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Humans possess great capacity for behavioral and cultural change, but our ability to manage change is still limited. This article has two major objectives: first, to sketch a basic science of intentional change centered on evolution; second, to provide examples of intentional behavioral and cultural change from the applied behavioral sciences, which are largely unknown to the basic sciences community. All species have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that enable them to respond adaptively to their environments. Some mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity count as evolutionary processes in their own right. The human capacity for symbolic thought provides an inheritance system having the same kind of combinatorial diversity as does genetic recombination and antibody formation. Taking these propositions seriously allows an integration of major traditions within the basic behavioral sciences, such as behaviorism, social constructivism, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and evolutionary psychology, which are often isolated and even conceptualized as opposed to one another. The applied behavioral sciences include well-validated examples of successfully managing behavioral and cultural change at scales ranging from individuals to small groups to large populations. However, these examples are largely unknown beyond their disciplinary boundaries, for lack of a unifying theoretical framework. Viewed from an evolutionary perspective, they are examples of managing evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity, including open-ended processes of variation and selection. Once the many branches of the basic and applied behavioral sciences become conceptually unified, we are closer to a science of intentional change than one might think.

Much linguistic research has been done on the fictional argot of A Clockwork Orange, known as Nadsat, but few efforts have been made to expand beyond the classification and analysis of Nadsat. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper looks at the overarching discourse of A Clockwork Orange and aims to answer three questions: What exigencies and discourses inform the creation of these works? What techniques and power structures are employed in the construction of these works? How do these works shape or attempt to shape the discourse? To answer these questions, I look at three instances of the discourse: Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange, and Krege’s translation, Clockwork Orange. These instances are varied over time of publication (1962, 1971, 1997), language (English, German), medium (novel, film), and culture (British, American, German), allowing enough variance to examine how the discourse changes to meet the needs of its participants.

Much linguistic research has been done on the fictional argot of A Clockwork Orange, known as Nadsat, but few efforts have been made to expand beyond the classification and analysis of Nadsat. Using Critical Discourse Analysis, this paper looks at the overarching discourse of A Clockwork Orange and aims to answer three questions: What exigencies and discourses inform the creation of these works? What techniques and power structures are employed in the construction of these works? How do these works shape or attempt to shape the discourse? To answer these questions, I look at three instances of the discourse: Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange, and Krege’s translation, Clockwork Orange. These instances are varied over time of publication (1962, 1971, 1997), language (English, German), medium (novel, film), and culture (British, American, German), allowing enough variance to examine how the discourse changes to meet the needs of its participants.

B. F. Skinner's radical behaviorism has been intellectually important, yet its long-term survival is uncertain. This paper examines challenges currently facing radical behaviorism and draws lessons from the historical trajectory of functionalism, a school of thought that became highly influential through its assimilation into mainstream psychology. The discussion examines Skinner's approach in About Behaviorism and explores the role of open intellectual exchange in advancing scientific ideas. The marketplace of ideas is presented as both an opportunity and a challenge, emphasizing the importance of effective communication and engagement beyond the behaviorist community. Ultimately, the paper suggests that the integration of Skinner's best ideas into mainstream psychology could secure their place in the field, even if radical behaviorism as a distinct school may fade, as have other schools of thought.

Functional analysis is a methodology used within the field of Behavioral Analysis to explain, predict, and influence behavior. This is achieved by identifying the functional relationships between behavior, the antecedent stimuli that elicit or evoke behavior, and the consequences of behavior that influence its future occurrence. Within this context, a functional relationship refers to a consistent and observable change in behavior (the “dependent variable”) that results from the systematic manipulation of environmental conditions (the “independent variables”). Functional analyses typically focus on the immediate environmental context, where stimuli functionally related to the behavior are observed. In applied and clinical settings, however, behavior analysts may consider additional variables (e.g., genetic predispositions, social context, learning history) to enhance the accuracy and relevance of their analyses. These variables are usually controlled for or excluded in experimental settings but can play a meaningful role in naturalistic behavior assessment.

