Explore the vast range of titles available.

\"The United States government has spent billions of dollars to prepare the nation for bioterrorism despite the extremely rare occurrence of biological attacks in modern American history. Germ Wars argues that bioterrorism has emerged as a prominent fear in the modern age, arising with the production of new forms of microbial nature and changing practices of warfare. In the last century, revolutions in biological science have made visible a vast microscopic world, and in this same era we have watched the rise of a global war on terror. Germ Wars demonstrates that these movements did not occur separately but are instead deeply entwined--new scientific knowledge of microbes makes possible new mechanisms of war. Whether to eliminate disease or create weapons, the work to harness and control germs and the history of these endeavors provide an important opportunity for investigating how biological natures shape modern life. Germ Wars aims to convince students and scholars as well as policymakers and activists that the ways in which bioterrorism has been produced have consequences for how people live in this world of unspecifiable risks\"--Provided by publisher.

We provide incidences (cases/10 million persons) in the Netherlands during 2009-2019 for pathogens listed as potential bioterrorism agents. We included pathogens from the highest categories of the European Medicines Agency or the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Notifiable diseases and recently published data were used to calculate the average annual incidence. Coxiella burnetii had the highest incidence because of a Q fever epidemic during 2007-2010. Incidence then decreased to 10.8 cases/. Pathogens with an incidence >1 were Brucella spp. (2.5 cases), Francisella tularensis (1.3 cases), and Burkholderia pseudomallei (1.1 cases). Pathogens with an incidence <1 were hemorrhagic fever viruses (0.3 cases), Clostridium botulinum (0.2 cases), and Bacillus anthracis (0.1 cases). Variola major and Yersinia pestis were absent. The generally low incidences make it unlikely that ill-meaning persons can isolate these pathogens from natural sources in the Netherlands. However, the pathogens are stored in laboratories, underscoring the need for biosecurity measures.

Only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing the H5 HA and the remaining seven gene segments from a human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. Elements involved in H5N1 transmission Whether avian H5N1 viruses can gain the ability to transmit between humans was uncertain. The viral haemagglutinin protein (HA) mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors, but previous studies have shown that alterations in HA that enable binding to human-type receptors are not sufficient to enable respiratory droplet transmission of H5N1 viruses in ferrets, the best animal model for human-to-human transmission. Imai et al . show that only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing H5 HA, with the remaining genes from human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. It is probable that further adaptations in other avian virus genes would be required to mediate transmission of wholly avian H5N1 in mammals, but human H1N1 and H5N1 viruses are genetically compatible and the emergence of H5-HA-containing viruses might be expected to cause a pandemic because humans lack immunity to H5 viruses. Knowledge of the mutations involved in adapting H5 HA to mammalian transmission could help with surveillance and monitoring of H5N1 viruses adapting towards pandemic potential. Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans, but currently do not transmit efficiently among humans. The viral haemagglutinin (HA) protein is a known host-range determinant as it mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors 1 , 2 , 3 . Here we assess the molecular changes in HA that would allow a virus possessing subtype H5 HA to be transmissible among mammals. We identified a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus—comprising H5 HA (from an H5N1 virus) with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus—that was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model. The transmissible H5 reassortant virus preferentially recognized human-type receptors, replicated efficiently in ferrets, caused lung lesions and weight loss, but was not highly pathogenic and did not cause mortality. These results indicate that H5 HA can convert to an HA that supports efficient viral transmission in mammals; however, we do not know whether the four mutations in the H5 HA identified here would render a wholly avian H5N1 virus transmissible. The genetic origin of the remaining seven viral gene segments may also critically contribute to transmissibility in mammals. Nevertheless, as H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and infect humans, receptor-binding variants of H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, including avian–human reassortant viruses as tested here, may emerge. Our findings emphasize the need to prepare for potential pandemics caused by influenza viruses possessing H5 HA, and will help individuals conducting surveillance in regions with circulating H5N1 viruses to recognize key residues that predict the pandemic potential of isolates, which will inform the development, production and distribution of effective countermeasures.

