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This study delves into the Social Economy Business Survey Index (S-BSI), a tool designed to monitor the social and economic value generated within the social economy (SE) to furnish vital insights for timely public policy interventions. The study aims to comprehensively analyze the S-BSI, encompassing its development, distinctive features, and effectiveness as an advanced instrument for policymaking and evaluating the SE policy. The research methodology comprises an in-depth analysis of the S-BSI's development process, followed by multiple comparative analyses of similar surveys on a domestic and international scale. Furthermore, the study utilizes qualitative evaluation techniques grounded in the next-generation public policy framework for the SE sector. This multifaceted research approach aims to offer a holistic understanding of the S-BSI, delivering valuable insights tailored for policymakers and stakeholders engaged in shaping public policies for the SE. Cette étude explore l’Indice des enquêtes de conjoncture en économie sociale, un outil conçu pour évaluer la valeur sociale et économique réalisée dans l’économie sociale afin d’obtenir un savoir qui pourrait s’avérer utile pour mener des interventions opportunes dans les politiques publiques. L’étude a pour but d’effectuer une analyse compréhensive de l’Indice en tenant compte de son développement, de ses caractéristiques distinctives et de son efficacité comme instrument avancé pour formuler et évaluer des politiques en économie sociale. La méthodologie employée comprend une analyse en profondeur du processus de développement de l’Indice, suivie de multiples analyses comparatives d’enquêtes semblables à l’échelle domestique et internationale. En outre, l’étude recourt à des techniques d’évaluation qualitative fondées sur un cadre « prochaine génération » pour formuler des politiques publiques en économie sociale. Cette approche de recherche à multiples facettes vise à inspirer une compréhension holistique de l’Indice, offrant des observations qui pourraient s’avérer utiles pour les décideurs et les bailleurs de fonds responsables de développer les politiques publiques en économie sociale.

The paper identifies the information content at the firm level of qualitative business survey data by examining the consistency between these data and the quantitative data that are provided by the same respondents to the UK's Office for National Statistics in Official surveys. Since the qualitative data are published ahead of the quantitative data the paper then assesses the ability of the qualitative data to predict the firm level quantitative data.

What happens in the developing world when stringent regulations characterizing the investment climate meet weak government willingness or capability to enforce those regulations? How is business actually done? The Doing Business project surveys experts concerning the legally required time and costs of regulatory compliance for various aspects of private enterprise—starting a firm, dealing with construction permits, trading across borders, paying taxes, getting credit, enforcing contracts, and so on—around the world. The World Bank's firm-level Enterprise Surveys around the world ask managers at a wide array of firms about their business, including questions about how long it took to go through various processes like obtaining an operating license or a construction permit, or bringing in imports. This paper compares the results of three broadly comparable indicators from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys. Overall, we find that the estimate of legally required time for firms to complete a certain legal and regulatory process provided by the Doing Business survey does not summarize even modestly well the experience of firms as reported by the Enterprise Surveys. When strict de jure regulation and high rates of taxation meet weak governmental capabilities for implementation and enforcement, we argue that researchers and policymakers should stop thinking about regulations as creating “rules” to be followed, but rather as creating a space in which “deals” of various kinds are possible.

This paper uses survey expectations data to construct empirical proxies for time-varying business-level uncertainty. Access to the micro data from the German IFO Business Climate Survey permits construction of uncertainty measures based on both ex ante disagreement and ex post forecast errors. Ex ante disagreement is strongly correlated with dispersion in ex post forecast errors. Surprise movements in either measure lead to significant reductions in production that abate fairly quickly. We extend our analysis to US data, measuring uncertainty with forecast disagreement from the Business Outlook Survey. Surprise increases in forecast dispersion lead to more persistent reductions in production than in the German data.

The issue of corruption is important to politicians, citizens, and firms. Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have sought to understand the causes and consequences of corruption employing firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and potential false response by the firms. We argue that in politically repressive environments, firms use nonresponse and potential false response as self-protection mechanisms. Corruption is likely understated in such countries. We test our argument using the World Bank enterprise survey data of more than 44,000 firms in 72 countries for the period 2000-2005. We find that firms in countries with less press freedom are more likely to provide nonresponse and false response on the issue of corruption. Therefore ignoring these systematic biases in firms' responses could result in serious underestimation of the severity of corruption in politically repressive countries. More important, these biases are a rich and underutilized source of information on the political constraints faced by the firms. Firm managers can better evaluate levels of corruption, not only by truthful answers to corruption questions, but also by nonresponses and false responses to such questions.

The system of federal economic statistics developed in the 20th century has served the country well, but the current methods for collecting and disseminating these data products are unsustainable. These statistics are heavily reliant on sample surveys. Recently, however, response rates for both household and business surveys have declined, increasing costs and threatening quality. Existing statistical measures, many developed decades ago, may also miss important aspects of our rapidly evolving economy; moreover, they may not be sufficiently accurate, timely, or granular to meet the increasingly complex needs of data users. Meanwhile, the rapid proliferation of online data and more powerful computation make privacy and confidentiality protections more challenging. There is broad agreement on the need to transform government statistical agencies from the 20th century survey-centric model to a 21st century model that blends structured survey data with administrative and unstructured alternative digital data sources. In this essay, I describe some work underway that hints at what 21st century official economic measurement will look like and offer some preliminary comments on what is needed to get there.

High-growth firms (HCF) represent a highly desirable subset of firms, which provide disproportionate economic gains, and greater insight into their determinants which is of interest to policymakers, scholars and business owners. We contribute to the literature on HGFs, which is largely absent of cross-national institutional studies, by examining the institutional conditions driving HGFs in 26 transition countries over a long period comprising three panels between 1998 and 2009. Using an institutional hierarchy approach, we test for the influence of formal and informal institutions on HGF prevalence in countries. Our analysis relies first on a principal component analysis to identify institutional factors. Second, we use GLS estimation to test the influence of these three factors on HGF prevalence in a country, followed by a robustness check. Our results show that interaction effects, rather than direct effects, are useful in explaining systematic variations in HGFs prevalence in transition economies. We find that the interaction between formal and informal institutions positively influences HGFs. Further, we find that in fast-reforming transition economies, more burdensome formal institutions discourage HGFs but in slow-reforming transition economies, informal institutions encourage HGFs.

Do the repayment requirements of the classic microfinance contract inhibit investment in high-return but illiquid business opportunities among the poor? Using a field experiment, we compare the classic contract which requires that repayment begin immediately after loan disbursement to a contract that includes a two-month grace period. The provision of a grace period increased short-run business investment and long-run profits but also default rates. The results, thus, indicate that debt contracts that require early repayment discourage illiquid risky investment and thereby limit the potential impact of microfinance on microenterprise growth and household poverty.

We study status as it pertains to loyalty programs, investigating the impact of the number and size of tiers on consumers’ perceptions of status. We find that increasing the number of elites in the top tier dilutes perceptions of status, while adding a subordinate tier enhances status. Tiers below the second tier do not affect those at the top but can make those in the tier immediately above feel more elite. Given the choice between alternative programs, those who do not qualify for status prefer hierarchies with multiple tiers. Finally, we show that status‐laden labels (gold and silver) on their own signal an increasingly selective hierarchy.