Edgar A. Singer Jr. is largely forgotten. Yet in the early twentieth century he was one of the most persistent proponents for a theory of \"mind as behavior.\" This essay explores Singer's theory of mind as a form of experimentally-definable behavior. This interpretation of mind is derived from Singer's \"philosophy of experiment,\" which delimits the forms of questions that can have meaningful answers. Valid questions, according to Singer's theory, must appeal to phenomena that are public in some sense and which have verifiable effects on our \"mechanical images\" of nature (which is not to say that such phenomena are themselves solely mechanical). From this perspective, Singer is able to give behavioral criteria for attributing \"mind\" to organisms and for such \"mental faculties\" as purpose, sensation, consciousness, and thought. It might be wondered how Singer's experimental concept of mind compares with B. F. Skinner's better-known concept of private events. Although there are difficulties involved in the interpretation of each, it would seem that Singer and Skinner are largely in agreement, although they emphasize different factors in the behavioral interpretation of mind.

[...]we evaluate how radical behaviorism could feasibly contribute to a secular humanist agenda, by providing more effective ways for the accomplishment of secular humanist values. [...]we assess the potential of radical behaviorism to participate in contemporary philosophical debates involving themes and topics dear to secular humanists. Rejection of authority was the theme of the revival of learning, when men dedicated themselves to the study of \"nature, not books.\" Among them there is one that forbids any member to argue with their fellows in case of disagreement with any of the rules in Walden Two's code (Skinner, 1948/2005, p. 152). Besides this, the privileges assigned to the board of experts that rules Walden Two may sometimes seem at odds with a plain commitment with free inquiry.

Determinism is considered one of the radical behaviorism assumptions, the philosophy of behavior analysis: \"Determinism has long been a core assumption in many forms of behaviorism, including radical behaviorism\" (Slife, Yanchar & Willians, 1999, p. 75). To have a science of psychology at all, we must adopt the fundamental postulate that human behavior is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free agent-in other words, that it is completely determined, (p. 319) In the first part of the excerpt, Skinner depicted determinism as a necessary condition for doing science. [...]to say that behavior is determined means to say that it is a phenomenon that can be described by laws (lawful datum), from which it also follows that behavior is a regular or ordered fact (see Skinner, 1956/1999a, p. 130). [...]the relations between responses and environmental variables do not always present themselves with the expected regularity; a response may occur without an explicit connection to another event, and the occurrence of an event (stimulus) may not be followed by the usual response. [...]there are deviations or disruptions in these regularities, which appear in the form of spontaneity or whim. In the case of a behavioral science (and not of genetics), the failure to demonstrate the dependency relationship of these \"spontaneous\" events with environmental stimuli would be an occasion for a free agent action, whose assumption would be antithetical to the pursuit of the regularities that underlie the laws of a science (Skinner, 1947/1999c). [...]it is assumed that all instances of responses, typical or not, would have a causal (or functional) dependency relationship with other events (Skinner, 1953/2005). [...]the conceptual presumptions of the Skinnerian formulation of determinism indicate that: 1) determinism is a pre-condition for science, 2) every instance of response is the result of a causal law, and that 3) possible derangements in the ordering of the relations between stimuli and responses in a behavioral science do not amount to the action of a free agent, but the interference of physical causes that need to be identified.

[...]I started to make copies (we did not have digital subscriptions back then) and read everything, no matter the subject, from volume 1 to the last available there. Skinner's most cited books and papers are the theorical ones in which he laid down the philosophical foundations of behavior analysis as well as his efforts to analyze behavioral process (usually via interpretation) beyond the domain of laboratory. [...]I would like to express my gratitude to the past-editor of Behavior and Philosophy, Jose E. Burgos, for helping me during the transition of editorship as well as to Rebekah Pavlik, for her support in all things related to B&P and Sorah Stein for her careful copyediting work.