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Over the last 20 years the theoretical concept of the commons has come to be used not only in the field of natural resources management, but also as a key notion in domains as diverse as the digital economy and alternative politics. The wide use of the term has, however, led to a loss of specificity in the way it is used. Across several disciplines the commons is often used almost interchangeably with terms such as open access, common property, public domain, public goods, or common pool resources. We examine the reasons for the increasing conflation of these concepts over time. The field emerged as the result of the collaboration of two types of theoretical work: a) the study of common pool resources which focused on the characteristics of the resources in order to predict social behaviour, and b) research on the analysis of common property regimes that focused on the structural characteristics of the institutions devised to manage those resources. This difference in emphasis resulted in the development of two sets of concepts to refer to the same processes but from slightly different perspectives. With increasing interest in research focussed on the commons, these concepts are often used uncritically and their original designations are conflated across a suite of categories.

Ostrom’s design principles have been widely recognized in sustaining commons governance. However, studies focusing on the assessment of the design principles in land governance are limited, especially in Africa. Focusing on Ghana, this study examines the fit of the local land governance structure with the design principles, using four case study areas with operational Land Management Committees (LMCs). Through in-depth interviews with local land governance stakeholders, the findings show that the existing legal and institutional frameworks for land governance in Ghana fit the Ostrom design principles. However, operational challenges such as undocumented customary land boundaries, absence of graduated sanctions, restricted proportional equivalence, and collective choice in some areas, as well as limited platforms for horizontal cooperation among the LMCs, threaten the sustainability of some land management regimes. The strong social capital in the study areas makes the existing weak sanctioning regime imperceptible. We argue that land as a common property resource when managed within the framework of the Ostrom design principles could enhance sustainability of both the management regimes and the resource system.

Reciprocal relations underscore the mutual caretaking obligations held between nature and society, as intertwining entities that are co-constituted with one another. In this paper, we draw from scholarship on human-nature relations, which emphasizes the intrinsic value and agency of non-human beings and the landscape. Building on this literature, we investigate the practice of reciprocal relations for exemplar communities in Hawaiʻi, British Columbia (Canada), the Appalachian mountain region (U.S.), and Madagascar that are all actively cultivating stewardship of natural resources in the face of economic, political, and ecological pressures. Our cases illustrate the diverse ways individuals and communities enact reciprocal relations and examine how these acts may increase community access to land and water. We show how communities mobilize reciprocal relations through both formal governance actions (e.g. management planning and legislation) and informal avenues (e.g. daily human-environment interactions). Our findings expand upon Ribot and Peluso’s theory of access by considering the multi-directional flows of benefits and responsibilities between people and places exemplified by reciprocal relations. By reframing environmental governance around mutual responsibilities, we hope to increase recognition of existing reciprocal place-based relationships, and facilitate greater community access to land, water, and resources.

Physical spaces and assets vary in legal nature and as such can be subjected to both private and public ownership. Therefore, rights and obligations connected with the use and enjoyment of the different goods depends on the juridic nature of the good itself. In the Italian legal framework, private goods are subject to homogeneous regulation, whereas public goods might comprehend a plethora of heterogeneous categories each of them featuring a specific legal regulation. Among those, collective-owned goods present a complex case as they have the typical characteristics of common goods but might be the object of specific rival and exclusive rights that are guaranteed to certain communities with the system of “civic use rights” (usi civici). This peculiar legal regime is typical of rural areas, where, traditionally, common ownership of the land was pursued and encouraged resulting in the creation of a common agri-sylvan-pastoral heritage. As such, the areas susceptible to being left behind or even abandoned due to a lack of public resources or initiatives that can foster their intrinsic cultural, social, and economic value. We intend collective goods to be long-term physical assets that trigger ecosystems of social entrepreneurial, innovative partnerships, and impact investing that can meet long-lasting and/or emerging social and collective needs. This paper aims to achieve two objectives. Firstly, we investigate the Italian juridical regime of “shared-ownership rights” and “civic use rights” aiming to define a taxonomy that provides support in categorising these goods according to pre-defined legal clusters. Secondly, we explore the evaluation issues related to land appraisal processes.

