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Abstract David Furley has suggested that we think of Callicles' immoralism as attacking a thick concept. I take up this suggestion and apply it to the argument of Plato's Gorgias more generally. I show that the discussion between Socrates, Gorgias and Polus, which prepares the ground for Callicles, is precisely addressing the thickness of the concept of justice: it reveals that this concept is both descriptive and evaluative and that formulating a revisionist position about justice is therefore extremely difficult. Callicles' strategy is best read as a response to this difficulty, which sets the stage for Socrates' revisionist account of justice.

The Gorgias presents us with a mystery and an enigma: Who was Callicles? And, what was Plato trying to accomplish in this dialogue? While searching for the identity of Callicles, we gain a better understanding of Plato's purpose for this dialogue, which is to use justice as a means for staking out the boundaries of four types of rhetoric. This article argues that Plato uses the Gorgias to reveal the deficiencies of sophistic nomos-centered rhetorics and an unjust sophistic phusis-centered rhetoric, opening the door for a “true” rhetoric that he articulates in the Phaedrus and a universal justice based on virtue that he describes in the Republic.

This paper focuses on a neglected portion of Plato's Gorgias from 506c to 513d during Socrates's discussion with Callicles. I claim that Callicles adopts the view that virtue lies in self-preservation in this part of the dialogue. Such a position allows him to assert the value of rhetoric in civic life by appealing not to the goodness of acting unjustly with impunity, but to the badness of suffering unjustly without remedy. On this view, the benefits of the life of rhetoric depend on the idea that virtue consists in the power to protect oneself from the predations of others. I argue that by challenging this understanding of virtue as self-preservation, Socrates both deprives Callicles of any remaining justification for the rhetorical life in the Gorgias and, at the same time, makes room for his own defense of the life of philosophy.

Maximizing Hedonism maintains that the most pleasurable pleasures are the best. Francis Bradley argues that this is either incompatible with Mill’s Qualitative Hedonism, or renders the latter redundant. Some ‘sympathetic’ interpreters respond that Mill was either a Non-Maximizing Hedonist or a Non-Hedonist. However, Bradley’s argument is fallacious, and these ‘sympathetic’ interpretations cannot provide adequate accounts of: Mill’s identification with the Protagorean Socrates; his criticisms of the Gorgian Socrates; or his apparent belief that Callicles is misguided to attempt to show that the pleasures of the intelligent can be more valuable than the pleasures of fools without also being more pleasurable. L’hédonisme maximisateur maintient que les plaisirs les plus plaisants sont les meilleurs. Francis Bradley soutient que soit cela est incompatible avec l’hédonisme qualitatif de Mill, soit cela rend ce dernier redondant. Certains interprètes bien intentionnés répondent que Mill était soit un hédoniste non-maximisateur, soit un non-hédoniste. L’argument de Bradley est toutefois fallacieux et ces interprétations bien intentionnées ne peuvent rendre compte de manière adéquate de l’identification de Mill avec le Socrate protagorien, de ses critiques du Socrate gorgien, ni de sa conviction apparente que Calliclès a tort de tenter de montrer que les plaisirs de la personne intelligente peuvent être plus précieux que les plaisirs de l’idiot sans pour autant être plus plaisants.

El presente artículo defiende que en Gorgias 521d Sócrates se atribuye a sí mismo una forma genuina de saber político. Para ello, se abordan los problemas planteados por la crítica reciente en lo que respecta a la aparente incompatibilidad de dicha atribución con (1) el reconocimiento explícito en Gorgias de no poseer un saber referido a lo justo, y (2) la aparente invalidez de la actividad desarrollada por Sócrates para contar, bajo los criterios que él mismo establece en el Gorgias, como efectivamente política. El trabajo responde a estas dificultades realizando un análisis del tipo de naturaleza que Sócrates atribuye a su propio saber en esta obra, así como de los efectos que su actividad dialógica demuestra ser capaz de producir sobre Calicles. De este modo, el artículo permite aclarar en qué sentido Sócrates es presentado en el Gorgias como el verdadero político. El presente artículo defiende que en Gorgias 521d Sócrates se atribuye a sí mismo una forma genuina de saber político. Para ello, se abordan los problemas planteados por la crítica reciente en lo que respecta a la aparente incompatibilidad de dicha atribución con (1) el reconocimiento explícito en Gorgias de no poseer un saber referido a lo justo, y (2) la aparente invalidez de la actividad desarrollada por Sócrates para contar, bajo los criterios que él mismo establece en el Gorgias, como efectivamente política. El trabajo responde a estas dificultades realizando un análisis del tipo de naturaleza que Sócrates atribuye a su propio saber en esta obra, así como de los efectos que su actividad dialógica demuestra ser capaz de producir sobre Calicles. De este modo, el artículo permite aclarar en qué sentido Sócrates es presentado en el Gorgias como el verdadero político.

