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result(s) for
"Chamberlain, Neville, 1869-1940."
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The Periodic Table
2019
[...]chemistry becomes everything: life itself. A down-at-heel factory manager in 'Nitrogen' commissions him to identify the unguent that renders lipstick 'kiss proof' He decides the starting point must be uric acid. The book ends with the imagined odyssey of an atom of carbon, from calcium carbonate to carbon dioxide to leaf tissue, to glucose and ultimately to the pulse of energy in the hand that holds the pen.
Journal Article
Munich
by
Harris, Robert, 1957- author
,
Fowlie, Gemma, illustrator
in
Hitler, Adolf, 1889-1945 Fiction.
,
Chamberlain, Neville, 1869-1940 Fiction.
,
Chamberlain, Neville, 1869-1940.
2018
\"September 1938. Hitler is determined to invade Czechoslovakia. The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, is desperate to avoid what would certainly be the war following such a move. The city of Munich, Germany, is to be the site of an eleventh-hour meeting between them--a last desperate effort to preserve an already precarious peace. Aboard the plane flying Chamberlain to the meeting is Hugh Legat, a rising star of the British diplomatic corps, serving at 10 Downing Street as a private secretary to the Prime Minister. Aboard the overnight train bringing Hitler to Munich is Paul von Hartmann, a staff member of the German Foreign Office. Legat and Hartmann were close friends at Oxford in the 1920s, but have not been in contact for six years. Each of them is carrying the weight of a painful, personal secret. Now, as their paths cross in Munich, they will become privy to a state secret--one that could profoundly affect the very future of Europe. And they will be confronted with a dreadful decision: What are they each willing to betray? Friends, family, country, or conscience? Once again, Robert Harris gives us actual events of historical importance--here are Hitler, Chamberlain, Mussolini, and Daladier at the precipice of a second world war--at the heart of an utterly electrifying novel.\" --Dust jacket.
Year 9 use sources to explore contemporary meanings and understandings of appeasement
Sellin shares his experience of using sources to explore contemporary meanings and understandings of 'appeasement' with his Year 9 students in the UK. He decided to show his Year 9 pupils that the meaning of words is fluid. After reading cabinet memos and opinion polls from the 1930s, Year 9 pupils explored the different meanings that Neville Chamberlain and his contemporaries ascribed to the idea of 'appeasement.'
Journal Article
Alternatives to appeasement : Neville Chamberlain and Hitler's Germany
Charts the origins, development, and viability of the various alternatives to Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. Shows that none of the alternatives would have maintained a lasting peace and that war could not have been avoided given the rapid rise of Hitler and the Nazis in Germany.
INTRODUCTION
Londonderry's many correspondents include his second cousin, Winston Churchill, as well as the likes of Hermann Göring, Neville Chamberlain, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin, Andrew Bonar Law, Franz von Papen, Edward Carson, King George V, James Craig, Adolf Hitler, and Lords Halifax, Hailsham, Derby, and Salisbury. The first is a meeting in April 1924 with a deputation of Protestant churchmen,3 and the second records his encounter in February 1925 with a deputation of Belfast Orangemen.4 Also included in the volume are Londonderry's detailed diary notes of his first visit to Nazi Germany in January and February 1936, during which he was hosted by Göring and introduced to leading Nazi figures;5 and, in addition, there is an abbreviated account of his interview with Hitler on 4 February 1936.6 Londonderry's retention of secretarial assistance and determination to keep records of his correspondence, especially after his appointment to the cabinet in 1931, means that copies of outgoing letters are often preserved in the Londonderry Papers along with those received. Prevented by officials from making the two letters publicly available, as well as being reluctant to appear as an opponent of the government, Londonderry circulated copies to select politicians and journalists – he also did this with letters from his German contacts – and he paraphrased or published excerpts in his two books, Ourselves and Germany and Wings of Destiny.8 His extended missives to the likes of Baldwin and Halifax are admittedly repetitive in places, especially when reviewing the challenges and sleights, perceived and real, that Londonderry experienced at the hands of his former cabinet colleagues. [...]Ourselves and Germany reproduces – in the main body of the text – an excerpt of a letter to Ribbentrop, dated 21 February 1936, and reproduced in full in this volume, in which Londonderry tried, clumsily, to indicate his understanding of German anti-Semitism whilst acknowledging that some Jews were a force for good.14 The public criticism that greeted these comments on Jewish influence certainly gave him reason to express regret to a family friend, Anthony de Rothschild.15 But it is clear that Londonderry believed that he had nothing to lose from making public the content of his letters.
Journal Article
Appeasement : Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the road to war
by
Bouverie, Tim, 1987- author
in
Chamberlain, Neville, 1869-1940.
,
Churchill, Winston, 1874-1965.
,
Hitler, Adolf, 1889-1945.
2019
\"A new history of the British appeasement of the Third Reich on the eve of World War II\"-- Provided by publisher.
Anschluss: The Chamberlain Government and the First Test of Appeasement, February-March 1938
2017
The union of Austria and Germany in March 1938 - the Anschluss - forced by Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany with the acquiescence of Italy was the first test of the appeasement strategy of the Neville Chamberlain government. Austro-German Anschluss did not occur unexpectedly: after Habsburg collapse in 1918, it had been desired by pan-Germans in Austria and Germany but denied by the Paris Peace Settlement; its possibility arose a couple of times in the early 1930s; and by 1937, the majority of Austrians seemed willing to unite with their Nazi neighbour. Even before Chamberlain became Premier in May 1937 and changed the strategic basis of British foreign policy, the Foreign Office and other ministries wrestled over whether to thwart Anschluss and, until 1937, worked to keep the two German-speaking Powers apart. After Chamberlain took power, the willingness to oppose abated as Hitler's pan-German solution spoke to both national self-determination and Austrian ambivalence about independence. Chamberlain's government submitted expecting that they might use the absorption of Austria as a means to divide Nazi Germany from Fascist Italy. 'Good relations' with the dictators existed as a cardinal element of Chamberlain's brand of appeasement.
Journal Article
The balance of forces on the eve of Munich
2018
Had the Munich Agreement not forestalled it, the Second World War, or at least a European war, would have begun in 1938. According to arguments in defence of appeasement, Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier bought time and avoided embroiling their countries in a conflict for which they were not prepared. The abundant historiography on Munich, nevertheless, continues to lack a complete picture of the balance of forces at the time. This article seeks to establish which side in the looming conflict was actually best positioned. It examines the likely line-up of belligerents, their respective land, sea and air forces and their war plans and strategies. The French and Czechoslovak armies were a more than even match for the Wehrmacht, it argues. An analysis of the German, Czechoslovak and French plans shows that Hitler's projected offensive was a hazardous enterprise that risked becoming bogged down and opening the Reich to a multi-sided invasion. Czechoslovak army strength and defensive capabilities, too often ignored or glossed over, weighed the scales down materially against German success. This was without even counting, finally, on the potential contributions of Britain and the Soviet Union on the allied side.
Journal Article