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The rapid development of smartphone technology has led to the increased popularity of dynamic ridesharing apps used to organize ad hoc ridesharing trips between strangers on short notice. To support such real-time on-demand services, cost-sharing between drivers and riders is commonly centrally determined by ridesharing apps according to prescribed rules. To highlight the impacts of appropriate cost-sharing strategies on the success of ridesharing programs, this paper models the mode choices of a group of heterogeneous travelers with continuously distributed values of time in a single-corridor network, considering the complex interactions between travelers’ mode choices and the attractiveness of ridesharing in terms of rider/driver waiting/detouring times and matching probabilities. The equilibrium state under any given cost-sharing strategy is described by a system of variational inequalities based on which the existence of equilibria is established. With the proposed modeling framework, various cost-sharing strategies are examined to avoid mode shifts among transit users to autos and/or reduce vehicular traffic in the short run; the necessary conditions for cost-sharing strategies to sustain participation and/or reduce vehicle usage are explicitly provided. It is shown that when driving alone is faster but more expensive than public transit, no cost-sharing strategy exists to sustain an active ridesharing platform without inducing transit users to join the ridesharing program. Moreover, the existence of cost-sharing strategies capable of reducing vehicular traffic on the road is not always guaranteed, depending on the costs of driving alone and taking public transit in the considered corridor, fuel prices, and travelers’ prioritization of safety and privacy. Furthermore, it is found that the initial state with no ridesharing participants is an equilibrium under any cost-sharing strategy if the additional cost incurred by a traveler through participating in a ridesharing program is nonnegative. This explains the difficulty of initiating a ridesharing program and implies the initial necessity of subsidizing all intended riders and/or drivers to encourage participation. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2017.0801 .

Patient cost sharing for contraceptive prescriptions was eliminated for certain insurance plans as part of the Affordable Care Act. We examined the impact of this change on women's patterns of choosing prescription contraceptive methods. Using claims data for a sample of midwestern women ages 18-46 with employer-sponsored coverage, we examined the contraceptive choices made by women in employer groups whose coverage complied with the mandate, compared to the choices of women in groups whose coverage did not comply. We found that the reduction in cost sharing was associated with a 2.3-percentage-point increase in the choice of any prescription contraceptive, relative to the 30 percent rate of choosing prescription contraceptives before the change in cost sharing. A disproportionate share of this increase came from increased selection of long-term contraception methods. Thus, the removal of cost as a barrier seems to be an important factor in contraceptive choice, and our findings about long-term methods may have implications for rates of unintended pregnancy that require further study.

Policy Points Concerns have been raised about risk selection in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Specifically, turnover in accountable care organization (ACO) physicians and patient panels has led to concerns that ACOs may be earning shared‐savings bonuses by selecting lower‐risk patients or providers with lower‐risk panels. We find no evidence that changes in ACO patient populations explain savings estimates from previous evaluations through 2015. We also find no evidence that ACOs systematically manipulated provider composition or billing to earn bonuses. The modest savings and lack of risk selection in the original MSSP design suggest opportunities to build on early progress. Recent program changes provide ACOs with more opportunity to select providers with lower‐risk patients. Understanding the effect of these changes will be important for guiding future payment policy. Context The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) establishes incentives for participating accountable care organizations (ACOs) to lower spending for their attributed fee‐for‐service Medicare patients. Turnover in ACO physicians and patient panels has raised concerns that ACOs may be earning shared‐savings bonuses by selecting lower‐risk patients or providers with lower‐risk panels. Methods We conducted three sets of analyses of Medicare claims data. First, we estimated overall MSSP savings through 2015 using a difference‐in‐differences approach and methods that eliminated selection bias from ACO program exit or changes in the practices or physicians included in ACO contracts. We then checked for residual risk selection at the patient level. Second, we reestimated savings with methods that address undetected risk selection but could introduce bias from other sources. These included patient fixed effects, baseline or prospective assignment, and area‐level MSSP exposure to hold patient populations constant. Third, we tested for changes in provider composition or provider billing that may have contributed to bonuses, even if they were eliminated as sources of bias in the evaluation analyses. Findings MSSP participation was associated with modest and increasing annual gross savings in the 2012‐2013 entry cohorts of ACOs that reached$139 to $ 302 per patient by 2015. Savings in the 2014 entry cohort were small and not statistically significant. Robustness checks revealed no evidence of residual risk selection. Alternative methods to address risk selection produced results that were substantively consistent with our primary analysis but varied somewhat and were more sensitive to adjustment for patient characteristics, suggesting the introduction of bias from within‐patient changes in time‐varying characteristics. We found no evidence of ACO manipulation of provider composition or billing to inflate savings. Finally, larger savings for physician group ACOs were robust to consideration of differential changes in organizational structure among non‐ACO providers (eg, from consolidation). Conclusions Participation in the original MSSP program was associated with modest savings and not with favorable risk selection. These findings suggest an opportunity to build on early progress. Understanding the effect of new opportunities and incentives for risk selection in the revamped MSSP will be important for guiding future program reforms.

