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Do CEOs Matter? Evidence from Hospitalization Events
Using variation in firms' exposure to their CEOs resulting from hospitalization, we estimate the effect of chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm policies, holding firm-CEO matches constant. We document three main findings. First, CEOs have a significant effect on profitability and investment. Second, CEO effects are larger for younger CEOs, in growing and family-controlled firms, and in human-capital-intensive industries. Third, CEOs are unique: the hospitalization of other senior executives does not have similar effects on the performance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that CEOs are a key driver of firm performance, which suggests that CEO contingency plans are valuable.
Journal Article
Higher Highs and Lower Lows
Research summary: Investing a firm's resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives remains a contentious issue. While research suggests firm financial performance is the primary driver of CEO dismissal, we propose that CSR will provide important additional context when interpreting a firm's financial performance. Consistent with this prediction, our results suggest that past CSR decisions amplify the negative relationship between financial performance and CEO dismissal. Specifically, we find that greater prior investments in CSR appear to expose CEOs of firms with poor financial performance to a greater risk of dismissal. In contrast, greater past investments in CSR appear to help shield CEOs of firms with good financial performance from dismissal. These findings provide novel insight into how CEOs' career outcomes may be affected by earlier CSR decisions. Managerial summary: In this study, we examined a potential personal consequence for CEOs related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We explored the role prior investments in CSR play when a board evaluates the firm's financial performance and considers whether or not to fire the CEO. Our results suggest that while financial performance sets the overall tone of a CEO's evaluation, CSR amplifies that baseline evaluation. Specifically, our results suggest that greater past investments in CSR appear to (a) greatly increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is poor, and (b) somewhat reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is good. Thus, striving to deliver profits in a socially responsible manner may have both positive and negative personal consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal Article
Full circle : a memoir of leaning in too far and the journey back
The author's memoir of her Wall Street career, focusing on her time as Chief Financial Officer at Lehman Brothers from late 2007 until mid-2008 during the height of the financial crisis, as well as how she has slowly regained balance and happiness in her previously work-centric life.
Book
Has the \CEO effect\ increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in America's attention to corporate leaders
We introduce a new explanation for one of the most pronounced phenomena on the American business landscape in recent decades: a dramatic increase in attributions of CEO significance. Specifically, we test the possibility that America's CEOs became seen as increasingly significant because they were, in fact, increasingly significant. Employing variance partitioning methodologies on data spanning 60years and more than 18,000 firm-years, we find that the proportion of variance in performance explained by individual CEOs, or \"the CEO effect,\" increased substantially over the decades of study. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this finding.
Journal Article
CEO equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking
Research Summary We draw upon applied psychology literature to explore interagent differences in perceived risk to their equity when making strategic risk decisions. Our theory suggests behavioral agency's predicted negative relationship between equity risk bearing and strategic risk taking is contingent upon four personality traits. Our empirical analyses, based on personality profiles of 158 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of S&P 1,500 firms in manufacturing industries, indicate the relationship between executive risk bearing and strategic risk taking crosses from negative to positive for high extraversion, greater openness, and low conscientiousness. These findings demonstrate that agency based predictions of CEO risk taking in response to compensation—and board attempts at creating incentive alignment using compensation—are enhanced by integrating insights from personality trait literature. Managerial Summary We study the effect of CEO personality on their behavioral responses to stock option pay. Our findings reveal that CEOs that score high on extraversion or openness and low on conscientiousness are less likely to decrease their firm's strategic risk taking as the value of their stock options increases. That is, the tendency of CEOs to become more risk averse in their strategic choices as their option wealth increases (due to loss aversion) is weaker for highly extraverted and more open CEOs, but stronger for more conscientiousness CEOs. Overall, our findings suggest that board of directors need to consider personality traits of their CEOs when designing compensation packages with the intention to align incentives of CEOs with shareholder risk preferences.
Journal Article
ARE FOUNDER CEOS MORE OVERCONFIDENT THAN PROFESSIONAL CEOS? EVIDENCE FROM S&P 1500 COMPANIES
Research summary: We provide evidence that founder chief executive officers (CEOs) of large S&P 1500 companies are more overconfident than their nonfounder counterparts (\"professional CEOs\"). We measure overconfidence via tone of CEO tweets, tone of CEO statements during earnings conference calls, management earnings forecasts, and CEO option-exercise behavior. Compared with professional CEOs, founder CEOs use more optimistic language on Twitter and during earnings conference calls. In addition, founder CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts that are too high; they are also more likely to perceive their firms to be undervalued, as implied by their option-exercise behavior. We provide evidence that, to date, investors appear unaware of this \"overconfidence bias\" among founders. Managerial summary: This article helps to explain why firms managed by founder chief executive officers (CEOs) behave differently from those managed by professional CEOs. We study a sample of S&P 1500 firms and find strong evidence that founder CEOs are more overconfident than professional CEOs. To date, investors appear unaware of this overconfidence bias among founders. Our study should help firm stakeholders, including investors, employees, suppliers, and customers, put the statements and actions of founder CEOs in perspective. Our study should also help members of corporate boards make more informed decisions about whether to retain (or bring back) founder CEOs or hire professional CEOs.
Journal Article
Throwing caution to the wind: The effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems
Stock options are thought to align the interests of CEOs and shareholders, but scholars have shown that options sometimes lead to outcomes that run counter to what they are meant to achieve. Building on this research, we argue that options promote a lack of caution in CEOs that manifests in a higher incidence of product safety problems. We also posit that this relationship varies across CEOs, and that the effect of options will depend upon CEO characteristics such as tenure and founder status. Analyzing product recall data for a large sample of FDA-regulated companies, we find support for our theory.
Journal Article
The Role of CEO's Personal Incentives in Driving Corporate Social Responsibility
In this study, we explore the role of Chief Executive Officers' (CEOs') incentives, split between monetary (based on both bonus compensation and changes in the value of the CEO's portfolio of stocks and options) and non-monetary (career concerns, incoming/departing CEOs, and power and entrenchment), in relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We base our analysis on a sample of 597 US firms over the period 2005–2009. We find that both monetary and non-monetary incentives have an effect on CSR decisions. Specifically, monetary incentives designed to align the CEO's and shareholders' interests have a negative effect on CSR and non-monetary incentives have a positive effect on CSR. The study has important implications for the design of executive remuneration (compensation) plans, as we show that there are many levers that can affect the CEO's decisions with regard to CSR. Our evidence also confirms the prominent role of the CEO in relation to CSR decisions, while also recognizing the complexity of factors affecting CSR. Finally, we propose a research design that takes into account endogeneity issues arising when examining compensation variables.
Journal Article