic interests. Given the ideas at work inside
the U.S. military, Smith explains how the lessons learned from
biodefense can help solve other important problems that range from
radiation weapons to cyber attacks.
Information Sharing and Collaboration
by
Policy, Board on Health Sciences
,
Workshop, Planning Committee on Information-Sharing Models and Guidelines for Collaboration: Applications to an Integrated One Health Biosurveillance Strategy--A
,
Medicine, Institute of
in
Biological warfare
,
Congresses
,
Emergency management
2012
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax mailings, the U.S. government prioritized a biosurveillance strategy aimed at detecting, monitoring, and characterizing national security health threats in human and animal populations, food, water, agriculture, and the environment. However, gaps and challenges in biosurveillance efforts and integration of biosurveillance activities remain. September 8-9, 2011, the IOM held a workshop to explore the information-sharing and collaboration processes needed for the nation's integrated biosurveillance strategy.
Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical, Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Terrorist Attacks
by
Tom LaTourrette
,
David E. Mosher
,
Lois M. Davis
in
Bioterrorism
,
Chemical terrorism
,
Nuclear terrorism
2003
Individuals may have to rely on themselves to protect their own health and safety--perhaps even their own lives--in the event of a terrorist attack. Even those who know how to take care of themselves in the event of a fire, tornado, or earthquake might not know what to do in case of a chemical, radiological, nuclear, or biological attack. This quick guide attempts to fill in some of these gaps by offering specific actions to take during each of these situations, as well as preparations that can be taken. These actions are appropriate regardless of the likelihood of an attack, its scale, or the current government alert level; are designed to be sensitive to potential variations; and have been defined in terms of simple rules that should be easy to follow. A reference card included at the back of the guide encapsulates the key points and can be removed for display in a prominent place.
Safe food
2010
Food safety is a matter of intense public concern, and for good reason. Millions of annual cases of food \"poisonings\" raise alarm not only about the food served in restaurants and fast-food outlets but also about foods bought in supermarkets. The introduction of genetically modified foods—immediately dubbed \"Frankenfoods\"—only adds to the general sense of unease. Finally, the events of September 11, 2001, heightened fears by exposing the vulnerability of food and water supplies to attacks by bioterrorists. How concerned should we be about such problems? Who is responsible for preventing them? Who benefits from ignoring them? Who decides?