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Dedicated to Commemorate the 75th Years of India’s Independence. Editorial for a Special Issue on Indian logic
This special issue on Indian logic consists of nine research papers dealing with different aspects of Indian logic by nine distinguished authors. It is divided into three sections, such as Nyāya logic, Buddhist logic and Jaina logic. The papers deal with the issue of inference and allied concepts from both historical and conceptual considerations. Indian logic followed linguistic model and thereby in India it gives the foundation of epistemology and the development of philosophy of language.
Journal Article
On Verbal Cognition: Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s Treatment of vivakṣā
Jinendrabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are those who, while putting the ‘intention of the speaker’ (
) at the core of their analysis of verbal communication, opt for a formal and technical treatment of the topic. In order to prove through coherent arguments that
is inference and therefore to support Dignāga’s reduction of the valid means of correct knowledge, they all identify
with the property-possessor (
) or probandum (
), and
(‘word’) with the logical mark (
) or probans (
). They do so to counteract the criticisms of the opponents (Kumārila first of all). Nevertheless, while Jinendrabuddhi, following Dharmakīrti, recognizes the sheer pragmatic value of verbal cognition, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to follow Dignāga more closely and also recognize its epistemic value. The purpose of this article is precisely to describe the essential points of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, and show their most original aspects.
Journal Article
Dharmakīrtian Inference
Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception.
Journal Article
Contradiction, Negation, and the Catuṣkoṭi: Just Several Passages from Dharmapāla’s Commentary on Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka
Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the catuṣkoṭi via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and prasajya-pratiṣedha is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using prasajya-pratiṣedha or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative catuṣkoṭi, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the catuṣkoṭi are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the catuṣkoṭi is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions.
Journal Article
Jayasena's Proof of the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna Scriptures
We can find some of the works of Indian Buddhist philosophers that prove the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras within Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese textual sources. *Jayasena's critique of *Asvabhāva's proof was first introduced in the commentaries of Kuiji. Numerous references to *Jayasena in Chinese Yogācāra scriptures indicate that he was regarded as a Yogācāra master. His revised proof was further revised by Xuanzang. According to Xuanzang's biographies, *Jayasena was an Indian lay Buddhist scholar who had many non-Buddhist disciples. It is, therefore, possible that he discussed the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras with his disciples. Following Kuiji's introduction of *Jayasena's proof in East Asia, this proof and Xuanzang's critique have been widely discussed. Wonhyo, one of the most famous Silla Buddhist scholars, critiqued Xuanzang's revision and published his revised formula. Zenju, a representative Yogācāra master of the Nara period, pointed out some logical problems to be seen in Wonhyo's revision, but did not provide any alternative. Proof of the authenticity of the Mahāyāna sutras was originally developed as a result of interactions between Mahāyāna and non-Mahāyāna Buddhists. However, the purpose of the proof seems to have shifted from being based on arguments with actual opponents to internal discussions among Mahāyāna Buddhists, especially within East Asia.
Journal Article
Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and His Successors on the Classification of Arguments by Consequence (thal 'gyur) Based on the Type of the Logical Reason
The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence (thal 'gyurlthal ba). Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa's classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa's classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the 'apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]' ('gal ba dmigs pa) and among them the specific case of the 'apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]' ('gal ba'i rgyu dmigs pa). The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa's classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge (?-after 1195) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150-1210). Turning to Phya pa's effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa's rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Samdhinirṃocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant (at times divergent) versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification.
Journal Article
Once Again on the \Hetucakraḍamaru\: Rotating the Wheels
The little versified treatise on the elements of Buddhist logic, often referred to as the Hetucakraḍamaru, is usually attributed to Dignāga. It is only available in a Tibetan translation and quotations from a few of its verses are extant in Sanskrit sources. On the basis of a novel interpretation that is based on a critical edition of the text, we argue that there is a good reason why its title was Hetucakraḍlamaru - a ḍamant is a two-headed drum. The \"heads\" of the drum are circular and they refer to the sapakṣa and vipakṣa conditions of the logical reason (hetu). These \"wheels\" can be turned clock-wise and counter clock-wise. The nine positions that are located on the wheels do remind one of a dharmacakra, which has a center and eight positions that are placed around it as if it were a compass. We illustrate our interpretation of the text by means of various diagrams.
Journal Article
Dharmakīrti on the Cessation of Suffering
Liberation from suffering is an underlying subject in Indian doctrinal and philosophical history. This book is a study of Dharmakīrti's discussion on the topic according to Manorathanandin, the last commentator on the Pramāṇavārttika in the Sanskrit cosmopolis.
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