Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
164,120
result(s) for
"CONSTITUTIONS"
Sort by:
Qué significa y para qué sirve la reserva de Constitución?
Reserva de Constitución significa, además de establecer un límite entre Poder Constituyente y poderes constituidos que no puede ser materialmente traspasado, la afirmación de la incumbencia exclusiva de la Constitución sobre determinadas cuestiones. Se trata de cuestiones relacionadas con los derechos fundamentales y la organización del poder que precisan del acuerdo de la mayoría social que soporta en términos de cultura política la existencia misma de la Constitución. Como refleja Eloy García en esta nueva entrega de nuestra TRIBUNA CONSTITUCIONAL, las implicaciones de esta idea son enormes. (1) Para empezar, supone el absoluto respeto al contenidos normativos establecidos por la Constitución que no pueden ser enmendados, sobrepasados o alterados por el legislador posterior más que acudiendo a la reforma constitucional. (2) Además significa entender que los órganos de supremacía constitucional, directamente creados y definidos por la Constitución, no pueden asumir más funciones que las estipuladas estrictamente por la propia Constitución, lo que equivale a poner en duda tanto la capacidad del legislador ordinario para atribuir nuevas capacidades a los poderes del Estado, cuanto la posibilidad de rediseñar vía interpretativa el cometido constitucional de órganos que como el Tribunal Constitucional, desde el primer momento de su gestación legislativa y a través de figuras creativas como el bloque de la constitucionalidad, ha venido ultrapasando claramente los límites de la reserva constitucional. (3) Al mismo tiempo significa revalidar y potenciar la naturaleza política de los órganos de supremacía constitucional en orden a la realización de la Forma de Gobierno, lo que entraña una revitalización de la dimensión nacional de la democracia que limite la tendencia desconstitucionalizadora de las clausulas de apertura que permiten que organizaciones y pactos internacionales de estructura incontrolable asumen atribuciones que la Constitución reserva al autogobierno de la política. (4) Finalmente también evidencia la reserva de Constitución la diferente posición que la Constitución confiere a los poderes y competencias del Estado, de las propias de las Comunidades Autónomas que contra lo que se ha dicho y fallado no pueden asumir el papel Constitucional del Estado so pena de desnaturalizar la propia arquitectura del poder Constituyente en la que a fin de cuentas descansa existencialmente la supervivencia de la comunidad política.
Journal Article
IL LAVORO COME DOVERE
The essay suggests a unitary reconstruction of the concept of labour included into the Italian Constitution and marks the political value conferred to it by the Constitution itself. The duty to work as stated in article 4 of the Italian Constitution is analyzed in the light of the general discussion on constitutional duties. In this perspective, the essay offers a magis ut valeat interpretation of the article 4 of the Constitution. Special attention is given to the duty of work intended as a limit to the enjoyment of rights and to the cases in which from that duty derives a clear legal obligation.
Journal Article
Presentación
Como muchas revistas y publicaciones lo han hecho, la Revista Derecho del Estado también ha querido editar un número especial para celebrar los 30 años de la Constitución colombiana de 1991, que abrió para Colombia la oportunidad de convertirse en un Estado constitucional social de derecho.
Journal Article
Two concepts of constitutional legitimacy
What legitimates constitutions? One standard answer is that constitutions are legitimate only if they represent the people they govern. This article identifies two different conceptions of representation. Representation can be grounded either in the consent or the will of the citizens or when the constitution reflects the ‘real’ identity of the members of the nation. Alternatively, it is sometimes stated that the constitution is legitimate because it promotes justice or, more generally, is grounded in reason. While constitutions are typically grounded both in claims to represent the people and in claims concerning the justness and wisdom of the constitutional provisions, we establish that there are two types of constitutions: constitutions that are primarily representational (e.g. the US Constitution) and constitutions that are primarily reason-based (e.g. the German Constitution). We also show that this distinction has important ramifications for how constitutions are drafted and ratified, and how they operate. One central implication is that the legitimacy of constitutions that make weak claims to representation – for example, constitutions that are imposed by foreign powers – can still be defended on reason-based grounds.
Journal Article
THE DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLE IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
In recent years, antidemocratic behavior has rippled across the nation. Lameduck state legislatures have stripped popularly elected governors of their powers; extreme partisan gerrymanders have warped representative institutions; state officials have nullified popularly adopted initiatives. The federal Constitution offers few resources to address these problems, and ballot-box solutions cannot work when antidemocratic actions undermine elections themselves. Commentators increasingly decry the rule of the many by the few. This Article argues that a vital response has been neglected. State constitutions embody a deep commitment to democracy. Unlike the federal Constitution, they were drafted—and have been repeatedly rewritten and amended—to empower popular majorities. In text, history, and structure alike, they express a commitment to popular sovereignty, majority rule, and political equality. We shorthand this commitment the democracy principle and describe its development and current potential. The Article's aims are both theoretical and practical. At the level of theory, we offer a new view of American constitutionalism, one in which the majoritarian commitment of states' founding documents complements the antimajoritarian tilt of the national document. Such complementarity is an unspoken premise of the familiar claim that the federal Constitution may temper excesses and abuses of state majoritarianism. We focus on the other half of the equation: state constitutions may ameliorate national democratic shortcomings. At the level of practice, we show how the democracy principle can inform a number of contemporary conflicts. Reimagining recent cases concerning electoral interference, political entrenchment, and more, we argue that it is time to reclaim the state constitutional commitment to democracy.
Journal Article