Is property a black box? Is it best understood in terms of the relationship between owners and nonowners, without regard to the internal dynamics of property stakeholders? Exclusion theorists of property think that the concept of property properly concerns only the relations between owners and nonowners-that is, the external relationships of owners, or what we might call the \"external life\" of property. From this perspective, the 'internal' relationships among property stakeholders-the \"internal life\" of property-are irrelevant from a conceptual point of view, even though these relationships are often very significant to property as a doctrinal matter. To exclusion theorists, all that matters conceptually is the owner's right to exclude nonowners from using, possessing, or interfering with the owner's asset. Therefore, what happens within the box- between or among the persons having a property interest in the asset- is of no concern to property law. The law of property, built around the right to exclude, concerns itself primarily with the owner's relationship with the rest of the world.

This article examines whether (and why) migrant communities are less likely to support institutions for managing common pool resources. Focusing on Buvuma Island, which is situated in Uganda’s portion of Lake Victoria, I study the efforts at locally supporting forestry regulations among randomly selected communities. These communities have varying proportions of both immigrants and prospective out-migrants, and they are confronting the degradation of adjacent forest reserves. The evidence from survey data on 293 randomly selected heads of households suggests that migrant communities are less likely to support common pool resource institutions. The same evidence suggests that the lower likelihood of support among migrant communities has more to do with their weaker relationships (of reputation, trust, and reciprocity) than their expectations about the institutional net-benefits.

Agricultural land and forestlands can have multiple uses and generate multiple sources of utility. Although landowners benefit from most of them, society can benefit from others because of their intrinsic characteristics as common-property resources and customary practice. In many Italian territories, the picking of mushrooms is allowed on privately owned agricultural land and in forests. The management of these resources is challenging due to the emerging conflicts between landowners and users. In addition, the pressure exerted by users gives rise to issues on stock preservation, thus contributing to putting biodiversity at risk in contexts already heavily jeopardized by modern agriculture. Through the years, regulation established the primacy of the landowner’s right, introduced a permit fee for users, and set limits on the resource stock to be collected daily. Nonetheless, the relationship between public and private interests in common-property resource exploitation is still controversial. In this paper, we investigate and model a right holder’s decision whether to exploit a common-property resource according to their actual status of being an actual or potential user. The model is developed within the real options valuation framework. In detail, we investigate the entry/exit decision on the exploitation of the resource by considering the uncertainty that affects the resource stock, the entry/exist costs, and the number of rival users.

Quasi-property interests refer to situations in which the law seeks to simulate the idea of exclusion, normally associated with property rights, through a relational liability regime, by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the interaction in question, which is thought to merit a highly circumscribed form of exclusion. In this Article, I unpack the analytical and normative bases of quasiproperty interests, examine the primary triggering events that cause courts to invoke the category, and respond to potential objections to the recognition of quasi-property as an independent category of interests in the law.

Abstract-In this article, some common fixed point theorems were proved in complete 2- metric space using weakly compatible mappings in which property (E.A), common property (E.A) and (E.A) like Property are involved.

In this article, we apply common fixed point results in incomplete metric spaces to examine the existence of a unique common solution for the following systems of Urysohn integral equations and Volterra-Hammerstein integral equations, respectively: u ( s ) = ϕ i ( s ) + ∫ a b K i ( s , r , u ( r ) ) d r , where s ∈ ( a , b ) ⊆ R ; u , ϕ i ∈ C ( ( a , b ) , R n ) and K i : ( a , b ) × ( a , b ) × R n → R n , i = 1 , 2 , … , 6 and u ( s ) = p i ( s ) + λ ∫ 0 t m ( s , r ) g i ( r , u ( r ) ) d r + μ ∫ 0 ∞ n ( s , r ) h i ( r , u ( r ) ) d r , where s ∈ ( 0 , ∞ ) , λ , μ ∈ R , u , p i , m ( s , r ) , n ( s , r ) , g i ( r , u ( r ) ) and h i ( r , u ( r ) ) , i = 1 , 2 , … , 6 , are real-valued measurable functions both in s and r on ( 0 , ∞ ) .