•Microorganisms have been use as weapons since pre-historic times.•Biowarfare is the intentional use of biological agents as weapons in war scenarios.•Bioterrorism is the intentional use of biological agents against a civilian population.•Biocrime is the intentional use of biological agents against a specific individual.•Microbial forensics can be applied to solve cases of BW, BT, and BC. Microbial Forensics is a field that continues to grow in interest and application among the forensic community. This review, divided into two sections, covers several topics associated with this new field. The first section presents a historic overview concerning the use of microorganisms (or its product, i.e. toxins) as harmful biological agents in the context of biological warfare (biowarfare), bioterrorism, and biocrime. Each case is illustrated with the examination of case reports that span from prehistory to the present day. The second part of the manuscript is devoted to the role of MF and highlights the necessity to prepare for the pressing threat of the harmful use of biological agents as weapons. Preventative actions, developments within the field to ensure a timely and effective response and are discussed herein.

Without clarity if an outbreak is natural, accidental, or deliberate, infectious disease outbreaks of unknown or ambiguous origin can lead to speculation of a purposeful biological attack. Outbreaks in conflict settings are particularly prone to suspicions and allegations. In an increasingly confrontative global geopolitical landscape and with active information manipulation, outbreaks of ambiguous origin are likely to increase concerns of the deliberate use of biological agents. The United Nations General Assembly has agreed on and the United Nations Security Council has endorsed a mechanism to investigate allegations of deliberate use titled the United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons. A recent full-scale field exercise evaluated the deployment readiness of the mechanism and found it is well placed to investigate suspicious disease outbreaks, with room for continual improvement.

L, the world's greatest detective, has twenty-three days to live--and twenty-two days to save humanity from bioterrorists who hope to change the world forever.

With advances in science and technology, biotechnology is becoming more accessible to people of all demographics. These advances inevitably hold the promise to improve personal and population well-being and welfare substantially. It is paradoxical that while greater access to biotechnology on a population level has many advantages, it may also increase the likelihood and frequency of biodisasters due to accidental or malicious use. Similar to \"Disease X\" (describing unknown naturally emerging pathogenic diseases with a pandemic potential), we term this unknown risk from biotechnologies \"Biodisaster X.\" To date, no studies have examined the potential role of information technologies in preventing and mitigating Biodisaster X. This study aimed to explore (1) what Biodisaster X might entail and (2) solutions that use artificial intelligence (AI) and emerging 6G technologies to help monitor and manage Biodisaster X threats. A review of the literature on applying AI and 6G technologies for monitoring and managing biodisasters was conducted on PubMed, using articles published from database inception through to November 16, 2020. Our findings show that Biodisaster X has the potential to upend lives and livelihoods and destroy economies, essentially posing a looming risk for civilizations worldwide. To shed light on Biodisaster X threats, we detailed effective AI and 6G-enabled strategies, ranging from natural language processing to deep learning-based image analysis to address issues ranging from early Biodisaster X detection (eg, identification of suspicious behaviors), remote design and development of pharmaceuticals (eg, treatment development), and public health interventions (eg, reactive shelter-at-home mandate enforcement), as well as disaster recovery (eg, sentiment analysis of social media posts to shed light on the public's feelings and readiness for recovery building). Biodisaster X is a looming but avoidable catastrophe. Considering the potential human and economic consequences Biodisaster X could cause, actions that can effectively monitor and manage Biodisaster X threats must be taken promptly and proactively. Rather than solely depending on overstretched professional attention of health experts and government officials, it is perhaps more cost-effective and practical to deploy technology-based solutions to prevent and control Biodisaster X threats. This study discusses what Biodisaster X could entail and emphasizes the importance of monitoring and managing Biodisaster X threats by AI techniques and 6G technologies. Future studies could explore how the convergence of AI and 6G systems may further advance the preparedness for high-impact, less likely events beyond Biodisaster X.