Explore the vast range of titles available.

Background: Despite the apparent importance of global catastrophe risks (GCRs), human society has invested relatively little to reduce them. One possible reason is that we do not understand the significance of reducing GCRs, especially when measured in the monetary terms that we typically use to make decisions. Consequently, we cannot compare them to other issues that influence our decision making and well-being. Purpose: In this study, we quantified the benefits of reducing all non-natural GCRs to highlight their importance. Method: We used a probabilistic model for simulation. Due to limited information, we introduced concepts and assumptions to aid the calculations, such as steady-state economics and sensitivity analyses. In addition, we converted expert opinions to help us focus on a narrower range of risk levels. Results: Within a considerably plausible range of the GCR, we found the following: 1. The benefits of halving the overall non-natural GCR over the next 100 years are substantial. 2. The expected human survival years are sensitive to the mitigation effort but robust to the horizon length. 3. The higher the population growth rate, the larger the expected life years saved. 4. The expected monetary benefits are positively related to the GWP per capita growth rate, mitigation period, and magnitude of natural GCRs but are negatively related to the discounting rate. Significance: The human species is actually facing multiple GCRs simultaneously. In the literature, there is still a gap in quantifying the benefits of reducing all non-natural GCRs/ERs in the coming century while accounting for the very long run on a million-year scale. This article fills such a gap, and the results may serve as a reference for global policymaking to handle this global public issue.

Suppose that a decision-maker’s aim, under certainty, is to maximize some continuous value, such as lifetime income or continuous social welfare. Can such a decision-maker rationally satisfy what has been called ‘continuity for easy cases’ while at the same time satisfying what seems to be a widespread intuition against the full-blown continuity axiom of expected utility theory? In this note I argue that the answer is ‘no’: given transitivity and a weak trade-off principle, continuity for easy cases violates the anti-continuity intuition. I end the note by exploring an even weaker continuity condition that is consistent with the aforementioned intuition.

This report addresses the large flood exposures of Central Europe and proposes efficient financial and risk transfer mechanisms to mitigate fiscal losses from natural catastrophes. In particular, the Visegrad countries (V-4) of Central Europe, namely, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and the Slovak Republic, have such tremendous potential flood damages that reliance on budgetary appropriations or even European Union (EU) funds in such circumstances becomes ineffective and does not provide needed cash funds for the quick response and recovery needed to minimize economic disruptions. The report is primarily addressed to the governments of the region, which should build into their fiscal planning the necessary contingent funding mechanisms, based on their exposures. The report is addressed to finance ministries and also to the insurance and securities regulators and the private insurance and capital markets, which may all play a role in the proposed mechanisms. An arrangement using a multi-country pool with a hazard-triggered insurance payout mechanism complemented by contingent financing is proposed, to better manage these risks and avoid major fiscal volatility and disruption.

The paper develops a conceptual framework for the analysis and management of catastrophic risk. The framework serves to assess rare extreme events in systematic, quantitative and consistent ways. It dispenses with probabilistic extreme value theory, concentrating on descriptive statistics and simple probability distributions. Risk assessment is based on a recently developed axiomatic approach to non-expected utility preferences defined on the set of risky alternative courses of action available to an agent. The utility values of catastrophic risks are given an explicit algebraic representation, which shows them to be highly unstable (“elastic”) in the sense that they respond disproportionately to small perturbations of the decision outcomes and their probabilities. Various elasticity coefficients are defined for the outcome variables and utility preferences attached to them. They indicate whether a variable possibly takes on large negative values. The coefficients can also be defined as sample statistics and, thus, computed from observed data. The approach admits various applications to practical problems of disaster risk management. The applications include estimations of the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of risk management, the specification of limits of acceptance of catastrophic risk for regulatory purposes, and safety and security systems design and dimensioning.

Global catastrophes such as a supervolcanic eruption, asteroid impact, or nuclear winter could cause global agricultural collapse due to reduced sunlight reaching the Earth’s surface. The human civilization’s food production system is unprepared to respond to such events, but methane single cell protein (SCP) could be a key part of the solution. Current preparedness centers around food stockpiling, an excessively expensive solution given that an abrupt sunlight reduction scenario (ASRS) could hamper conventional agriculture for 5–10 years. Instead, it is more cost-effective to consider resilient food production techniques requiring little to no sunlight. This study analyses the potential of SCP produced from methane (natural gas and biogas) as a resilient food source for global catastrophic food shocks from ASRS. The following are quantified: global production potential of methane SCP, capital costs, material and energy requirements, ramp-up rates, and retail prices. In addition, potential bottlenecks for fast deployment are considered. While providing a more valuable, protein-rich product than its alternatives, the production capacity could be slower to ramp up. Based on 24/7 construction of facilities, 7%–11% of the global protein requirements could be fulfilled at the end of the first year. Despite significant remaining uncertainties, methane SCP shows significant potential to prevent global protein starvation during an ASRS at an affordable price—US$3–5/kg dry.

