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Political uncertainty is a crucial disadvantage to the internationalization of enterprises in developing countries. Using data from a survey of World Bank in 106 developing countries from 2006 to 2020, this study empirically investigates the innovative behavior of export enterprises in response to political uncertainty. The empirical results illustrate that export enterprises significantly improve the probability of participating in product innovation activities and R&D innovation activities under higher political uncertainty. Export enterprises substitute for fixed asset investment by engaging in innovative activities that can mitigate the decline in exports in an uncertain political environment. Both financing constraints and domestic production competition significantly reduce the positive effect of political uncertainty on the innovation of export enterprises.

In January 1978, President Jimmy Carter proclaimed that \"There is all across our land a growing sense of peace and a sense of common purpose.\" Yet in the ensuing months, a series of crises disturbed that fragile sense of peace, ultimately setting the stage for Reagan's decisive victory in 1980 and ushering in the final phase of the Cold War.

Since the 1980s, austerity has become synonymous with neoliberal \"free\" markets and the retreat of the state. With case studies from early Stalinist Russia, interwar corporatist Portugal, and late socialist Romania, we offer an alternative historical geography of austerity in the twentieth century. Significantly, we argue that austerity was not a corollary of neoliberalism but fulfilled the crucial functions of state-building, state transformation, and state maintenance in systems falling outside the liberal framework. The regimes under study resorted to austerity to drive deep structural change, expand state capacity, and pursue utopian promises of future-oriented progress and national independence. Focusing on places on the margins of the global capitalist economy, we uncover often-overlooked tool kits-both theoretical and technical-that state officials used to implement austerity. Collectively, we show how austerity is, at its core, a technology of the state and a mode of governance, widely adopted across political ideologies and economic systems in the past century.

Existing empirical schemas of class structure do not specify the capitalist class in an adequate manner. We propose a schema in which the specification of capitalist households is based on wealth thresholds. Individuals in non-capitalist households are assigned class locations based on their position in the social labour process. The schema is designed to address the question of the relationship between class structure and overall economic inequality in the United States. Although the major portion of inequality occurs within classes, inter-class inequality, especially the large gaps between capitalist households and everyone else, contributed substantially to the rise in overall inequality.

In this article I compare the approaches to process and order of classical political economy and marginalist economics, taking into account the implicit ontological commitments of each perspective in their explanation of capitalism. I draw on the social ontology developed by Tony Lawson, especially the notion of social positioning. The classical political economists studied the capitalist economy as a process of reproduction and distribution of the economic surplus, where socio-economic order depends on the division of society into social classes. After the marginal revolution, the classical approach is definitely abandoned, in a context where the analysis of human institutions in terms of social positions is progressively replaced by methodological individualism. This leads to a conception where the notion of socio-economic order is interpreted always in terms of market exchange between individuals, and in many cases replaced with a concern with the stability of an equilibrium situation.

We examine the role of reputation in limiting opportunistic behavior by venture capitalists towards four types of counterparties: entrepreneurs, investors, other VCs, and buyers of VC-backed startups. Using a hand-collected database of lawsuits, we document that more reputable VCs (i.e., VCs that are older, have more deals and funds under management, and syndicate with larger networks of VCs) are less likely to be litigated. We also find that litigated VCs suffer declines in future business relative to matched peers. These declines are larger for more reputable VCs, and for VCs that are defendants to multiple lawsuits or sued by entrepreneurs.

The IR literature on hegemony rarely combines attention to material power and ideas. Cox's neo-Gramscian work is a rare exception, but it too narrowly construes Gramsci's conceptualization of common sense, reducing it to elite views on political economy. But Gramsci argued that hegemony had to reckon with mass quotidian common sense. If political elites do not take into account the taken-for-granted world of the masses, elite ideological projects would likely founder against daily practices of resistance. In this article, I show how mass common sense can be an obstacle to an elite hegemonic project aimed at moving a great power into the core of the world capitalist economy. In contemporary Russia, a ruling elite with a neoliberal project is being thwarted daily by a mass common sense that has little affinity with democratic market capitalism. Scholarly work on future Chinese, Brazilian, or Indian participation in constructing a new hegemonic order would do well to pay attention to the mass common senses prevailing in those societies

In this paper I to ask an old fashioned question, “Why do capitalist economies evolve in the way that they do?” The answer will lie, in the nature of human curiosity and the corresponding growth of knowledge and in the particular instituted rules of the game that induce the self transformation of each particular economic order. The essential idea is this; the manner of self transforming is contingent on the manner of self-ordering, so that different instituting frames have different dynamic consequences. The notion of order provides the bridge to the systemic properties of the economy, the nature of its parts and the manner of their interconnection, while the notion of transformation provides the link with evolution and the open-ended, essentially unpredictable, development of capitalism. From my perspective capitalist economies are ignorance economies, in which highly specialised individuals and teams know a great deal about very little, so that the productive strength of the system, its collective knowing, depends on how the pools of specialised, narrow understandings are connected. Connectivity requires organisation and organisation depends on rules of the game and on belief and trust so that we can rely upon the testimony and actions of others. Failure of trust leads to failure of connectivity and a corresponding loss of system coherence. Order is central to the notion of economic evolution and, in practice, economic configurations demonstrate immense richness and subtlety but order is not equilibrium. Systems in equilibrium do not evolve. That the day to day structures of capitalism are the product of ordering processes in the epistemic as well as the material realm seems to me self evident and it is equally self evident that these structures are restless, that their development is open-ended and unpredictable.

We analyze the impact of the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on real decision-making within the firm. Our structural model predicts that CDS introduction increases debt capacity more when uncertainty about the credit events that trigger CDS payment is lower. Using a sample of more than 56,000 firms across 51 countries, we find that CDSs increase leverage more in legal and market environments where uncertainty about CDS obligations is reduced and when property rights are weaker. Our results highlight the importance of legal uncertainty in the interpretation of the underlying trigger events of global credit derivatives.