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PurposeThe mobile medical consultation (MMC) service is growing rapidly, but not all consumers are always willing to actively engage with it. To address this issue, based on IT identity theory, this study explores the underlying mechanism of how two types of platform-related consumer experience influence MMC platform identity, in turn, result in consumer negatively-valenced engagement in MMC.Design/methodology/approachThe data was collected from 400 consumers with the experience of MMC and analyzed by the partial least square (PLS) method.FindingsThe findings unfold that these two distinct consumer experience, servicescape experience (i.e. perceived telepresence and perceived platform surveillance) and service search experience (i.e. perceived diagnosticity and perceived serendipity), are associated with MMC platform identity and consumer negatively valenced engagement with MMC.Originality/valueResearch on consumer negatively-valenced engagement in the field of MMC is still in a nascent stage. The study identifies consumer experience in accordance with the unique context of the MMC platform and fills the research gap on the role of IT identity in consumer negatively valenced engagement.

While physician-assisted suicide legislation is being drafted and passed across the United States, a gray-area continues to exist in regard to the legality of a lay person’s assistance with suicide. Several high-profile cases have been covered in the media, namely that of Michelle Carter in Massachusetts and William Melchert-Dinkel in Minnesota, but there is also a growing volume of anonymous pro-suicide materials online. Pro-suicide groups fly under the radar and claim to help those desiring to take their own lives. This paper aims to identify the point at which an individual or group can be held civilly or criminally liable for assisting suicide and discusses how the First Amendment can be used to shield authors from such liability.

Cyberbullicide, a phenomenon in which a victim commits suicide after encountering bullying through technological means, has become a major social problem with the rise of online communication platforms. With many cases of online bullies finding their way into the courts, the vague language of cyberbullying statutes often leads to confusion and public debate about what defines cyberbullying. This thesis aims to linguistically define cyberbullying by researching its linguistic patterns in the literature, including determining whether persuasion and encouragement play a role. This research is then applied to two corpora, a collection of cyberbullying texts that have led to suicides and a case study in which the presence of bullying language has been questioned by the media and scholars alike. Through three linguistic analyses, the language in the case of Michelle Carter is then compared to the findings of cyberbullying features described in the literature. Of the described linguistic features, some are found in the language of Michelle Carter, while others are not. Whether or not Carter can be classified as a cyberbully could assist the way in which the courts define cyberbullying in the future, as her unique language features could potentially help in clarifying the language of statutes that will ultimately charge offenders.

[...]Part I of this Note will discuss the causation element in manslaughter proceedings generally and the unique difficulties it raises in suicide-related cases. [...]in Lewis v. State,101 the act of teaching someone to play Russian roulette was deemed insufficient to establish liability when the victim subsequently made the choice to seek out the same gun and use it to shoot himself, as he was no longer in the presence of the defendant.108 Michelle Carter, unlike the participants in Atencio, was not a member of a \"joint enterprise,\"109 did not provide the means to commit suicide,110 and was not physically present when the death occurred.111 Yet, the SJC viewed her situation as analogous to a decision rooted in the concept of \"mutual encouragement.\" Judge Moniz in Carter, did not acknowledge that suicide was a crime at the time Bowen was decided.127 This means that Bowen implicated an entirely different backdrop of legal considerations that no longer exist, such as the possibility of being complicit in the crime of suicide.128 Furthermore, Judge Moniz did not explain how the but-for and proximate cause requirements were satisfied, he failed to mention the issue of intervening cause, and he did not refer to any state statutes that have tried to address the problem more recently. [...]the use of the Bowen case alone constitutes shaky precedent to serve as the basis for a manslaughter conviction today, and yet it was the only measure of support cited here. Specifically, the court noted that \"[t]he ordinary definition of the verb \"advise\" is to \"[i]nform,\" and \"[t]he ordinary definition of the verb 'encourage' is to '[g]ive courage, confidence, or hope.'\" Id. at 23. Because \"[t]he ordinary definition of the verb 'assist' is 'help,'\" which is defined as \"provid[ing] (a person etc.) with what is needed for a purpose,\" it by definition requires a \"direct, causal connection to a suicide\" that advising and encouraging do not.

