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Considerable attention has been given to addressing side-channel attacks to improve the security of cryptographic hardware implementations. These attacks encourage the exploration of various countermeasures across different levels of abstraction, through masking and hiding techniques, mainly. In this paper, we introduce a novel hiding countermeasure designed to mitigate Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks without significant overhead. The new countermeasure interferes with the processed data, minimizing the power correlation with the secret key. The proposed method involves using a Correlated-Power-Noise Generator (CPNG). This study is supported by experimental results using CPA attacks on a SAKURA-G board with a SPARTAN-6 Xilinx FPGA. An Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher with 128/256-bit key size is employed for this purpose. The proposed secure design of AES has an area overhead of 29.04% compared to unprotected AES. After conducting a CPA attack, the acquisition of information about the private key has been reduced drastically by 44.5%.

一个公钥加密方案的KDM(Key-Dependent Message)安全性要求: 即使敌手可以得到一些可能依赖于私钥的消息加密后的密文, 它仍然是安全的. 这一场景经常会出现在如: 硬盘加密、形式化密码学或者一些特殊的协议中. 迄今为止, 已经有一些具体的方法可以达到这类安全性. 但是, 大多数情形中, 都限制消息作为用户私钥的函数为仿射函数.本文定义了一类新的函数族, 并且证明了在公钥密码学中起着非常重要作用的ElGamal加密方案关于这类函数族具有相应的KDM安全性. 从技术角度来说, 由于ElGamal加密方案的明文空间与私钥空间不太“匹配”, 因此, 我们需要将原始的ElGamal加密方案进行适当的“裁剪”以证明它的KDM安全性. 更为重要的是, 本文定义的新的函数族自然地包含一些不属于仿射函数族的函数. 另外, 也证明了该方案关于Qin等人在2013年ACISP上提出的函数族也满足相应的KDM安全性. 最后, 我们指出, 在这两种情形下, 都可以将本文所得到的“裁剪的”ElGamal加密方案应用到匿名证书系统中.

High leakage power consumption has become one of the main concerns of data security protection with CMOS device scaling. Spintronic technology is one of the efficient solutions to control circuit leakage power consumption by benefiting from its non-volatility property. Spintronic devices such as magnetic tunnel junctions (MTJs) are also compatible with CMOS transistors and suitable for designing hybrid MTJ/CMOS circuits. Hybrid MTJ/CMOS circuits can be used in many applications, such as logic-in-memory (LiM) and high-security structures. These circuits demonstrate enhanced data security compared to CMOS-based circuits by leveraging their non-volatile feature, making information leakage and data access more challenging. However, these circuits are not completely immune to attacks, and information can be revealed by potent power analysis attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA). This paper investigates the resistance to side-channel attacks, especially DPA and CPA, for the magnetoresistive RAM (MRAM) and hybrid MTJ/CMOS AND, OR, XOR gates, hybrid MTJ/CMOS full-adder, and multiplexer circuits. Comprehensive post-layout simulation results using 40 nm TSMC CMOS technology, Monte-Carlo results, and values of normalized energy deviation (NED), normalized standard deviation (NSD)), and normalized power deviation (NPD) of PCSA-based MRAM indicate that the power consumption pattern remains constant in circuits with symmetrical structures in the reading phase even in the presence of inevitable process variation, so these circuits are resilient to power attacks and are competent for use in high-security applications such as hardware implementation of encryption algorithms.