BackgroundHigh patient out-of-pocket (OOP) spending for medical care is associated with medical debt, distress about household finances, and forgoing medical care because of cost in the USA.ObjectiveTo examine the national prevalence of medical financial hardship domains: (1) material conditions from increased OOP expenses (e.g., medical debt), (2) psychological responses (e.g., distress), and (3) coping behaviors (e.g., forgoing care); and factors associated with financial hardship.Design and ParticipantsWe identified adults aged 18–64 years (N = 68,828) and ≥ 65 years (N = 24,614) from the 2015–2017 National Health Interview Survey. Multivariable analyses of nationally representative cross-sectional survey data were stratified by age group, 18–64 years and ≥ 65 years.Main MeasuresPrevalence of material, psychological, and behavioral hardship and hardship intensity.Key ResultsApproximately 137.1 million (95% CI 132.7–141.5) adults reported any medical financial hardship in the past year. Hardship is more common for material, psychological and behavioral domains in adults aged 18–64 years (28.9%, 46.9%, and 21.2%, respectively) than in adults aged ≥ 65 years (15.3%, 28.4%, and 12.7%, respectively; all p < .001). Lower educational attainment and more health conditions were strongly associated with hardship intensity in multivariable analyses in both age groups (p < .001). In the younger group, the uninsured were more likely to report multiple domains of hardship (52.8%), compared to those with some public (26.5%) or private insurance (23.2%) (p < .001). In the older group, individuals with Medicare only were more likely to report hardship in multiple domains (17.1%) compared to those with Medicare and public (12.1%) or Medicare and private coverage (10.1%) (p < .001).ConclusionsMedical financial hardship is common in the USA, especially in adults aged 18–64 years and those without health insurance coverage. With trends towards higher patient cost-sharing and increasing health care costs, risks of hardship may increase in the future.

Out-of-pocket spending is a long-standing challenge for privately insured people. New Mexico passed the first US law prohibiting private insurers from applying cost sharing to behavioral health treatment, effective January 1, 2022. We examined the perceptions of key informants, including clinicians, insurers, and state officials, about implementing the No Behavioral Health Cost Sharing law to explore how it might affect downstream outcomes such as spending and access. The law was viewed favorably and implemented without much difficulty. Clinicians noted widespread positive impacts, particularly for those needing intensive treatment. However, they worried about workforce capacity and the exclusion of people covered under self-insured employer plans, which are exempt from state regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. Insurers found the law to be in alignment with their organizational goals, but they expressed concern about the administrative burden caused by increased reviews of claims, and some were monitoring for unintended consequences (for example, waste and fraud) that could lead to increased premiums. Engagement strategies were needed to inform eligible members and facilitate enrollment in eligible plans. The law provides a potential model for states to improve access to behavioral health care, but impacts may be limited by factors such as workforce, awareness, and federal ERISA constraints.

Dual-eligible Medicare–Medicaid beneficiaries receive the Low-Income Subsidy, which reduces cost sharing for medications. Loss of drug subsidies after Medicaid disenrollment was associated with increased mortality.

We compared the generosity of Medicare plans in terms of out-of-pocket costs attributable to cost sharing and premiums, including both basic and supplemental services. From 2014 through 2019, projected out-of-pocket costs for a typical enrollee were 18-24 percent lower in Medicare Advantage than traditional fee-for-service Medicare.

In the Medicare program, increases in cost sharing by a supplemental insurer can exert financial externalities. We study a policy cange that raised patient cost sharing for the supplemental insurer for retired public employees in California. We find that physician visits and prescription drug usage have elasticities that are similar to those of the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). Unlike the HIE, however, we find substantial \"offset\" effects in terms of increased hospital utilization. The savings from increased cost sharing accrue mostly to the supplemental insurer, while the costs of increased hospitalization accrue mostly to Medicare.

Value-based insurance design (VBID) is a strategy that reduces cost sharing for high-value services and increases consumers' out-of-pocket spending for low-value care. VBID has increasingly been implemented by private and public payers and has inspired demonstration programs in Medicare Advantage and TRICARE. Given the recent publication of several studies, we performed an updated systematic review that evaluated the effects of reducing consumer cost sharing on medication adherence and other relevant outcomes. Searches were conducted in key online databases, and the screening of citations yielded twenty-one unique studies, of which eight had not been included in previous reviews. Using the Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) system, we found moderate-quality evidence showing improvement (range: 0.1-14.3 percent) in medication adherence with VBID. This increase in adherence was associated with no effect on total health care spending, which suggests that the incremental drug spending was offset by decreases in spending for other health care services.