For Danielle Allen, punishment is more a window onto democratic Athens' fundamental values than simply a set of official practices. From imprisonment to stoning to refusal of burial, instances of punishment in ancient Athens fueled conversations among ordinary citizens and political and literary figures about the nature of justice. Re-creating in vivid detail the cultural context of this conversation, Allen shows that punishment gave the community an opportunity to establish a shining myth of harmony and cleanliness: that the city could be purified of anger and social struggle, and perfect order achieved. Each member of the city--including notably women and slaves--had a specific role to play in restoring equilibrium among punisher, punished, and society. The common view is that democratic legal processes moved away from the \"emotional and personal\" to the \"rational and civic,\" but Allen shows that anger, honor, reciprocity, spectacle, and social memory constantly prevailed in Athenian law and politics. Allen draws upon oratory, tragedy, and philosophy to present the lively intellectual climate in which punishment was incurred, debated, and inflicted by Athenians. Broad in scope, this book is one of the first to offer both a full account of punishment in antiquity and an examination of the political stakes of democratic punishment. It will engage classicists, political theorists, legal historians, and anyone wishing to learn more about the relations between institutions and culture, normative ideas and daily events, punishment and democracy.

By \"literary criticism\" we usually mean a self-conscious act involving the technical and aesthetic appraisal, by individuals, of autonomous works of art. Aristotle and Plato come to mind. The word \"social\" does not. Yet, as this book shows, it should--if, that is, we wish to understand where literary criticism as we think of it today came from. Andrew Ford offers a new understanding of the development of criticism, demonstrating that its roots stretch back long before the sophists to public commentary on the performance of songs and poems in the preliterary era of ancient Greece. He pinpoints when and how, later in the Greek tradition than is usually assumed, poetry was studied as a discipline with its own principles and methods. The Origins of Criticism complements the usual, history-of-ideas approach to the topic precisely by treating criticism as a social as well as a theoretical activity. With unprecedented and penetrating detail, Ford considers varying scholarly interpretations of the key texts discussed. Examining Greek discussions of poetry from the late sixth century B.C. through the rise of poetics in the late fourth, he asks when we first can recognize anything like the modern notions of literature as imaginative writing and of literary criticism as a special knowledge of such writing.

Classical Athenian literature often speaks of democratic politics in sexual terms. Citizens are urged to become lovers of the polis, and politicians claim to be lovers of the people. Victoria Wohl argues that this was no dead metaphor. Exploring the intersection between eros and politics in democratic Athens, Wohl traces the private desires aroused by public ideology and the political consequences of citizens' most intimate longings. Love among the Ruins analyzes the civic fantasies that lay beneath (but not necessarily parallel to) Athens's political ideology. It shows how desire can disrupt politics and provides a deeper--at times disturbing--insight into the democratic unconscious of ancient Athens. The Athenians imagined the perfect citizen as a noble and manly lover. But this icon conceals a multitude of other possible figures: sexy tyrants, potent pathics, and seductive perverts. Through critical re-readings of canonical texts, Wohl investigates these fantasies, which seem so antithetical to Athens's manifest ideals. She examines the interrelation of patriotism and narcissism, the trope of politics as prostitution, the elite suspicion of political pleasure, and the status of perversion within Athens's sexual and political norms. She also discusses the morbid drive that propelled Athenian imperialism, as well as democratic Athens's paradoxical fascination with the joys of tyranny.

Modern philosophy has been vexed by the question \"Why should I be moral?\" and by doubts about the rational authority of moral virtue. InReasons without Rationalism, Kieran Setiya shows that these doubts rest on a mistake. The \"should\" of practical reason cannot be understood apart from the virtues of character, including such moral virtues as justice and benevolence, and the considerations to which the virtues make one sensitive thereby count as reasons to act. Proposing a new framework for debates about practical reason, Setiya argues that the only alternative to this \"virtue theory\" is a form of ethical rationalism in which reasons derive from the nature of intentional action. Despite its recent popularity, however, ethical rationalism is false. It wrongly assumes that we act \"under the guise of the good,\" or it relies on dubious views about intention and motivation. It follows from the failure of rationalism that the virtue theory is true: we cannot be fully good without the perfection of practical reason, or have that perfection without being good. Addressing such topics as the psychology of virtue and the explanation of action,Reasons without Rationalismis essential reading for philosophers interested in ethics, rationality, or the philosophy of mind.

El propósito de este artículo es ofrecer una reconstrucción de la teoría ética presentada porCalicles en el Gorgias de Platón, con el apoyo de otros textos de la época que contribuyen a explicardicha teoría y a refinarla. El primer paso de esta reconstrucción es mostrar que Calicles ofrece unateoría perspectivista de los juicios morales, de acuerdo a la cual los juicios morales pueden emitirsedesde dos perspectivas radicalmente distintas – la perspectiva contractual, y la natural. El segundo esmostrar que Calicles emplea un peculiar concepto de naturaleza que le permite sostener que ciertosderechos y prerrogativas naturales provenientes de una perspectiva natural, han de imperar por sobrelos que se derivan de la perspectiva contractual. El resultado es una teoría que además de tener un altovalor filosófico, parece no ser vulnerable a varias de las dificultades fundamentales señaladas por lasinterpretaciones dominantes, ni estar tampoco afecta al implausible hedonismo burdo que Platón leatribuye a Calicles en el diálogo.