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We examine the sales of French manufacturing firms in 113 destinations, including France itself. Several regularities stand out: (i) the number of French firms selling to a market, relative to French market share, increases systematically with market size; (ii) sales distributions are similar across markets of very different size and extent of French participation; (iii) average sales in France rise systematically with selling to less popular markets and to more markets. We adopt a model of firm heterogeneity and export participation which we estimate to match moments of the French data using the method of simulated moments. The results imply that over half the variation across firms in market entry can be attributed to a single dimension of underlying firm heterogeneity: efficiency. Conditional on entry, underlying efficiency accounts for much less of the variation in sales in any given market. We use our results to simulate the effects of a 10 percent counterfactual decline in bilateral trade barriers on French firms. While total French sales rise by around $ 16 billion (U.S.), sales by the top decile of firms rise by nearly $23 billion (U.S.). Every lower decile experiences a drop in sales, due to selling less at home or exiting altogether.

How exactly does the display location of a sale price relative to the original price affect consumers' evaluations? Across multiple studies, including field studies with actual choices and studies with nonstudent samples, this article shows that consumer evaluations are a function of the display location of the sale price, but such evaluations are moderated by discount depth. First, presenting the smaller number to the right (vs. left) makes it easier to initiate the subtraction task, a phenomenon the authors refer to as the \"subtraction principle.\" Second, given that evaluating sale prices inherently involves a subtraction task, locating sale prices to the right (vs. left) of the original price facilitates calculation of discount depth, increasing evaluations for moderate discounts but not for low discounts. These effects are potentially reversed in cases of both very low discounts and exaggerated discounts. The findings in this article offer novel and nonintuitive insights into how sale price display locations and discount depth interact to influence numerical cognitions, processing of sale prices, and subsequent evaluations.

This research examines the impact of attractiveness on consumers during a consumption experience. Specifically, it examines the effects of an attractive social influence in the context of touching and contamination of store products by investigating how consumers respond when they see attractive others touching the same products they want to purchase. In doing so, it provides the first experimental evidence of a positive contagion effect in either the marketing or the psychology literature. Across three field experiments using an actual retail shopping environment, the authors find that product evaluations are higher when consumers perceive a product as having been physically touched by a highly attractive other. Moreover, they identify sex as a critical moderating variable in the realization of this positive contagion effect; the contact source and observing consumer must be of the opposite sex for positive contagion to occur. Finally, in contrast to previous work, the authors demonstrate that these effects are driven by a physical model of contagion.

We examine how subjective performance evaluations are influenced by the level and controllability of an accompanying measure of a separate performance dimension. In our experiment, supervisors evaluate the office administration performance of a hypothetical subordinate. We find that supervisors' subjective evaluations are directionally influenced by an accompanying objective measure of sales performance, even after excluding participants who perceive informativeness across measures. Consistent with concerns for fairness and motivation, we also find an asymmetric uncontrollability effect—supervisors' evaluations are higher when an uncontrollable factor decreases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they compensate for bad luck), but are not lower when the uncontrollable factor increases the subordinate's sales (i.e., they do not punish for good luck). This evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion provided to evaluate performance on one task to adjust for perceived deficiencies in the evaluation of performance on other tasks. Our study integrates theories of cognitive bias and motivation, highlighting the need to consider the potentially interactive effects of different performance measures in multi-task settings.

Multinational production (MP) can lead to large gains through international technology sharing. However, empirical evidence suggests that geography matters for MP: Affiliate sales fall in distance from the headquarters. We introduce intrafirm trade into a standard model of exports and MP and show that the model is consistent with firm-level and aggregate evidence. Using a maximum likelihood estimator, we find that intrafirm trade plays a crucial role in shaping the geography of MP. An implication of our work is that MP and exports are very similar activities. Consequently, shutting down MP leads to relatively small welfare losses.

Market outcomes depend on the quality of information available to its participants. We measure the effect of information disclosure on market outcomes using a large-scale field experiment that randomly discloses quality information in wholesale automobile auctions. We argue that buyers in this market are horizontally differentiated across cars that are vertically ranked by quality. This implies that information disclosure helps match heterogeneous buyers to cars of varying quality, causing both good and bad news to increase competition and revenues. The data confirm these hypotheses. These findings have implications for the design of other markets, including e-commerce, procurement auctions, and labor markets.

This research demonstrates that as people approach a goal, external representations, which increase the ease of visualizing the goal, enhance goal pursuit. Specifically, consumers judge easy-to-visualize goals to be closer than difficult-to-visualize goals, which in turn increases effort and commitment. Ease of visualization affects performance in swimming competitions and the physical effort exerted in the lab. Visualization also affects commitment toward savings, willingness to wait for service, and performance in a simulated sales task. Importantly, the beneficial effects of visualization exist only when people are close to the goal. In addition, the effect of visualization attenuates when the goal is split into subgoals. Managers can use these results to enhance consumer goal pursuit, influence consumer satisfaction in online service encounters, and motivate employees to improve performance. In these varied contexts, visual representations of goal progress (e.g., progress bars) enhance motivation as people approach their goal.

Disclosure is often proposed as a remedy for conflicts of interest, but it can backfire, hurting those whom it is intended to protect. Building on our prior research, we introduce a conceptual model of disclosure’s effects on advisors and advice recipients that helps to explain when and why it backfires. Studies 1 and 2 examine psychological mechanisms (strategic exaggeration, moral licensing) by which disclosure can lead advisors to give more-biased advice. Study 3 shows that disclosure backfires when advice recipients who receive disclosure fail to sufficiently discount and thus fail to mitigate the adverse effects of disclosure on advisor bias. Study 4 identifies one remedy for inadequate discounting of biased advice: explicitly and simultaneously contrasting biased advice with unbiased advice.

Managers often state that they are reluctant to vary prices for fear of “antagonizing customers.” However, there is no empirical evidence that antagonizing customers through price adjustments reduces demand or profits. We use a 28-month randomized field experiment involving over 50,000 customers to investigate how customers react if they buy a product and later observe the same retailer selling it for less. We find that customers react by making fewer subsequent purchases from the firm. The effect is largest among the firm's most valuable customers: those whose prior purchases were most recent and at the highest prices.