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We explore how optimal information choices change the predictions of strategic models. When a large number of agents play a game with strategic complementarity, information choices exhibit complementarity as well: if an agent wants to do what others do, they want to know what others know. This makes heterogeneous beliefs difficult to sustain and may generate multiple equilibria. In models with substitutability, agents prefer to differentiate their information choices. We use these theoretical results to examine the role of information choice in recent price-setting models and to propose modelling techniques that ensure equilibrium uniqueness.

The purpose of this paper is to prove the existence of a marginal pricing economic equilibrium in presence of increasing returns and externalities in a commodity space general enough as to encompass the vast majority of economic situations. This extends the existing literature on competitive equilibria in vector lattices by incorporating market failures, and it also generalises several non-competitive existence results to a larger class of commodity spaces. The key features are a suitable definition for the marginal pricing rule and an adaptation of the properness condition.

We introduce a model in which agents in a network can trade via bilateral contracts. We find that when continuous transfers are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear, the full substitutability of preferences is sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes for any underlying network structure. Furthermore, the set of stable outcomes is essentially equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria, and all stable outcomes are in the core and are efficient. By contrast, for any domain of preferences strictly larger than that of full substitutability, the existence of stable outcomes and competitive equilibria cannot be guaranteed.

In this paper we study how a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policy should trade off the costs and benefits of public expenditure. We characterize and solve for Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game between successive governments. The characterization consists of an inter-temporal first-order condition (a \"generalized Euler equation\") for the government, and we use it both to gain insight into the nature of the equilibrium and as a basis for computations. For a calibrated economy, we find that when the only tax base available to the government is capital income--an inelastic source of funds at any point in time--the government still refrains from taxing at confiscatory rates. We also find that when the only tax base is labour income the Markov equilibrium features less public expenditure and lower tax rates than the Ramsey equilibrium.

This article considers an N-firm oligopoly with abating and non-abating firms and analyses a dynamic setting in which the environmental regulator sets the tax rate to incentivise firms to undertake emission-reduction actions according to different hypotheses (fixed rule and optimal rule). The behaviour of the public authority sharply affects the firm’s (individual) incentive to move towards the abatement activity over time. This changes the number of (non)abating firms on the market and the corresponding social welfare outcomes. The article eventually shows that the environmental policy may cause oscillations resulting in a coexistence of the two types of firms in the long term and pinpoints the welfare outcomes emerging in the model.

Despite the accumulation of research on indirect reciprocity over the past 30 years and the publication of over 100,000 related papers, there are still many issues to be addressed. Here, we look back on the research that has been done on indirect reciprocity and identify the issues that have been resolved and the ones that remain to be resolved. This manuscript introduces indirect reciprocity in the context of the evolution of cooperation, basic models of social dilemma situations, the path taken in the elaboration of mathematical analysis using evolutionary game theory, the discovery of image scoring norms, and the breakthroughs brought about by the analysis of the evolutionary instability of the norms. Moreover, it presents key results obtained by refining the assessment function, resolving the punishment dilemma, and presenting a complete solution to the social dilemma problem. Finally, it discusses the application of indirect reciprocity in various disciplines.

School choice programs seek to give students the option to choose their school but also close an opportunity gap. To be fair in the assignment of students, it is usually argued that the assignment of students to schools should be stable. This second concern is usually expressed in terms of proportions. As an example, in 1989, the city of White Plains, New York, required each school to have the same proportions of Blacks, Hispanics, and “others,” a term that includes Whites and Asians. Satisfying both these concerns at the same time is difficult. Prior work replaces the proportions by numbers related to the capacity of school, but this assumes each school is operating at full capacity, which is often not the case. In this paper, we treat such proportionality constraints as soft but provide ex post guarantees on how well the constraints are satisfied while preserving stability. The problem of finding stable matches that meet distributional concerns is usually formulated by imposing side constraints whose “right-hand sides” are absolute numbers specified before the preferences or number of agents on the “proposing” side are known. In many cases, it is more natural to express the relevant constraints as proportions. We treat such constraints as soft but provide ex post guarantees on how well the constraints are satisfied while preserving stability. Our technique requires an extension of Scarf’s lemma, which is of independent interest.

In this paper we analyze the role of pollution for industry location and residence choice. We present a new economic geography (NEG) model in which manufacturing generates local pollution (that does not accumulate) and uses two types of labour input: unskilled workers that cannot migrate and work where they live; and high-skilled entrepreneurs that choose where to produce and where to live. Taking on board costless commuting or, in alternative, distance working, entrepreneurs can live in a different location from production. Both types of households enjoy utility from consuming all commodities (locally and imported variants) and suffer from local pollution. The resulting model is of the footloose entrepreneur variant, but involves two dynamic equations: the standard one governing the residential choice of entrepreneurs, and another one governing where production is located. The current paper analyses the discrete time dynamic process defined by a two-dimensional piecewise smooth map. Depending on parameters this map can have possibly coexisting attractors of various types (fixed points, cycles, closed curves as well as chaotic attractors). We analytically obtain stability conditions for the fixed points. Using numerical methods we describe also some global dynamic properties of the considered map. Finally, we propose an economic interpretation of the results concerning local stability analysis and global dynamics.

We consider the bifurcations occurring in a two-dimensional piecewise-linear discontinuous map that describes the dynamics of a cobweb model in which firms rely on a regime-switching expectation rule. In three different partitions of the phase plane, separated by two discontinuity lines, the map is defined by linear functions with the same Jacobian matrix, having two real eigenvalues, one of which is negative and one equal to 0. This leads to asymptotic dynamics that can belong to two or three critical lines. We show that when the basic fixed point is attracting, it may coexist with at most three attracting cycles. We have determined their existence regions, in the two-dimensional parameter plane, bounded by border collision bifurcation curves. At parameter values for which the basic fixed point is repelling, chaotic attractors may exist - either one that is symmetric with respect to the basic fixed point, or, if not symmetric, the symmetric one also exists. The homoclinic bifurcations of repelling cycles leading to the merging of chaotic attractors are commented by using the first return map on a suitable line. Moreover, four different kinds of homoclinic bifurcations of a saddle 2-cycle, leading to divergence of the generic trajectory, are determined.