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Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy. Two experiments examined the effect of news frames on tolerance for the Ku Klux Klan. The first presented research participants with one of two local news stories about a Klan rally that varied by frame: One framed the rally as a free speech issue, and the other framed it as a disruption of public order. Participants who viewed the free speech story expressed more tolerance for the Klan than participants who watched the public order story. Additional data indicate that frames affect tolerance by altering the perceived importance of public order values. The relative accessibility of free speech and public order concepts did not respond to framing. A second experiment used a simulated electronic news service to present different frames and replicated these findings.

Vitteritti discusses the origin of the Blaine Amendment and its far-reaching impact on state-level jurisprudence regarding religion and public education.

In October 1950, John Courtney Murray, S.J., wrote for the use of Msgr. Giovanni Battista Montini of the Vatican Secretariat of State a memorandum: “The crisis in Church-State Relationships in the U.S.A.” An attempt by Murray to encourage a development of Catholic teaching on church and state and religious freedom that would enable American Catholics to give support in principle to the First Amendment of the U.S Constitution, the memorandum was submitted to some American churchmen and to the Vatican's Holy Office. The dossier here published for the first time includes the texts of Murray's memorandum and of responses to it written by Samule Cardinal Stritch and Fr. Francis J. Cornell, C.SS.R. The introduction to these texts sets the memorandum in context and explains the Holy Office's actions against Murray.

Congress frequently seeks to reverse the policies of the U.S. Supreme Court. Much is known about the circumstances in which lawmakers confront the Court and whether they are likely to succeed. Still, we do not know how individual members of Congress make these decisions. Why do some members defer to judicial policymaking, while others openly oppose it? The case of the Flag Protection Amendment of 1990, considered in response to the Court's decisions on the issue of flag burning, provides an illustrative setting in which to examine this question. Despite evidence that congressional reaction to judicial policy is distinctive, our model of the vote suggests that the nature of institutional conflict does not shape the decision. Rather, members largely reflect ideological and constituent preferences when deciding whether to reverse the Court.

Freedom of expression is celebrated as one of the glories of the American political system. But does all speech deserve immunity? In particular, should speech designed to vilify or degrade on the basis of race be protected? Opinions on racist speech are complicated because they must accommodate two fundamental democratic principles that operate at cross purposes: freedom of expression, which implies support for racist speech, and racial equality, which implies the opposite. Using data from the 1990 General Social Survey, we examine how Americans resolve this conflict. Our major finding is that the principle of free expression dominates the principle of racial equality. What contemporary legal scholars regard as a hard case entailing a collision of democratic principles, ordinary Americans seem to interpret as a straightforward application of just a single principle. This result mirrors and perhaps reflects a nearly century-long and mostly lop-sided debate favouring free speech among American elites.

The question implies that the First Amendment's “separation of church and state,” as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is an insufficient solution to the old conflict between American democracy and Catholicism. Catholicism has become unsafe in contemporary American democracy in ways that the original constitutional arrangement, of which the First Amendment was only a part, does not help. The contemporary danger is rooted partly in the old conflict between classical liberalism and revealed religion as such. But the more proximate danger is the secular “civil liberties” regime that has been instituted by the Supreme Court since 1940. That regime permits Catholics to follow their religion in public affairs only insofar as it is in agreement with the secularism which the “civil liberties” regime both instituted and understands liberal democracy to require.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO \"FREEDOM OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATION\" IS ANALYZED. IN GRISWOLD VS. CONNECTICUT, THE SUPREME COURT EXTENDED WHAT WAS PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED TO BE A 1ST AMENDMENT RIGHT, AND SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS WITHIN A GENERAL 'ZONE OF PRIVACY' CREATED IN PART BY THE 1ST AMENDMENT, BUT ALSO BY THE 3RD, 4TH, 5TH AMENDMENTS AS WELL. EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS ARE ANALYZED.