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Stocks with large increases in call (put) implied volatilities over the previous month tend to have high (low) future returns. Sorting stocks ranked into decile portfolios by past call implied volatilities produces spreads in average returns of approximately 1% per month, and the return differences persist up to six months. The cross section of stock returns also predicts option implied volatilities, with stocks with high past returns tending to have call and put option contracts that exhibit increases in implied volatility over the next month, but with decreasing realized volatility. These predictability patterns are consistent with rational models of informed trading.

Deviations from put-call parity contain information about future stock returns. Using the difference in implied volatility between pairs of call and put options to measure these deviations, we find that stocks with relatively expensive calls outperform stocks with relatively expensive puts by 50 basis points per week. We find both positive abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive calls and negative abnormal performance in stocks with relatively expensive puts, which cannot be explained by short sale constraints. Rebate rates from the stock lending market directly confirm that our findings are not driven by stocks that are hard to borrow. The degree of predictability is larger when option liquidity is high and stock liquidity low, while there is little predictability when the opposite is true. Controlling for size, option prices are more likely to deviate from strict put-call parity when underlying stocks face more information risk. The degree of predictability decreases over the sample period. Our results are consistent with mispricing during the earlier years of the study, with a gradual reduction of the mispricing over time.

State-of-the-art stochastic volatility models generate a \"volatility smirk\" that explains why out-of-the-money index puts have high prices relative to the Black-Scholes benchmark. These models also adequately explain how the volatility smirk moves up and down in response to changes in risk. However, the data indicate that the slope and the level of the smirk fluctuate largely independently. Although single-factor stochastic volatility models can capture the slope of the smirk, they cannot explain such largely independent fluctuations in its level and slope over time. We propose to model these movements using a two-factor stochastic volatility model. Because the factors have distinct correlations with market returns, and because the weights of the factors vary over time, the model generates stochastic correlation between volatility and stock returns. Besides providing more flexible modeling of the time variation in the smirk, the model also provides more flexible modeling of the volatility term structure. Our empirical results indicate that the model improves on the benchmark Heston stochastic volatility model by 24% in-sample and 23% out-of-sample. The better fit results from improvements in the modeling of the term structure dimension as well as the moneyness dimension.

Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders' information advantage.We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm-specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short-term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo-event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.

U.S. exchange-traded stock options are exercisable before expiration. While put options should frequently be exercised early to earn interest, they are not. In this paper, we derive an early exercise decision rule and then examine actual exercise behavior during the period January 1996 through September 2008. We find that more than 3.96 million puts that should have been exercised early remain unexercised, representing over 3.7% of all outstanding puts. We also find that failure to exercise cost put option holders $1.9 billion in forgone interest income and that this interest is systematically captured by market makers and proprietary firms.

Widespread violations of stochastic dominance by 1-month S&P 500 index call options over 1986-2006 imply that a trader can improve expected utility by engaging in a zero-net-cost trade net of transaction costs and bid-ask spread. Although precrash option prices conform to the Black-Scholes-Merton model reasonably well, they are incorrectly priced if the distribution of the index return is estimated from time-series data. Substantial violations by postcrash OTM calls contradict the notion that the problem lies primarily with the left-hand tail of the index return distribution and that the smile is too steep. The decrease in violations over the postcrash period of 1988-1995 is followed by a substantial increase over 1997-2006, which may be due to the lower quality of the data but, in any case, does not provide evidence that the options market is becoming more rational over time.

This paper examines expected option returns in the context of mainstream asset-pricing theory. Under mild assumptions, expected call returns exceed those of the underlying security and increase with the strike price. Likewise, expected put returns are below the risk-free rate and increase with the strike price. S&P index option returns consistently exhibit these characteristics. Under stronger assumptions, expected option returns vary linearly with option betas. However, zero-beta, at-the-money straddle positions produce average losses of approximately three percent per week. This suggests that some additional factor, such as systematic stochastic volatility, is priced in option returns.

We examine call option rights as a contractual clause in international joint ventures (IJVs) and propose that the assignment of the call option right in an IJV is determined by certain ex ante asymmetries between the partners. Results show that between the two partners in an IJV, the firm with greater complementarity with the venture and greater prior IJV experience is more likely to hold the call option right; in addition, the firm's contractual choice on the call option right and its ownership choice on a greater initial equity stake are substitutive. Our focus on explicit call options advances the real options theory of collaborative agreements, and our results also highlight that option rights be considered an important part of alliance design.

American options on the S&P 500 index futures that violate the stochastic dominance bounds of Constantinides and Perrakis (2009) from 1983 to 2006 are identified as potentially profitable trades. Call bid prices more frequently violate their upper bound than put bid prices do, while violations of the lower bounds by ask prices are infrequent. In out-of-sample tests of stochastic dominance, the writing of options that violate the upper bound increases the expected utility of any risk-averse investor holding the market and cash, net of transaction costs and bid-ask spreads. The results are economically significant and robust.

In this paper, we use call option prices to identify synergies and news from merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction announcements. We find that M&A announcements result in large and approximately equal gains to the bidder and the target on average, with the combined gains being large enough to justify the premium paid to target shareholders. On average, M&A announcements release good news about targets, but bad news about bidders. This suggests that market prices understate true synergy gains, and helps reconcile the generally negative market-based evidence on value-creation in takeovers with their continued prominence in everyday business strategy.