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Early crime fiction is usually linked to the true crime stories that developed into The Newgate Calendar by the mid-eighteenth century, but there were late medieval and early modern narratives in popular poetry that described and even celebrated actions by free peasants against the authorities of the church and the then somewhat fragmentary state. Four domains of such narratives – seen here as the ancestors of the crime novel – are described and explored. They are: Robin Hood ballads, focusing on the early major texts, `Robin Hood and the Monk’, `Robin Hood and the Potter’, `Robin Hood and Guy of Gisborne’ and The Gest of Robin Hood. Popular ballads recording family crimes, `The Twa Sisters’, `The Cruel Brother’, `Edward’, or ‘Lord Randal’ or presenting conflicts with the supernatural: `Lady Isabel and the Elf-Knight’ and `Gil Brenton’. Anglo-Scottish border ballads of politico-military conflict, `Johnie Armstrong’ and `Tam Lin’. Early modern verse narratives usually called `King and Subject Narratives’, where a free peasant directly challenges the anonymous monarch and finally meets him, awkwardly, at court: `King Edward IV and the Tanner’, `John the Reeve’ and `King Edward and the Shepherd’, with its intriguingly open ending. Across these little known rich popular narratives are transcribed the patterns of early and politically-resistant crime fiction.

Context/objective: The border conflict between Peru and Ecuador (1910) over the definition of their frontiers fueled the Peruvian nationalism that emerged in the nineteenth century. The trigger was a series of clashes at the Consulate and the Legate’s Office of Peru in Ecuador between March and May 1910. In the following pages, we will analyze the role of local and regional political bodies (prefectura and subprefecturas of the Andean region of Ayacucho) in the exaltation of nationalism used to collect resources and the “blood contingent” for the war. Methodology: We use discourse and documentary analysis of telegrams and memos sent from and to the prefectura and subprefecturas of Ayacucho. Originality: The role played by local authorities in constructing Peruvian nationalism has not been sufficiently addressed; however, it is of great importance since it allows us to understand the homogenizing effort of the nascent State and its multiple contradictions. Conclusions: We will note how the nationalism imposed by regional and local governments was accepted in theory. However, it was pretty diminished among citizens of all social sectors when it was needed to swell the troops.   Contexto/objetivo: El conflicto limítrofe entre Perú y Ecuador (1910) por la definición de sus fronteras avivó el emergente nacionalismo decimonónico peruano. Su detonante fue una serie de altercados ocurridos en el Consulado y la Legación de Perú en Ecuador entre los meses de marzo y mayo de 1910. En las siguientes páginas, analizaremos el papel de los organismos de política local y regional (la prefectura y las subprefecturas de la región serrana de Ayacucho) en la exaltación del nacionalismo utilizado en la recaudación de recursos y del “contingente de sangre” para la guerra. Metodología: Nos valdremos del análisis del discurso y del análisis documental de telegramas y circulares enviados desde y hacia la prefectura y las subprefecturas ayacuchanas. Originalidad: El papel desempeñado por las autoridades locales en la construcción del nacionalismo peruano no ha sido suficientemente abordado; sin embargo, reviste gran importancia ya que permite comprender el esfuerzo homogeneizador del incipiente Estado y sus múltiples contradicciones. Conclusiones: Constataremos cómo el nacionalismo impuesto por los gobiernos regionales y locales era aceptado de manera teórica, aunque se veía bastante menguado en los ciudadanos de todos los sectores sociales cuando había de servir para engrosar las tropas. Contexto/objetivo: o conflito fronteiriço entre o Peru e o Equador (1910) sobre a definição de suas fronteiras alimentou o surgimento do nacionalismo peruano do século 19. Ela foi desencadeada por uma série de altercações que ocorreram no Consulado e na Legação do Peru no Equador entre março e maio de 1910. Nas páginas a seguir, analisamos o papel dos órgãos políticos locais e regionais (a prefeitura e as subprefeituras da região montanhosa de Ayacucho) na exaltação do nacionalismo usado para angariar recursos e o “contingente de sangue” para a guerra. Metodologia: usamos análise de discurso e análise documental de telegramas e circulares enviados de e para a prefeitura e para as subprefeituras de Ayacucho. Originalidade: o papel desempenhado pelas autoridades locais na construção do nacionalismo peruano não foi suficientemente abordado; no entanto, ele é de grande importância, pois nos permite entender o esforço de homogeneização do Estado incipiente e suas múltiplas contradições. Conclusões: o nacionalismo imposto pelos governos regionais e locais foi aceito em teoria, embora tenha sido bastante enfraquecido nos cidadãos de todos os setores sociais quando teve de ser usado para aumentar as tropas.

