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\"From the racially segregated 'Jim Crow' US South to the many electoral but hardly democratic local regimes in Argentina and other federal democracies, the political rights of citizens around the world are often curtailed by powerful subnational rulers. Hybrid Regimes within Democracies presents the first comprehensive study of democracy and authoritarianism in all the subnational units of a federation. The book focuses on Argentina, but also contains a comparative chapter that considers seven other federations including Germany, Mexico, and the USA. The in-depth and multidimensional description of subnational regimes in all Argentine provinces is complemented with an innovative explanation for the large differences between those that are democratic and those that are 'hybrid', complex combinations of democratic and authoritarian elements. Putting forward and testing an original theory of subnational democracy, Gervasoni extends the rentier-state explanatory logic from resource rents to a more general concept, such as 'fiscal federalism rents', and from the national to the subnational level\"-- Provided by publisher.

What drives the uneven distribution of democratic practices at the subnational level? Within subunits of a democratic federation, lasting political practices that restrict choice, limit debate, and exclude or distort democratic participation have been analyzed in recent scholarship as subnational authoritarianism. Once a critical number of citizens or regions band together in these practices, they can leverage illiberal efforts at the federal level. This timely, data-driven book compares federations that underwent transitions in the first, second, and third waves of democratization and offers a substantial expansion of the concept of subnational authoritarianism. The eleven expert political scientists featured in this text examine the nature and scope of subnational democratic variations within six large federations, including the United States, India, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Russia. Illiberal Practices makes the case that subnational units are more likely to operate by means of illiberal structures and practices than as fully authoritarian regimes. Detailed case studies examine uneven levels of citizenship in each federal system. These are distributed unequally across the different regions of the country and display semi-democratic or hybrid characteristics. Appropriate for scholars and students of democratization, authoritarianism, federalism, decentralization, and comparative politics, Illiberal Practices sheds light on the uneven extension of democracy within countries that have already democratized. Contributors: Jacqueline Behrend, André Borges, Julián Durazo Herrmann, Carlos Gervasoni, Edward L. Gibson, Desmond King, Inga A.-L. Saikkonen, Celina Souza, Maya Tudor, Laurence Whitehead, Adam Ziegfeld

Why would states ever give up their independence to join federations? While federation can provide more wealth or security than self-sufficiency, states can in principle get those benefits more easily by cooperating through international organizations such as alliances or customs unions. Chad Rector develops a new theory that states federate when their leaders expect benefits from closer military or economic cooperation but also expect that cooperation via an international organization would put some of the states in a vulnerable position, open to extortion from their erstwhile partners. The potentially vulnerable states hold out, refusing to join alliances or customs unions, and only agreeing to military and economic cooperation under a federal constitution. Rector examines several historical cases: the making of a federal Australia and the eventual exclusion of New Zealand from the union, the decisions made within Buenos Aires and Prussia to build Argentina and Germany largely through federal contracts rather than conquests, and the failures of postindependence unions in East Africa and the Caribbean.

Several scholars have argued that decentralization benefits states and municipalities, granting them more autonomy for managing their budgets and more resources to deliver their services. Others have questioned this assertion, claiming that decentralization makes subnational units more fiscally dependent on central governments. This article argues that the fiscal impact of decentralization must be differentiated across states. It theoretically specifies and empirically demonstrates which states benefit during periods of decentralization and centralization. It argues that powerful presidents who centralize resources have imposed greater costs on more developed and fiscally independent districts (which prefer to administer their own resources and can be serious challengers to presidential power), thus relying mainly on support from less developed and more fiscally dependent provinces, which prefer more redistribution. I present empirical evidence for Argentina (1983—2004), a developing federation with strong governors and high cross-regional inequality, and discuss some implications for comparative studies on the topic. Varios investigadores han argumentado que la descentralización beneficia a las unidades subnacionales, otorgándoles más autonomía para gestionar sus presupuestos y más recursos para cumplir sus funciones. Otros han cuestionado esta afirmación, alegando que la descentralización hace que las unidades subnacionales sean más dependientes fiscalmente de los gobiernos centrales. Este trabajo sostiene que debemos diferenciar el impacto fiscal de las políticas de descentralización en los distintos estados. Para ello, el trabajo especifica teóricamente y demuestra empíricamente cuáles son los estados que se benefician durante períodos de descentralización y centralización. Argumenta que los presidentes crean apoyo para las reformas centralizadoras compensando a los gobernadores que prefieren un gobierno nacional capaz de recaudar impuestos de los distritos más ricos y de redistribuir esos fondos entre ellos, imponiendo mayores costos a los que tienen mayor autonomía fiscal y que prefieren más competencias descentralizadas para administrar sus propios recursos. En el trabajo se presenta evidencia empírica para Argentina (1983—2004), una federación en desarrollo con grandes desigualdades interregionales y gobernadores fuertes, y se discuten algunas implicancias para los estudios comparados sobre el tema.

Audacious Reforms examines the creation of new political institutions in three Latin American countries: direct elections for governors and mayors in Venezuela, radical municipalization in Bolivia, and direct election of the mayor of Buenos Aires in Argentina. Diverging from the usual incremental processes of political change, these cases marked a significant departure from traditional centralized governments. Such \"audacious reforms, \" explains Merilee S. Grindle, reinvent the ways in which public problems are manifested and resolved, the ways in which political actors calculate the costs and benefits of their activities, and the ways in which social groups relate to the political process. Grindle considers three central questions: Why would rational politicians choose to give up power? What accounts for the selection of some institutions rather than others? And how does the introduction of new institutions alter the nature of political actions? The case studies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina demonstrate that institutional invention must be understood from theoretical perspectives that stretch beyond immediate concerns about electoral gains and political support building. Broader theoretical perspectives on the definition of nation and state, the nature of political contests, the legitimacy of political systems, and the role of elites all must be considered. While past conflicts are not erased by reforms, in the new order there is often greater potential for more responsible, accountable, and democratic government.

This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential-provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential-provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions. Reprinted by permission of CFS Associates: Publius

Leadership and Innovation in Subnational Government takes stock of promising innovations that began to appear in local government across the region of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1990s. The purpose of this work—in contrast to many reports which document best practice—is to deepen our understanding of the genesis and evolution of change as local leaders cope with the challenges of governing in decentralized democracies. One of the most striking features exhibited by the cases in this volume is that local authorities have been change makers often without help from outside, from national or international agencies. The authors, Tim Campbell and Harald Fuhr, call these local enterprising risk takers an \"engine of change.\" Twenty specific cases of innovation have been documented in the study covering the core business areas of cities—finance, popular participation, service delivery, privatization, and personnel management. The book aims to show, in policy and practice, how to sustain this engine of change. One of the central messages of this work is that by supporting key steps in the process of innovation, donors can enjoy cost-effective impacts and help to achieve the next stages of reform in the region. But to do so, donors must focus on management and learning at the local level, building on the foundations of broad participation in public choice and working more actively to help local actors learn from each other.

Argentina has defaulted on its external debt on January, 2002. The country hopes for \"fresh money\" from the IMF. However, the Fund has opted for a different policy than in earlier years: it now has set a number of pre-conditions to be fulfilled not only by the central government, but also by the state provinces. Among them are that the central government and the provinces find a co-operative agreement about budget/debt consolidation, intra-state transfer payments and the distribution of tax income. These issues can be modelled based on the theory of alliances, where the provinces and the central government have to \"produce\" jointly the public good \"regaining international solvency\". We show in our paper that the new IMF conditionality can work as a self-enforcing contract and provide positive externalities to Argentina. Reprinted by permission of Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht