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In the last few decades, we have developed a substantial body of knowledge about CEO succession. However, except for some studies of family businesses that lack direct applicability to nonfamily CEO succession, the past studies of succession have not examined the very first succession event in a firm, when the Founder-CEO is replaced, on a large-scale basis. The critical differences between later-stage succession and Founder-CEO succession include the higher level of attachment between Founder-CEOs and the firms they create, the much larger equity holdings of Founder-CEOs (which give them much more control of the firm), the fact that many Founder-CEOs remain in the firm (even though it is being run by their successors), and the fact that nearly all early-stage succession events involve outside successors (in contrast to later-stage succession research, which has focused on the insider-outsider distinction). These differences make it hard to extrapolate from later-stage succession findings to Founder-CEO succession. Therefore, in order to examine Founder-CEO succession, I used field research and grounded theory building to study the factors that should affect Founder-CEO succession in Internet start-ups. I find that there are two central intertemporal events that may affect Founder-CEO succession: The completion of product development and the raising of each round of financing from outside investors. I develop testable hypotheses about how each of these events affect the rate of succession, and then test these hypotheses using an event-history analysis of a unique dataset containing the succession histories of 202 Internet firms. My findings point to multiple \"paradoxes of success\" in which the Founder-CEO's success at achieving critical milestones actually causes the chance of Founder-CEO succession to rise dramatically.

The objective of the study is to contemplate the effectiveness of hierarchical CEO succession and hierarchical CEO succession intensity on SOEs & Non-SOEs performance separately.  Meanwhile, the impact of hierarchical CEO succession on cash holdings has also been analysed. The authenticated data has been accumulated from CSMAR for the years 2012-2016 contemplating the listed companies (SOE and Non-SOEs separately for performance while overall companies for cash holdings) on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges. Through categorization of hierarchical CEO succession, it has been signified that middle-level hierarchical CEO succession elevates the SOEs performance. In contrast, middle and high-level hierarchical CEO succession mitigate the cash holdings. Conclusively, earning management as a moderator has been analysed while deducing that hierarchical CEO succession reduces cash holdings despite firms involving earning management activity which is ultimately beneficial for firms’ growth. The empirical results are robust to alternate technique 2SLS instrumental regression that controls for endogeneity.

Research Summary Our paper sheds new light on the performance implications associated with insider versus outsider CEOs. We frame CEO selection as risk‐taking, in which outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater tendency to generate extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We base this expectation on two complementary theoretical perspectives: human capital and information asymmetry. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions, with controls for endogeneity, and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders. Managerial Summary We shed new light on the performance implications associated with outsider CEOs. Instead of asking the customary question, “Do outsider CEOs, on average, perform better or worse than insider CEOs?,” we frame CEO selection as risk‐taking. Under this view, outsiders are relatively risky hires, with a greater likelihood of generating extreme performance outcomes—either positive or negative—as compared to insiders. We conduct multiple tests on large samples of CEO successions and find that outsiders are indeed associated with more extreme performance outcomes than are insiders.

Research summary: Drawing on theory about signaling, sensemaking, and the romance of leadership, we extend inquiry on investors' perceptions of CEO succession following misconduct. Whereas past studies have treated misconduct monolithically, we examine failures of integrity and competence separately. Using a policy capturing methodology that isolates investors' decision making from potential confounds, we find that, following an integrity failure, investors perceive outside and interim successors positively but inside successors negatively. Following a competence failure, investors perceive outside successors positively but are ambivalent toward inside and interim successors. Our findings indicate that whether an act of misconduct was an integrity failure or a competence failure, and what type of successor the firm chooses, are important considerations when using CEO succession as a means to restore investor confidence. Managerial summary: Business headlines regularly feature episodes of organizational misconduct, such as product safety problems, environmental violations, employee mistreatment, and securities lawsuits, and their aftermath. In such scenarios, shareholders demand answers from the people at the top, even if those people were not directly responsible for the problem. As a result, companies often fire the CEO as a means to restore investor confidence. Does this work? It depends on the type of misconduct and who is the CEO's successor. Following a competence failure, investors welcome the appointment of an outsider, but they are indifferent to inside and interim successors. Following an integrity failure, shareholders greet outside and interim CEO successors favorably while frowning on the promotion of insiders.

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early-stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms.

CEO turnover (or succession) is a critical event in an organization that influences organizational processes and performance. The objective of this study is to investigate whether workforce diversity (i.e., age, gender, and education-level diversity) might have a resilience effect on firm performance under the frequency of CEO turnover. Based on a sample of 409 Korean firms from 2010 to 2015, our results show that firms with more frequent CEO turnover have a lower firm performance. However, firms with more gender and education-level diversity could buffer the disruptive effect of frequent CEO turnover on firm performance to offer a benefit to the organization. Our theory and findings suggest that effectively managing diverse workforce can be a resilience factor in an uncertain organizational environment because diverse workforce has complementary skills and behaviors that can cope better with uncertainty and signals social inclusion of an organization, thus fostering a long-term exchange relationship. These findings contribute to the literature on CEO turnover (or succession) and diversity.

Despite the growing importance of CEOs' international experience (IE), we have yet to gain sufficient insights into its conceptualization and effect on firm outcomes. Based on prior research and work experience models, we suggest a e, new framework for measuring IE, including three components: length of time, number of countries, and cultural distance, along with their interactions. Drawing upon social and cognitive learning theories, we explore the impact of CEOs' IE on two outcomes: strategic change and firm performance. We argue that IE components affect the two outcomes by enhancing executives' international knowledge and general competencies. While international knowledge may affect firm performance directly, general competencies may affect firm performance both directly and indirectly through strategic change. Using a sample of 387 new CEOs, we found that time abroad had a positive effect on strategic change and firm performance, while number of countries and cultural distance positively moderated these relationships. Additionally, we also found that these components affected firm performance both directly and mediated through strategic change. Our findings have important theoretical implications for the conceptualization and impact of CEOs' IE and practical implications for executive development and promotion.

Using long-term data on Japanese family firms, this study explores when the transition from family to professional management leads to better performance. In order to avoid endogeneity bias, we employ propensity score matching and difference-in-differences techniques. We find evidence that firms that transition from family to professional CEOs outperform those that maintain family leadership. This performance improvement is more pronounced when (1) families maintain high ownership control but leave no family legacy behind, (2) when the transition moves from non-founder family managers to professionals, and (3) when professional managers graduated from elite universities.

Research summary: An important challenge that new CEOs face is establishing a group of immediate collaborators, which we call the \"strategic leadership constellation.\" Drawing on a comparative case study, we show that due to constraints on the CEO to change the top management team (TMT), the composition of the strategic leadership constellation initially tends to differ from that of the TMT: in some cases, it consists of a subgroup of the TMT; in others, it also comprises individuals outside the TMT such as staff members or lower-level managers. We show that the discrepancies between the strategic leadership constellation and the TMT lead to tensions that trigger a process of convergence between these two bodies, particularly as the constraints on TMT change decrease and the CEO's needs evolve. Managerial summary: A major challenge that new CEOs face is establishing a group of close collaborators, which we call the \"strategic leadership constellation.\" Our study shows that due to different constraints on changing the executive team, the composition of the strategic leadership constellation initially tends to differ from that of the executive team: in some cases, it consists of a subgroup of the executive team; in others, it also comprises individuals outside the executive team, such as staff members or lower-level managers. We show that the discrepancies between the strategic leadership constellation and the executive team lead to tensions that trigger a process of convergence between these two bodies, particularly as the constraints on changing the executive team decrease and the CEO's needs evolve.