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Audacious Reforms examines the creation of new political institutions in three Latin American countries: direct elections for governors and mayors in Venezuela, radical municipalization in Bolivia, and direct election of the mayor of Buenos Aires in Argentina. Diverging from the usual incremental processes of political change, these cases marked a significant departure from traditional centralized governments. Such \"audacious reforms, \" explains Merilee S. Grindle, reinvent the ways in which public problems are manifested and resolved, the ways in which political actors calculate the costs and benefits of their activities, and the ways in which social groups relate to the political process. Grindle considers three central questions: Why would rational politicians choose to give up power? What accounts for the selection of some institutions rather than others? And how does the introduction of new institutions alter the nature of political actions? The case studies of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina demonstrate that institutional invention must be understood from theoretical perspectives that stretch beyond immediate concerns about electoral gains and political support building. Broader theoretical perspectives on the definition of nation and state, the nature of political contests, the legitimacy of political systems, and the role of elites all must be considered. While past conflicts are not erased by reforms, in the new order there is often greater potential for more responsible, accountable, and democratic government.

Bolivia decentralized in an effort to deepen democracy, improve public services, and make government more accountable. Unlike many countries, Bolivia succeeded. Over the past generation, public investment shifted dramatically toward primary services and resource distribution became far more equitable, partly due to the creation of new local governments. Many municipalities responded to decentralization with transparent, accountable government, yet others suffered ineptitude, corruption, or both. Why? Jean-Paul Faguet combines broad econometric data with deep qualitative evidence to investigate the social underpinnings of governance. He shows how the interaction of civic groups and business interests determines the quality of local decision making. In order to understand decentralization, Faguet argues, we must understand governance from the ground up. Drawing on his findings, he offers an evaluation of the potential benefits of decentralization and recommendations for structuring successful reform.

The trend toward greater decentralization of governance activities, now accepted as commonplace in the West, has become a worldwide movement. Todays world demands flexibility, adaptability, and the autonomy to bring those qualities to bear. In this thought-provoking book, the first in a new series on Innovations in Governance, experts in government and public management trace the evolution and performance of decentralization concepts, from the transfer of authority within government to the sharing of power, authority, and responsibilities among broader governance institutions. The contributor.

Leadership and Innovation in Subnational Government takes stock of promising innovations that began to appear in local government across the region of Latin America and the Caribbean during the 1990s. The purpose of this work—in contrast to many reports which document best practice—is to deepen our understanding of the genesis and evolution of change as local leaders cope with the challenges of governing in decentralized democracies. One of the most striking features exhibited by the cases in this volume is that local authorities have been change makers often without help from outside, from national or international agencies. The authors, Tim Campbell and Harald Fuhr, call these local enterprising risk takers an \"engine of change.\" Twenty specific cases of innovation have been documented in the study covering the core business areas of cities—finance, popular participation, service delivery, privatization, and personnel management. The book aims to show, in policy and practice, how to sustain this engine of change. One of the central messages of this work is that by supporting key steps in the process of innovation, donors can enjoy cost-effective impacts and help to achieve the next stages of reform in the region. But to do so, donors must focus on management and learning at the local level, building on the foundations of broad participation in public choice and working more actively to help local actors learn from each other.

One of the most significant developments in Latin American politics and political economy in the last two decades has been the increasing decentralization of government. This development has generated a substantial literature on the pros and cons of decentralization and on subnational politics but few attempts to explain differences in the pattern of decentralization across countries. Fiscal decentralization must be understood as a political bargain involving presidents, legislators, and subnational politicians, each having somewhat conflicting preferences. How these bargains are struck will depend heavily on the lines of accountability within political parties. In systems with centralized political parties, the central government has exercised greater control over resources and uses than in countries with decentralized parties, in which subnational politicians exercise strong influence over legislators. The article explores this hypothesis through a comparative analysis of decentralization in Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico.

In Chile, the structure of the state has become modernised and decentralised, and the municipalities play an important role in this development. As a result, there are expectations of policies for participation that direct the concerns of citizens with respect to public policies at a local level. Similar to other states in Latin America, Chile enjoys policies that could be perfected in an effort to achieve better integration and synergy among them, especially in the municipalities. This article presents arguments and evidence in the case of Chile in respect of mechanisms of participation, associative life and confidence in the municipalities, as well as proposing ways to perfect public policies for local participation.

What factors shape decentralization processes in Latin American federations? This work reviews and statistically analyzes current approaches on the topic, questions some claims of generality in their theoretical frameworks, and presents an argument to explain variation in decentralization processes across these federations. The main hypothesis is that the degree of decentralization (in fiscal and administrative terms) in Latin American federations has been shaped by the political power of the national executive and sub-national actors and the fiscal context in which they interact. The article presents statistical evidence (for federal and unitary countries between 1979 and 1998) to sustain some of the expectations in the argument and discusses some of its limitations.

Why do some governments—both in different countries and in regions within those countries—employ more workers than others? Existing theories focus on the level of economic development, political redistribution, and social insurance. But they raise additional puzzles and do not account for all evidence or for a global trend toward decentralization of public employment. The authors propose a new theory, inspired by Russia's recent experience, that locates one motive for subnational public employment growth in a political and fiscal game between central and subnational governments. In countries with weak legal systems, local and regional officials may deliberately set their employment levels beyond their fiscal capacity, prompting bailouts from the central government, which fears the political cost to it if wage arrears accumulate and provoke strikes. The authors model the logic of such brinkmanship, derive several propositions, and show that they—and the model's assumptions—fit empirical evidence from Russia in the 1990s. Deficiencies of that country's overstaffed, underequipped, irregularly paid, ineffective, and strikeprone public sector appear to result in part from a system of dysfunctional incentives created by the interaction of electoral pressures with the system of fiscal federalism. The authors suggest parallels with Latin American countries such as Argentina and Brazil.