Modern civilization relies on a complex, globally interconnected industrial agriculture system to produce food. Its unprecedented yields hinge on external inputs like machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides, rendering it vulnerable to disruptions in production and international trade. Such a disruption could be caused by large‐scale damage to the electrical grid. Solar storms, nuclear detonations in the upper atmosphere, pandemics, or cyber‐attacks, could cause this severe damage to electrical infrastructure. To assess the impact of such a global catastrophic infrastructure loss on major food crops (corn, rice, soybean, wheat), we employ a generalized linear model. The predictions show a crop‐specific yield reduction between 15% and 37% in phase 1, the year after the catastrophe, assuming rationed use of fertilizers, pesticides, and fuel stocks. In phase 2, when all stocks are depleted, yields decrease by 35%–48%. Soybean is less affected in phase 1, while all crops experience strong declines in phase 2. Europe, North and South America, and parts of India, China, and Indonesia face major yield reductions, potentially up to 75%, while most African countries are less affected. These findings underscore the necessity for preparation by highlighting the vulnerability of the food system. Modern farming, dependent on machinery, fertilizer and pesticides, is at risk from electrical grid disruptions due to various catastrophes. Yields may drop 15%–37% in the first year and 35%–48% after industrial inputs run out, varying by crop. Europe, the Americas, and parts of Asia can see up to 75% yield reductions. Preparation is crucial.

When attempting to quantify future harms caused by carbon emissions and to set appropriate energy policies, it has been argued that the most important metric is the number of human deaths caused by climate change. Several studies have attempted to overcome the uncertainties associated with such forecasting. In this article, approaches to estimating future human death tolls from climate change relevant at any scale or location are compared and synthesized, and implications for energy policy are considered. Several studies are consistent with the “1000-ton rule,” according to which a future person is killed every time 1000 tons of fossil carbon are burned (order-of-magnitude estimate). If warming reaches or exceeds 2 °C this century, mainly richer humans will be responsible for killing roughly 1 billion mainly poorer humans through anthropogenic global warming, which is comparable with involuntary or negligent manslaughter. On this basis, relatively aggressive energy policies are summarized that would enable immediate and substantive decreases in carbon emissions. The limitations to such calculations are outlined and future work is recommended to accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy while minimizing the number of sacrificed human lives.

I defend the claim that life-suspending technologies can constitute a catastrophic and existential security factor for risks structurally similar to those related to climate change. The gist of the argument is that, under certain conditions, life-suspending technologies such as cryonics can provide self-interested actors with incentives to efficiently tackle such risks—in particular, they provide reasons to overcome certain manifestations of generational egoism, a risk factor of several catastrophic and existential risks. Provided we have reasons to decrease catastrophic and existential risks such as climate change, we also have a (defeasible) reason for investing in developing and making life-suspending technologies (more) widespread.

The Lessons from Covid-19 Research Agenda offers a structure to study the COVID-19 pandemic and the pandemic response from a Global Catastrophic Risk (GCR) perspective. The agenda sets out the aims of our study, which is to investigate the key decisions and actions (or failures to decide or to act) that significantly altered the course of the pandemic, with the aim of improving disaster preparedness and response in the future. It also asks how we can transfer these lessons to other areas of (potential) global catastrophic risk management such as extreme climate change, radical loss of biodiversity and the governance of extreme risks posed by new technologies. Our study aims to identify key moments- 'inflection points'- that significantly shaped the catastrophic trajectory of COVID-19. To that end this Research Agenda has identified four broad clusters where such inflection points are likely to exist: pandemic preparedness, early action, vaccines and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The aim is to drill down into each of these clusters to ascertain whether and how the course of the pandemic might have gone differently, both at the national and the global level, using counterfactual analysis. Four aspects are used to assess candidate inflection points within each cluster: 1. the information available at the time; 2. the decision-making processes used; 3. the capacity and ability to implement different courses of action, and 4. the communication of information and decisions to different publics. The Research Agenda identifies crucial questions in each cluster for all four aspects that should enable the identification of the key lessons from COVID-19 and the pandemic response.

Yum (2024) argues that the widespread adoption of language agent architectures would likely increase the risk posed by AI by simplifying the process of aligning artificial systems with human values and thereby making it easier for malicious actors to use them to cause a variety of harms. Yum takes this to be an example of a broader phenomenon: progress on the alignment problem is likely to be net safety-negative because it makes artificial systems easier for malicious actors to control. I offer some reasons for skepticism about this surprising and pessimistic conclusion.