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The Trump presidency generated concern about democratic backsliding and renewed interest in measuring the national democratic performance of the United States. However, the US has a decentralized form of federalism that administers democratic institutions at the state level. Using 51 indicators of electoral democracy from 2000 to 2018, I develop a measure of subnational democratic performance, the State Democracy Index. I then test theories of democratic expansion and backsliding based in party competition, polarization, demographic change, and the group interests of national party coalitions. Difference-in-differences results suggest a minimal role for all factors except Republican control of state government, which dramatically reduces states’ democratic performance during this period. This result calls into question theories focused on changes within states. The racial, geographic, and economic incentives of groups in national party coalitions may instead determine the health of democracy in the states.

It is a familiar mantra of American politics that the best response to dangerous speech that incites violence and spreads hate is ‘more speech’. Yet the principle obscures at least three crucial questions. Who, in particular, is to undertake the counter-speech that the doctrine recommends? What, exactly, are they required to do? And why is it morally justified to demand that they do it? This article argues that if citizens are to rely on counter-speech to defuse the dangers of dangerous expression, it is not enough to cheerlead its abstract importance and then sit back and hope for the best. Someone needs to do the work, and do it well. The article defends the thesis that all citizens have a moral duty to engage in counter-speech against dangerous expression. Focusing on counter-speech against expression that implicitly or explicitly advocates wrongful criminal violence, it argues that these duties can be derived from a much more basic normative source: the samaritan obligation, held by all moral agents, to rescue others from risks of harm. The specification of these duties' content, however, depends upon interdisciplinary work that integrates normative theory with social scientific research on human communication.

Guided by public health interests, the European Medicines Agency has set new standards for clinical trial data transparency by adopting a 2010 policy on access to documents and a 2014 policy on publication of clinical data for medicinal products for human use. Transparency, whether in politics, finance, or science, is a fundamental value of our society. In health care, decisions about medicines made by governments, regulators, and clinicians are, whenever possible, based on clinical trial results. We believe that patients have a right to know about the scientific basis for the approval and use of their medicines and that transparency of clinical trial data is therefore essential. Over the past 4 years, we at the European Medicines Agency (EMA) have set new standards for clinical trial data transparency by adopting two landmark policies. A 2010 policy on access to documents 1 and a . . .

In the face of measles outbreaks, New York City mandated vaccination in four Brooklyn ZIP Codes, raising legal, ethical, and practical concerns. Law shifts culture best through incremental change, and force does not educate, develop trust, or protect human dignity.

Louis D. Brandeis is a figure of perennial significance in American history. Brilliant lawyer, innovative reformer, seminal thinker, and judicial giant, he left few significant issues in American society untouched during the course of his long and productive career. The last several decades have been particularly rich in Brandeis historiography, creating the need for a work surveying current scholarship and addressing critical issues.Brandeis and Americamore than meets this need. Six distinguished Brandeis scholars -- David J. Danelski, Nelson L. Dawson, Allon Gal, David W. Levy, Philippa Strum, and Melvin I. Urofsky -- offer richly analytical essays illuminating key aspects of Brandeis's impact on American life: his relationship to the Progressive movement, his involvement in Zionism, his role as a New Deal advisor, and his significance in constitutional law. In addition, the book contains a comprehensive survey of Brandeis historiography, a reference chronology of his life, and an exploration of the deeply controversial issue of judicial propriety. It should prove a powerful stimulus to future Brandeis research. These essays not only contribute to an understanding of Brandeis himself but also cast light on vital political, social, and economic issues in twentieth-century America, issues that are sure to be with us well into the next century.

The birth of mandatory corporate disclosure is one of the defining narratives of the modern regulatory state. The brightest legal minds of their generation were called down from the ivory tower to help FDR rein in the excesses of Wall Street. Inspired by their intellectual mentor Louis Brandeis, they overcame fierce resistance from the securities industry (who opposed any regulation) as well as from the corporatist wing of New Deal reformers (who favored a broader economic planning role for the government) to craft a legislative solution that was so well-conceived that it has remained in place essentially unchanged for nearly a century--the Securities Act of 1933.

