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We investigate the dispositional sources of managerial discretion by theorizing that CEOs’ personality traits affect the extent to which their firms’ strategies reflect their preferences. In a longitudinal study of Fortune 500 firms, we examine the moderating influence of two personality traits—narcissism and extraversion—on the relationship between CEOs’ liberal- or conservative-leaning political ideologies and two firm strategies: corporate social responsibility (CSR) and workforce downsizing. We anticipate and confirm that liberalleaning CEOs are more likely than others to enact CSR practices, and conservative-leaning CEOs are more likely than others to engage in downsizing. We find that extraversion strengthens these effects: it increases liberal CEOs’ use of CSR and conservative CEOs’ use of downsizing. Narcissism likewise strengthens the effect of CEO liberalism on CSR, but it does not significantly moderate the effect of CEO conservatism on downsizing. In a supplementary study using primary data from working professionals, we further explore the distinct mechanisms associated with these two personality traits. We find that narcissism relates strongly to individuals’ inflated perception of their discretion, whereas extraversion relates to their ability to sell an issue to others. Our study furthers research on managerial discretion by providing nuanced theory and evidence on innate sources of CEOs’ influence, and it enhances research on CEOs’ political ideology by spotlighting the dispositional boundary conditions of its effects on firms’ strategies.

We provide new evidence that the subjective “look of competence” rather than beauty is important for CEO selection and compensation. Our experiments, studying the facial traits of CEOs using nearly 2,000 subjects, link facial characteristics to both CEO compensation and performance. In one experiment, we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more “competent” than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from large firms against CEOs from smaller firms and finds large-firm CEOs look more competent. In a third experiment, subjects numerically score the facial traits of CEOs. We find competent looks are priced into CEO compensation, more so than attractiveness. Our evidence suggests this premium has a behavioral origin. First, we find no evidence that the premium is associated with superior performance. Second, we separately analyze inside and outside CEO hires and find that the competence compensation premium is driven by outside hires—the situation where first impressions are likely to be more important. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance .

Research Summary We draw upon applied psychology literature to explore interagent differences in perceived risk to their equity when making strategic risk decisions. Our theory suggests behavioral agency's predicted negative relationship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking is contingent upon four personality traits. Our empirical analyses, based on personality profiles of 158 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of S&P 1,500 firms in manufacturing industries, indicate the relationship between executive risk bearing and strategic risk taking crosses from negative to positive for high extraversion, greater openness, and low conscientiousness. These findings demonstrate that agency based predictions of CEO risk taking in response to compensation—and board attempts at creating incentive alignment using compensation—are enhanced by integrating insights from personality trait literature. Managerial Summary We study the effect of CEO personality on their behavioral responses to stock option pay. Our findings reveal that CEOs that score high on extraversion or openness and low on conscientiousness are less likely to decrease their firm's strategic risk taking as the value of their stock options increases. That is, the tendency of CEOs to become more risk averse in their strategic choices as their option wealth increases (due to loss aversion) is weaker for highly extraverted and more open CEOs, but stronger for more conscientiousness CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that board of directors need to consider personality traits of their CEOs when designing compensation packages with the intention to align incentives of CEOs with shareholder risk preferences.

This article examines the relationship between CEO characteristics and firm performance with a sample formed by the best performing CEOs in the world according to Harvard Business Review. The empirical analysis is based on descriptive statistics techniques and studies the universe of CEOs included in the 2016 ranking “The Best-Performing CEOs in the World” released by Harvard Business Review. Moreover, it addresses performance at various levels: financial performance, environmental, social and governance performance (ESG) and overall performance. The findings of the study show: 1) a strongly negative association between financial and ESG performance; 2) outsider CEOs outperform insider CEOs in overall performance; 3) CEOs with engineering degrees show significantly higher ESG performance; 4) CEOs with longer tenures in the firm present stronger financial performance though weaker ESG performance; and 5) the CEO’s country of origin emerges as an important driver to explain the different types of performance. Results in this field contradict the conventional wisdom of Anglo-Saxon CEOs as the best performers CEOs.