Is it constitutional to hold an individual criminally liable for another's suicide when words alone drive the conviction? After a Massachusetts court convicted Michelle Carter of involuntary manslaughter following the suicide of her boyfriend Conrad Roy in 2014, the answer seemed to be \"yes.\" Although Carter's conviction-which focused on the content of her text messages-was a first-of-its-kind, that was not the case for long. Just five years later, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought similar charges against Inyoung You for causing the suicide of her boyfriend, Alexander Urtula, also via text. Although the facts in the two cases are not identical, they both raise the question of whether the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects this type of speech. The United States is built upon a foundation that safeguards freedom of speech. There are important limits, however, on just how far that protection extends. In 2016, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Carter focused on a First Amendment carveout-speech integral to criminal conduct-when convicting Carter of involuntary manslaughter. But as critics have emphasized, that was arguably a stretch of the exception. This Note argues that, although the reasoning of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was not terribly convincing, criminalizing speech that encourages another person's suicide can be constitutional. Ultimately, Massachusetts's proposed bill, aptly named Conrad's Law, which criminalizes this type of speech and conduct, could both eliminate future First Amendment questions and protect those struggling with mental illnesses.

\"5 The following afternoon, on July 13, 2014, a local police officer found the dead body of Conrad Roy.6 During the investigation that ensued in the wake of Roy's suicide, local law enforcement reviewed Roy's electronic communications.7 Their findings caused officials to more closely examine his relationship with his girlfriend, seventeen-year-old Michelle Carter.8 The officials discovered that Carter and Roy met in 2011 and dated at various times in the three years that followed.9 The majority of this relationship and contact took place via text messages and cellphone conversations.10 The content of these electronic communications was of particular concern to the police.11 While Roy had a history of mental health issues and attempted suicides, Carter appeared to have exacerbated her boyfriend's problems by constantly encouraging Roy to kill himself.12 For example, in the days leading up to his death, Carter and Roy had brainstormed ideas for devices that could produce carbon monoxide.13 Carter had suggested that Roy \"Google ways to make it[,]\" and subsequently recommended using a generator.14 The next day, Carter sent Roy a text promising that she would stay up with him if he wanted to kill himself that night.15 When Roy responded that he wished to wait, Carter replied, \"You can't keep pushing it off. In a widely publicized decision,21 Judge Moniz explained that Roy was in fact responsible for his own death in the time period leading up to his suicide.22 Judge Moniz found that Roy, who struggled with mental health problems, \"took significant actions of his own towards\" ending his life.23 These actions included researching methods of suicide, securing a generator, obtaining a water pump, placing his truck in an unnoticeable area, and turning on the pump.24 However, Judge Moniz stressed that Roy \"br[oke] that chain of self-causation by exiting the vehicle. At that exact moment, Judge Moniz reasoned, Carter became responsible for Roy's life.26 Judge Moniz found that \"instructing Mr. Roy to get back in the truck constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct by Ms. Carter,\" which created a situation where it was highly likely that substantial harm would befall Roy.27 The court found that Carter's instructions to \"get back in\" the truck created the circumstances that threatened Roy's life.28 The court held that, therefore, Carter had \"a duty to take reasonable steps to alleviate the risk,\" the failure of which can result in a charge of manslaughter under Massachusetts law.29 Judge Moniz found it damning that Carter took no such steps, asserting that \" [Carter] did not call the police or Mr. Roy's family. . . . she called no one. \"30 Instead, Carter simply listened to the sound of the motor and to Roy's coughs as her boyfriend died, obeying her instructions until his last breath.31 For these reasons, the court found that, \"Carter's actions, and also her failure to act, where she had a self-created duty to Mr. Roy since she had put him into that toxic environment, constituted . . . wanton and reckless conduct\" sufficient for a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.32 In February of 2019, the supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Judge Moniz's decision without conditions or reservations.33 Michelle Carter appealed her conviction to the United States Supreme Court on July 8, 2019, but the certiorari petition was denied.34 This Note argues that the Massachusetts court overreached to criminalize Michelle Carter's conduct.

Though Michelle Carter, chief underwriting officer, has been with workers' comp-focused organization Kinetic for just over a year, she has already contributed to the company's underwriting profitability, broker engagement and enterprise-wide performance. Two additional underwriters were brought on to focus on renewals, further ensuring alignment with the revised guidelines, executing non-renewals where needed, and mindfully driving rate increases where appropriate. In what continues to be a soft workers' comp market, Carter was intent to buck industry trends and seek rate increases among its clients.