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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into central bank digital currency research by reviewing the recent advances in central bank digital currency (CBDC) research in a way that would help researchers, policy makers and practitioners to take a closer look at CBDC.Design/methodology/approachThe paper uses a systematic literature review methodology.FindingsThe review shows a general consensus that a CBDC is a liability of the central bank and it has cash-like attributes. The review also presents the motivation and benefits of issuing a CBDC such as the need to increase financial inclusion, the need to improve the conduct of monetary policy and to foster efficient digital payments. The review also shows that many central banks are researching the potential to issue CBDCs due to its many benefits. However, a number of studies have called for caution against over-optimism about the potential benefits of CBDC due to the limiting nature of CBDC design and its inability to meet multiple competing goals. Suggested areas for future research are identified such as the need to find the optimal CBDC design that meets all competing objectives, the need for empirical evidence on the effect of CBDC on the cost of credit and financial stability, and the need to find a balance between limiting the CBDC holdings of users and allowing users to hold as much CBDC as they want, and there is a need to undertake country-specific and regional case studies of CBDC design.Originality/valueThis review paper offers new areas for further research in central bank digital currencies.

This article assesses the impact of Quantitative Easing and other unconventional monetary policies followed by central banks in the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2007. We consider the implications of theoretical models for the effectiveness of asset purchases and look at the evidence from a range of empirical studies. We also provide an overview of the contributions of the other articles in this Feature.

Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Breakthroughs in financial technology (fintech), ranging from early coins and banknotes to card payments, e-money, mobile payments, and, more recently, cryptocurrencies, portend transformative changes to the financial and monetary systems. Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies bear a significant resemblance to base money or central bank money. This functional similarity can potentially pose several challenges to central banks in various dimensions. It may pose risks to central banks’ monopoly over issuing base money, price stability, the smooth operation of payment systems, the conduct of monetary policy, and to the stability of credit institutions and the financial system. From among several potential policy responses, central banks have been investigating and experimenting with issuing central bank digital currency (CBDC). This paper investigates CBDC from a legal perspective and sheds light on the legal challenges of introducing CBDC in the euro area. Having studied the potential impact of issuing CBDC by the European Central Bank (ECB), particularly on the banking and financial stability, the efficient allocation of resources (i.e. credit), as well as on the conduct of monetary policy, the paper concludes that issuing CBDC by the ECB would face a set of legal challenges that need to be resolved before its issuance at the eurozone level. Resolving such legal challenges may prove to be an arduous task as it may ultimately need amendments to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience.

This paper assesses the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies by estimating a panel vector autoregression (VAR) with monthly data from eight advanced economies over a sample spanning the period since the onset of the global financial crisis. It finds that an exogenous increase in central bank balance sheets at the zero lower bound leads to a temporary rise in economic activity and consumer prices. The estimated output effects turn out to be qualitatively similar to the ones found in the literature on the effects of conventional monetary policy, while the impact on the price level is weaker and less persistent. Individual country results suggest that there are no major differences in the macroeconomic effects of unconventional monetary policies across countries, despite the heterogeneity of the measures that were taken.

Financial upheaval and unconventional monetary policies have made money a salient political issue. This provides a rare opportunity to study the under-appreciated role of monetary trust in the politics of central bank legitimacy which, for the first time in decades, appears fragile. While research on central bank communication with 'the markets' abounds, little is known about if and how central bankers speak to 'the people.' A closer look at the issue immediately reveals a paradox: while a central bank's legitimacy hinges on it being perceived as acting in line with the dominant folk theory of money, this theory accords poorly with how money actually works. How central banks cope with this ambiguity depends on the monetary situation. Using the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank as examples, this article shows that under inflationary macroeconomic conditions, central bankers willingly nourished the folk-theoretical notion of money as a quantity under the direct control of the central bank. By contrast, the Bank of England's recent refutation of the folk theory of money suggests that deflationary pressures and rapid monetary expansion have fundamentally altered the politics of monetary trust and central bank legitimacy.

We analyze the path from cryptocurrencies to official Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), to shed some light on the ultimate dematerialization of money. To that end, we made an extensive search that resulted in a review of more than 100 academic and grey literature references, including official positions from central banks. We present and discuss the characteristics of the different CBDC variants being considered—namely, wholesale, retail, and, for the latter, the account-based, and token-based—as well as ongoing pilots, scenarios of interoperability, and open issues. Our contribution enables decision-makers and society at large to understand the potential advantages and risks of introducing CBDCs, and how these vary according to many technical and economic design choices. The practical implication is that a debate becomes possible about the trade-offs that the stakeholders are willing to accept.

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.

We show that negative policy rates affect the supply of bank credit in a novel way. Banks are reluctant to pass on negative rates to depositors, which increases the funding cost of highdeposit banks, and reduces their net worth, relative to low-deposit banks. As a consequence, the introduction of negative policy rates by the European Central Bank in mid-2014 leads to more risk-taking and less lending by euro-area banks with a greater reliance on deposit funding. Our results suggest that negative rates are less accommodative and could pose a risk to financial stability, if lending is done by high-deposit banks.