INTRODUCTION The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act1 and the Clayton Act2 supplemented the Sherman Act.3 The FTC Act added a new enforcer and a new prohibition-on \"unfair methods of competition\" (the UMC prohibition).4 Members of Congress appreciated that the Constitution did not permit the delegation of legislative power to a commission5 and acted on the belief that the indefinite UMC prohibition would pass constitutional muster and usefully guide both the FTC and the courts. The Suprème Court's adoption of a rule of reason was condemned for judicial activism and for robbing the Sherman Act of certainty and potency.13 Corrective legislation was introduced within days.14 Senator Robert M. La Follette (R-Wis.) recruited Louis D. Brandeis to draft legislation establishing a rebuttable presumption of unreasonableness for certain practices.15 Senator Francis G. Newlands (D-Nev.) proposed creation of an \"administrative tribunal like the Interstate Commerce Commission, charged with powers over interstate trade. \"31 Incumbent William Howard Taft unsuccessfully defended the status quo.32 The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce completed the inquiry pursuant to Resolution 98 with a February 1913 report by Senator Albert B. Cummins (R-Iowa).33 The \"Cummins report\" found it \"inconceivable that in a country governed by a written Constitution and statute law the courts can be permitted to test each restraint of trade by the economic Standard which the individual members of the court may happen to approve. In Rublee's telling decades later, Brandeis surprisingly lent his support at the meeting, and Wilson was sold.49 Rublee later wrote that he had used the term \"unfair competition\" in craft-ing a new prohibition because he thought it had \"a recognized meaning in the terminology of anti-trust law,\" in that it had been used in several bills along the lines of the Clayton Act and in \"various decrees\" in Sherman Act cases.50 Rublee also noted that the Suprème Court had described Standard Oil's \"local price cutting at the points where necessary to suppress competition\" as one of

In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis began a storied legal tradition of trying to conceptualize privacy. Since that time, privacy's appeal has grown beyond those authors' wildest expectations, but its essence remains elusive. One of the rare points of agreement in boisterous academic privacy debates is that there is no consensus on what privacy means. The modern trend is to embrace the ambiguity. Unable to settle on boundaries, scholars welcome a broad array of interests into an expanding theoretical framework. As a result, privacy is invoked in debates about COVID-19 contact tracing, police body cameras, marriage equality, facial recognition, access to contraception, loud neighbors, telemarketing calls, and on and on. This \"pluralistic turn\" has made privacy popular, but this popularity comes at a cost. Lacking precision, ubiquitous invocations of privacy tend to cloud rather than clarify, raising the temperature of academic and policy debates while generating little light. This Article proposes a baseline definition of \"privacy\" to anchor legal discourse. The definition responds to privacy skeptics by identifying a core of pure privacy that can and should be protected. But it also pushes back on privacy pluralists by insisting on the need for precision. In a post-pandemic world, policymakers face powerful temptations to override longstanding privacy protections and countervailing pressures to abandon lifesaving policies in the face of vigorous privacy objections. Precisely identifying what is at stake in these debates can help to clarify the difficult choices that will shape the future.

Now that glitch-free U.S. health insurance exchanges are presenting consumers with robust sets of health insurance choices, it's time to redesign exchange websites so as to maximize the chances that consumers will choose plans best suited to their needs and preferences. In October 2013, the Affordable Care Act introduced a new insurance market — state and federal exchanges where people can purchase health insurance for themselves or their families. Although the rollout of the exchanges was disastrous, around-the-clock efforts fixed many of the biggest technical problems, and nearly 7 million people purchased insurance in the new market. The second round of enrollment exposed some new problems with the exchange websites — for example, Colorado's website had difficulty determining whether people were eligible for tax credits — but these problems paled in comparison with those encountered when the exchanges were first rolled . . .