We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20-year sample, our new 'CEO in Context' technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low-, medium-, and high-discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on the earnings management examined by the discretionary accruals. Design/methodology/approach The sample includes 151 French firms listed on the CAC ALL shares index from 2006 to 2015. The paper uses the feasible generalized least square regression technique to test the relationship between CEO characteristics and earnings management. Findings Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management, the results obtained from the three models (Jones modified 1995; Kothari et al., 2005; Raman and Shahrur, 2008) indicated that there is a positive and significant relationship between CEO duality, CEO nationality and the quality of financial communication. However, no significant relationship was found between CEO board member, CEO turnover and earnings management. Originality/value A literature review finds that fewer studies have investigated the relationship between earnings management practices and personal CEO characteristics in the French context. Furthermore, no study yet has examined the influence of CEO nationality and CEO age on earnings management practices. This study provides empirical data about the impact of CEO’s characteristics on earnings management and how these different characteristics can facilitate the transition to manipulate and influence the quality of financial communication.

Market-based theories predict that differences in CEO skills lead to potentially large differences in pay, but it is challenging to quantify the CEO skill premium in pay. In a first step toward overcoming this empirical challenge, we code detailed biographical information for a large sample of CEOs for a panel of S&P 1500 firms between 1993 and 2005 to identify specific reputational, career, and educational credentials that are indicative of skills. Newly appointed CEOs earn up to a 5% or $280,000 total pay premium per credential decile, which is concentrated among CEOs with better reputational and career credentials, those with the very best credentials, and those who run large firms. Consistent with the unique economic mechanism of market-based theories, CEO credentials have a positive impact on firm performance. The performance differential for newly appointed CEOs is up to 0.5% per credential decile and is also concentrated among CEOs with better reputational and career credentials and those at large firms. Credentials are positively correlated with unobserved CEO heterogeneity in pay and performance, which further validates our hypothesis that boards use them as publicly observable signals of otherwise hard-to-gauge CEO skills. In all, our results offer direct evidence in support of market-based explanations of the overall rise in CEO pay. This paper was accepted by Itay Goldstein, finance .

Research Summary Our paper sheds new light on the performance implications associated with insider versus outsider CEOs. We frame CEO selection as risk‐taking, in which outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater tendency to generate extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We base this expectation on two complementary theoretical perspectives: human capital and information asymmetry. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions, with controls for endogeneity, and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders. Managerial Summary We shed new light on the performance implications associated with outsider CEOs. Instead of asking the customary question, “Do outsider CEOs, on average, perform better or worse than insider CEOs?,” we frame CEO selection as risk‐taking. Under this view, outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater likelihood of generating extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders.

Research Question- How do CEO characteristics affect corporate tax avoidance level? Motivation- Few studies have addressed this topic in the French context. In addition, this research investigates the combined effect on tax avoidance of CEO characteristics. Indeed, prior studies analyzed each characteristic effect taken separately; i.e CEO tenure, CEO compensation, CEO duality, CEO ownership. In this respect, our study will shed further light on the question. Idea- We examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on corporate tax avoidance level.CEO characteristics as CEO duality, CEO compensation, CEO ownership, CEO financial expertise, and CEO tenure were used as the independent variables. Data- We use a sample of 34 companies listed on the CAC 40 during the 2013-2021 period. Tools- We use the GMM estimation for panel data.CEO characteristics data were hand-collected from companies’ annual reports, and financial data were obtained from Datastream database. Findings- The empirical results show that CEO characteristics, namely CEO duality, CEO compensation, CEO ownership, and CEO financial expertise, positively affect tax avoidance. However, no significant relationship was found between CEO tenure and corporate tax avoidance. Contribution- This paper contributes to the existing literature by extending previous literature on whether CEO characteristics, considered simultaneously, affect corporate tax avoidance in a specific context, the French context.

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to empirically examine the effect of board multiple directorships and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on firm performance among nonfinancial firms listed on the Palestine Security Exchange (PSE) during the period from 2009 to 2016.Design/methodology/approachBased on 200 observations, this study utilizes panel data to examine the effect of the predictors on firm performance measured by return on assets. The analysis is repeated using the return on equity and two regression methods to evaluate the robustness of the main analysis (pooled regression, and backward stepwise regression analysis).FindingsThe results show that the “busyness” of a CEO reduces their effectiveness and is associated with losses in the companies where they are in charge. On the other hand, the results show that CEO tenure, CEO experience and CEO political connections have a positive effect on corporate performance.Originality/valueThis study is timely given that the practice of multiple directorships is widely common among firms in developing countries. Prior research in Palestine has not investigated the role of multiple directorships and the CEO characteristics on corporate outcomes. This study provides a picture of the potential benefits to firms, policymakers and professional bodies from considering CEO variables. The findings of such an examination can help them to set up suitable policies and enhance the role and the quality of the CEO in firms.