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What changes has the Cheonan incident brought about in the Northeast Asian region? How and to what extent have those changes shifted as time goes by? I find that the Cheonan sinking has played a key role in deepening the ideological chasm in South Korea between conservatives and progressives. It has also become a serious obstacle to the improvement of South Korea-North Korea relations, and has been the catalyst for the emergence of a Cold War-like rivalry between the US-South Korea-Japan and the China-North Korea-Russia blocs. However, relations among neighboring countries in Northeast Asia have shifted over time, including significant improvement in China-Republic of Korea relations and worsening of relations between China and North Korea and South Korea and Japan.

In patients with COPD, acute exacerbation (AE) is not only an important determinant of prognosis, but also an important factor in choosing therapeutic agents. In this study, we evaluated the usefulness of COPD subtypes identified through cluster analysis to predict the first AE. Among COPD patients in the Korea COPD Subgroup Study (KOCOSS) cohort, 1,195 who had follow-up data for AE were included in our study. We selected seven variables for cluster analysis - age, body mass index, smoking status, history of asthma, COPD assessment test (CAT) score, post-bronchodilator (BD) FEV % predicted, and diffusing capacity of carbon monoxide % predicted. K-means clustering identified four clusters for COPD that we named putative asthma-COPD overlap (ACO), mild COPD, moderate COPD, and severe COPD subtypes. The ACO group (n=196) showed the second-best post-BD FEV (75.5% vs 80.9% [mild COPD, n=313] vs 52.4% [moderate COPD, n=345] vs 46.7% [severe COPD, n=341] predicted), the longest 6-min walking distance (424 m vs 405 m vs 389  m vs 365 m), and the lowest CAT score (12.2 vs 13.7 vs 15.6 vs 17.5) among the four groups. ACO group had greater risk for first AE compared to the mild COPD group (HR, 1.683; 95% CI, 1.175-2.410). The moderate COPD and severe COPD group HR values were 1.587 (95% CI, 1.145-2.200) and 1.664 (95% CI, 1.203-2.302), respectively. In addition, St. George's Respiratory Questionnaire score (HR: 1.019; 95% CI, 1.014-1.024) and gastroesophageal reflux disease were independent factors associated with the first AE (HR: 1.535; 95% CI, 1.116-2.112). Our cluster analysis revealed an exacerbator subtype of COPD independent of FEV . Since these patients are susceptible to AE, a more aggressive treatment strategy is needed in these patients.

In this article I assess the limits and potential of South Korea's democracy as revealed by a review of political developments related to the Cheonan incident I argue that the incidents aftermath shows that South Korea's democratic principles and procedures remain vulnerable to pressures generated by national security concerns, although this vulnerability was covered to a limited degree by an open public sphere and active civil society. Korea's political functioning in terms of republican principles and procedural democracy was seriously tested as imperatives of national security created the \"state of exception.\" But civil society appropriated new technologies as well as old tactics to generate \"public spheres\" of deliberation. I suggest that Korean democracy during the Cheonan crisis reflects the resiliency and vulnerability of the \"division system\" in which South Korea's politics is embedded.

The Lee Myung-bak government's response to the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan in March 2010 was a hard-line policy that met with widespread public doubt and criticism. His conservative government reacted to critics with suppression of free speech and use of state power to control the media. As a result, international ratings of press freedom and Internet freedom for South Korea were downgraded. The government relied on national security rhetoric; however, its primary legal tools were not the National Security Law but rather criminal defamation and broadcasting and Internet regulations. I discuss some factors that make South Korean democracy vulnerable to erosion of press freedom, including the enduring influence of the Cold War, fragility of liberalism, and the lack of executive constraints.

In this article, I examine the 2010 sinking of the South Korean naval ship Cheonan to assess the popular theory of \"rally-round-theflag,\" focusing especially on its domestic mechanisms. What did the South Korean government do to sell its version of the incident to the public? How effective was it? What were its obstacles? In addition, I explore the possibility that the authorities may in fact have limited ability to engage in effective diversionary activity. I conclude that authorities' efforts were partially successful because of their monopoly of information, control over the press, repression, and institutionalization of memories. Obstacles to their efforts included nongovernmental organizations, independent journalists, and the president's low popularity.

The analysis of the seismic and infrasound data recorded at the time of the Cheonan incident led Kim and Gitterman (this journal, published on line August 2012) to conclude that a non-contact underwater explosion had sunk the ship. They also concluded that one of the mines deployed by the South Korean Navy many years ago in the area and then abandoned sank the ship. Their mine theory that is based on the explosive charge weights they calculated by means of two methods using the bubble period determined by their analysis, however, appears to be invalid. Although the incident had occurred in a shallow sea with a depth of less than 50m, the authors used the methods that are applicable only to free-field underwater explosions. The consideration of the influence on the bubble period of the nearby sea surface and bottom and the nearby ship’s hull would double the calculated weights. In addition, the authors ignored several evidences that support the torpedo theory. One of them is aluminum-containing white powder found in large quantities at certain substrates in the retrieved Cheonan. However, the conclusion of the official investigation group that the torpedo was made in North Korea is based on a circumstantial evidence and is yet to be proven with other more direct evidences.

China criticized North Korea's nuclear test in 2006, but Beijing refused to condemn Pyongyang's provocations in 2010. When will China punish North Korea's belligerence? The \"Dual Threats Model\" suggests that China responds only when Pyongyang's activities heighten the possibility of U.S. military response, and as long as Pyongyang remains stable. Adapted from the source document.

Twenty years after diplomatic normalization in 1992, Korea-China relations have become more interdependent, complex, and conflictridden. In spite of ever-growing economic interactions, South Korea now views China as a source of concern with respect to its economy and security. The China-South Korean history controversy and the disillusionment in the midst of the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling further contributed to the rise of such concern. As the interactions grow in the future. South Korea and China will face challenges in seven areas: trade/commercial frictions, historical disputes, clashes of values and norms, North Korea's nuclear weapons, the Korea-US alliance, territorial disputes, and Korean reunification.

Dispute is going on over the letter mark on the torpedo that is believed to have sunk the Korean corvette Cheonan in March, 2010. This research is made to investigate if the spot has experienced temperature high enough to burn, which can be proof of later fabrication. Conditions to maximize the heating are introduced and the temperature is calculated numerically as the explosion ‘bubble’ expands underwater, the gas stream heats the disk front surface and heat is conducted to the letter-written rear surface. Results show less than 20°C rise everywhere in the torpedo propulsion part and essentially no temperature rise on the letter mark over extensive tests. Therefore, the assertion that the letter mark should have been burnt turns out to be fallacious.

The deterioration of Sino–South Korean relations following the attacks on the Cheonan and on Yonpyong Island in 2010 has again raised the question of Chinese intentions in the Korean peninsula. In this article, I explore Chinese netizen views of the two Koreas. Qualitative and quantitative evidence (in the form of a large-scale national Internet survey) provide convergent evidence that while Chinese netizens feel coolly toward both Koreas, they think and feel about them in very different ways. Chinese netizens appear to be profoundly disillusioned with a North Korea that refuses to adopt Chinese-style “reform and opening,” which only reminds them of their poor and authoritarian past. However, recent high-profile historical and cultural disputes appear to have led to widespread Chinese dismay and even anger toward South Korea as well, which is perceived to be poaching on China's proud cultural heritage. These attitudes toward Korea are reflective of evolving Chinese understandings of what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-first century.