SIMON is a block cipher developed to provide flexible security options for lightweight hardware applications such as the Internet-of-things (IoT). Safeguarding such resource-constrained hardware from side-channel attacks poses a significant challenge. Adiabatic circuit operation has recently received attention for such applications due to ultra-low power consumption. In this work, a charge-based methodology is developed to mount a correlation power analysis (CPA) based side-channel attack to an adiabatic SIMON core. The charge-based method significantly reduces the attack complexity by reducing the required number of power samples by two orders of magnitude. The CPA results demonstrate that the required measurements-to-disclosure (MTD) to retrieve the secret key of an adiabatic SIMON core is 4× higher compared to a conventional static CMOS based implementation. The effect of increase in the target signal load capacitance on the MTD is also investigated. It is observed that the MTD can be reduced by half if the load driven by the target signal is increased by 2× for an adiabatic SIMON, and by 5× for a static CMOS based SIMON. This sensitivity to target signal capacitance of the adiabatic SIMON can pose a serious concern by facilitating a more efficient CPA attack.

Cryptography is the science and art of hiding and securing information. There is a new vulnerability in a cryptographic algorithm implemented on a hardware device. This vulnerability is considered capable of uncovering secret key used in a cryptographic algorithm. This technique is known as Side channel attack (SCA). Previous and other research introduces countermeasure to countering this new vulnerability. Some researchers suggest using logic level with encoding the AES. The countermeasure using logic is very low cost and efficient. The contribution of this paper is to analyze CPA on encryption device that has been given logic level countermeasure. Our finding of this paper is the use of encoding with one-hot masking technique does not provide the maximum countermeasure effect against CPA-based attacks. In this research CPA attack can be successfully revealing the AES secret-key.

The chosen-message method is used to be employed in conducting Simple Power Analysis (SPA) attack by means of selecting special input messages. However, it is difficult to make distinction by visual observation i.e., SPA in practical IoT hardware environment. In this paper, we proposed a practical chosen-message correlation power analysis (CPA) attack which combines the chosen-message method with CPA for side channel attack. Then, we adopt other two practical chosen-messages, 1 and n + 1, to attack Boscher’s right-to-left binary exponentiation algorithm which is wildly considered as an efficient side channel resistant algorithm. Finally, this paper presents a countermeasure to resist the chosen-message CPA attack over Boscher’s algorithm without nullifying its countermeasure features to Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA). To validate the proposed attack method and countermeasure, a 1024-bit RSA coprocessor is constructed on the Xilinx Virtex-5 with the Side-channel Attack Standard Evaluation Board (SASEBO) to implement Boscher’s algorithm as well as our proposed algorithm and launched the proposed attack on it separately. The experiment results show that the proposed attack and countermeasure are feasible and efficient.

This paper formally discusses the security problem caused by the ciphertext verification, presenting a new security notion named IND-CVA (indistinguishability under ciphertext verification attacks) to characterize the privacy of encryption schemes in this situation. Allowing the adversary to access to both encryption oracle and ciphertext verification oracle, the new notion IND-CVA is slightly stronger than IND-CPA (indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks) but much weaker than IND-CCA (indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks), and can be satisfied by most of the popular symmetric encryption schemes such as OTP (one-time-pad), CBC (cipher block chaining) and CTR (counter). An MAC (message authentication scheme) is usually combined with an encryption to guarantee secure communication (e.g. SSH, SSL and IPSec). However, with the notion of IND-CVA, this paper shows that a secure MAC can spoil the privacy in some cases.

Prolexic, the global leader in Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) protection services, announced today that it has successfully completed its Type 2 SOC 1 examination, commonly referred to as SSAE (Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements) 16, and its Type 2 SOC 2 examination.

The rest of the black belt test involved self-defense, sparring, pattern movements and block breaking. Not many grandmothers can say they can break 12 consecutive wood blocks in a row, but that's exactly what Fraser did - followed by a concrete block. When asked if she will continue on to do her second degree black belt, she says, \"Oh probably!\" Credit: Denise Surette Contributing Writer

In an effort to boost lackluster ticket sales, Miami Marlins owner Jeffrey Loria announces that the baseball team will replace the live fish in the tank behind home plate at Marlins Park with a Burmese python wrestling an alligator. First controversy over Florida's new \"Guns on Campus\" law when a Florida State University student, standing his ground, shoots a fellow student doing the tomahawk chop. 31 --