A series of studies has shown that civil wars are caused not only by factors inside countries, but also by effects operating across state borders. Whereas a first wave of quantitative studies demonstrated that such effects make the “closed-polity” assumption untenable, more recently researchers have identified particular causal mechanisms driving conflict. Despite these recent advances, a central puzzle remains unresolved, namely why ethnic groups that at least in theory could count on support from large transborder ethnic kin (TEK) groups often have remained surprisingly peaceful, such as the stranded Russian populations in the “near abroad.” We propose a theoretical framework that extends the analysis from the primary dyad between the incumbent and the challenger group by adding a secondary dyad that pits the incumbent against the TEK group. We postulate a curvilinear effect of the TEK group's relative size on conflict onset. Using a new data set on transnational ethnic links, we find that that the risk of conflict increases within the middle range of the size spectrum, consistent with our main hypothesis. This means that large TEK groups have a conflict-dampening effect, provided that they control their own state. Excluded TEK groups, however, are not associated with lower conflict probabilities.

We argue that new international borders are rarely new. We propose that when states choose new borders they use previous administrative frontiers to solve a difficult short-term bargaining problem and a long-term coordination problem. With a unique new set of data collected specifically for this project, we systematically examine the new international borders of the twentieth century resulting from secession, partition, and the use of force. New international borders, we find, are drawn not according to principles of “nationalism” or defensible borders, but rather according to previous administrative frontiers. How borders are drawn has important consequences for international stability: borders drawn along previously existing internal or external administrative frontiers experience fewer future territorial disputes and have a much lower risk of militarized confrontation if a dispute emerges.

Domestic strife and civil war frequently produce large population dislocations and refugee flows across national boundaries. Mass refugee flows often entail negative consequences for receiving states, particularly in developing countries. Moreover, civil violence frequently extends across national boundaries as \"internal\" conflicts are not constrained by borders. This article argues that refugee flows between states significantly increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in that dyad. Refugee-receiving states are more likely to initiate MIDs as they intervene to prevent further externalities, and refugee-sending states initiate MIDs as they violate borders in pursuit of dissidents. Moreover, this research challenges conventional theories of international conflict that focus exclusively on distributional bargains between states. These propositions are tested in a quantitative analysis of the relationship between refugees and MID initiation, 1955-2000. Results confirm that refugees significantly increase the probability of international conflict.

Our article analyzes the impact of the European Union (EU) on border conflicts, in particular how integration and association are related to conflict transformation. We approach this issue from a theoretically as well as empirically grounded constructivist perspective. On this basis we propose a stage model of conflict development, based on the degree of securitization and societal reach of conflict communication. We argue that the EU can transform border conflicts and propose a four pathway-model of EU impact. This model comprises forms of EU impact that are, on the one hand, either actor-driven or indirectly caused by the integration process and have, on the other hand, as their main target either particular policies or the wider society in border conflict areas. We then apply this model to a comparative study of border conflicts, thereby analyzing the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Greece-Turkey, Cyprus, Europe's North (EU-Russia) and Israel-Palestine. We finish with a specification of the conditions of positive and negative EU impact.We are grateful to Gesa Bluhm, Olga Demetriou, Katy Hayward, Pertti Joenniemi, Kemal Kirisci, Yosef Lapid, Andrey Makarychev, David Newman, David Officer, Michelle Pace, Sergei Prozorov, Bahar Rumelili, Myria Vassiliadou, Jevgenia Viktorova, Tobias Werron, Antje Wiener, Haim Yacobi, and the reviewers and editors of this journal for their stimulating inputs, criticism, and support in the preparation of this article. Audiences at the Universities of Bielefeld, Hannover, and Osnabrück, Bilkent University (Ankara), the Viessmann Centre at Wilfrid Laurier University (Waterloo, Canada) and the copanelists at the BISA conferences 2002 and 2003, the ISA/CEEISA conference 2003, the ISA Annual Convention 2004, the ECPR Joint Session of Workshops 2004, and the ECPR SGIR Meeting 2004 have helped to shape and refine the arguments presented. We also thank Apostolos Agnantopoulos for his editorial assistance. This article builds on a research project on “The EU and Border Conflicts: The Impact of Integration and Association” (EUBorderConf), funded by a grant from the European Union's Fifth Framework Programme (SERD-2002-00144), with additional funding by the British Academy. See also 〈http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk〉 for further information.

The collapse of Mobutu's Zaire and the arrival of father and son Kabila regimes in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter, the DRC) were hastened by the dramatic and tumultuous spread of violence from neighboring Rwanda. Mobutu's state's inability to manage the influx of Hutu refugees (with Interahamwe militia members interspersed) into the Kivu province of eastern Zaire from Rwanda's bloody genocide of 1994 or to compensate for the ratcheting up of their cross-border skirmishes with the Banyamulenge (Zairean Tutsi) population in 1996, exacerbated extant tensions and has since resulted in more than a dozen years of civil war. This example prompts us to ask: are countries with higher levels of state capacity better able to resist the spread of violence from neighboring territories into their own? The author argues that when falsely divided notions of spatial heterogeneity and dependence are interacted, contagion from neighboring conflicts becomes a risk of diminishing value for increasingly capable states. A model of civil war contagion affirms a conditional hypothesis, showing that state capacity modifies the likelihood that a state will become infected by a civil conflict occurring in neighboring territories.

The migrations of 2015 have led to a temporary destabilization of the European border and migration regime. In this contribution, we trace the process of destabilization to its various origins, which we locate around the year 2011, and offer a preliminary assessment of the attempts at re-stabilization. We employ the notion of “border (as) conflict” to emphasize that crisis and exception lies at the very core of the European border and migration regime and its four main dimensions of externalization, techno-scientific borders, an internal mobility regime for asylum seekers, and humanitarization.

The spread, diffusion, spillover, or contagion of violent civil conflict – including insurgencies, coups, or other internal armed conflict – across international borders is of great concern to civil war scholars and international security policymakers alike. For instance, great power military interventions are often predicated in part on the belief that if a given conflict is not stopped now, it may spread and destabilize an entire region. Nevertheless, our understanding of this phenomenon of 'substate conflict contagion' is hindered by the lack of a comprehensive and accurate universe of cases. In this article I introduce an original dataset of cases and non-cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007. The key difference between my dataset and other datasets of this phenomenon is that I require in my definition of contagion not only the spatial and temporal proximity of two conflicts, but also a documented causal link between them. After introducing the dataset and the process by which it was constructed, I show that substate conflict contagion by my definition is significantly less common than previous scholarship and policymaker rhetoric suggest, and that its correlates – and potentially the best methods with which to measure those correlates – are different from prior research as well. Policy implications are considered, and applications of this dataset for future conflict research are explored.

Despite the improving accuracy of agent-based expert systems, human expert users aided by these systems have not improved their accuracy. Self-affirmation theory suggests that human expert users could be experiencing threat, causing them to act defensively and ignore the system's conflicting recommendations. Previous research has demonstrated that affirming an individual in an unrelated area reduces defensiveness and increases objectivity to conflicting information. Using an affirmation manipulation prior to a credibility assessment task, this study investigated if experts are threatened by counterattitudinal expert system recommendations. For our study, 178 credibility assessment experts from the American Polygraph Association (n = 134) and the European Union's border security agency Frontex (n = 44) interacted with a deception detection expert system to make a deception judgment that was immediately contradicted. Reducing the threat prior to making their judgments did not improve accuracy, but did improve objectivity toward the system. This study demonstrates that human experts are threatened by advanced expert systems that contradict their expertise. As more and more systems increase integration of artificial intelligence and inadvertently assail the expertise and abilities of users, threat and self-evaluative concerns will become an impediment to technology acceptance.