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"China Foreign economic relations Indo-Pacific Region."
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India's ocean : can China and India coexist?
The book focuses on analyzing the turbulent situation in the Indian Ocean from the political, economic and security perspectives. It discusses topics ranging from the major powers' great game in the Indo-Pacific and China's countermeasures, to China and India's reciprocal demands and potential conflicts in the Indian Ocean. It also addresses the relations between the Indian Ocean region and China's economic security and provides an in-depth analysis of the prospects of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.
The \Free and Open Indo-Pacific\ and Implications for ASEAN
2019
In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, this Trends paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional 'centrality'.
Putting the “geo” into geopolitics: a heuristic framework and the example of Australian foreign policy
2022
This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of geopolitics by offering a heuristic framework to understand the “geo” in geopolitics. The approach integrates economic and strategic processes with transformations of physical geography by emphasizing the role of context and the mutual construction of geography and politics. Understanding foreign policy choices requires a theorized contextualization that sees all geopolitical decisions being limited by the interaction of economic, strategic, and physical contexts. Geopolitics is situated within the structures and imperatives of the capitalist world-economy and defined as the process of controlling geographic entities; specifically, regions, networks, and places. Geopolitical activity occurs within three related contexts; specifically, geostructural, geostrategic, and geophysical. The geographic entities and contexts are constructed by geopolitical activity, and frame such activity, in a non-deterministic and mutually constitutive fashion. The framework is illustrated by a brief discussion of Australia’s foreign policy orientations in the Indo-Pacific region.
Journal Article
The United States, the European Union, and China: A Global Triangle of Rivalry and Cooperation
2023
This paper analyzes the new triangle of relations between the United States, the European Union, and China through the concept of trilateralism from polarity theory. Following this model, we examine the three bilateral relationships of US-China, US-EU, and EU-China that make up this global triangle. Economic relations between the United States and China provide the operational framework for this triangle and should currently be viewed as a cooperative rivalry rather than a traditionally hostile one like that seen in the Cold War. The EU also plays a key role in the triangle due to its strategic autonomy and significance to the other two. We argue that relations in the global US-EU-China triangle can be characterized in terms of cooperation but do not exclude rivalry. These global trilateral relations are marked by flexibility and openness that encourage the development of relations with third countries.
Journal Article
Strategic Hedging
2020
This article explores the viability of “strategic hedging” for Australia to insure itself against three security risks: excessive reliance on China for economic growth, China’s political and military domination of the region, and a reduction in U.S. strategic commitment to the region.
MAIN ARGUMENT
The current strategic debate within Australia about the country’s role as a middle power in the Indo-Pacific is framed as a binary choice between China (as the country’s principal economic partner and market) and the U.S. (as its chief security and political ally). However, this binary option is false. There is a viable third way that would avoid a choice of one side at the expense of the other. This option is overlooked because Australia’s hedging policy has yet to reach its full potential and can currently be described as “under-hedging” (i.e., not doing enough to reduce uncertainty about future risk). The weak link in Australia’s current hedging is the failure to enmesh regional powers. Without enlisting more partners on its side, Australia often either relies on the U.S. or acts mostly bilaterally in dealing with risks shared by many regional states.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• If Australia continues to frame its strategic debate as a binary choice, it will likely be unable to optimally manage its security risks and potentially risk losing either its principal economic partner or its chief security and political ally.
• A viable third option to Australia’s current policy of under-hedging is strategic hedging: not choosing between China and the U.S. but instead engaging actively with other middle powers-notably India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea-to avoid negative future scenarios or unexpected shortfalls.
• The value of strategic hedging in the Indo-Pacific may appreciate during the Covid-19 pandemic while the U.S. is momentarily distracted by the outbreak and China is increasingly assertive in the region.
Journal Article
The \Free and Open Indo-Pacific\ and Implications for ASEAN
2018
Frontmatter -- FOREWORD -- The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and Implications for ASEAN -- The “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and Implications for ASEAN -- CONCLUSION
Publication
Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific Vision
2020
This essay examines the evolution of Indonesia’s Indo-Pacific thinking, major developments since the election of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) in 2014, and the future of the country’s regional leadership amid new 21st-century challenges, particularly Covid-19.
MAIN ARGUMENT
Indonesia’s outlook as a maritime state has matured over the past decade. Under the Jokowi government, important shifts have occurred in the country’s thinking about the Indo-Pacific with implications for maritime policy. In particular, Jokowi has shown a greater focus during his second term on establishing a material legacy—including by upgrading infrastructure, developing human resources, boosting lagging economic growth, and relocating the capital—rather than a visionary one. While Indonesia’s relentless pursuit of multilateralism is necessary to promote regional cooperation and balance strategic rivalry, much of the administration’s attention has been diverted to addressing the economic fallout and public health pressures of the Covid-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, Indonesia’s concerted effort to be an active regional player, given its size and historical nonalignment, remains critical.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• The current Covid-19 crisis and heightened strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific in recent years mean that Indonesia will continue to strenuously pursue multilateralism to balance the influence of both the U.S. and China and to maximize stability and scientific cooperation.
• Slowing economic growth and increased strain on the country’s health system due to the pandemic will limit some of Jokowi’s goals for his second term. Yet, given the country’s centrality to the Indo-Pacific construct and the importance of maritime security for the archipelago, the administration cannot afford to divert its focus from the Indo-Pacific.
• Indonesia’s failure to develop a coherent response to Indo-Pacific maritime security issues can be traced back to the militarization of its foreign policy. This trend is unlikely to change during the president’s second term, given the prominence of former army generals as advisers in the cabinet.
Journal Article
MYANMAR’S FOREIGN STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA SINCE ROHINGYA CRISIS: CHANGES, OUTLOOK AND IMPLICATIONS
Myanmar has crafted a neutral foreign policy since its colonial years to avoid leaning too much on any foreign power, but a spiraling political crisis at home is pushing it toward China as a buffer against international outrage. Myanmar faces charges of genocide against the Rohingya. China has backed Myanmar in the UN. In fact, China is in a similar situation. China is grappling with international criticism over perceived repression of ethnic Uighur people. Myanmar is exposed to various words and loud in the international community. So Myanmar wants to improve relations with China and is turning into an active cooperative attitude as a strategy to secure a friendly army. This paper shows how the diplomatic relations between Myanmar and China are changing, and how Myanmar’s foreign strategy toward China is approaching. Also this article analyzes the outlook of diplomatic relations and the implications of the current situation.
Journal Article
21st Century U.S. Policy on an Emergent China: From Strategic Constrainment to Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific Region
2018
During his second term as U.S. president, former President Barack Obama made the Asia-Pacific region the focal point of American strategic attention. In November 2011, he announced the U.S. pivot to Asia. His goal was to constrain China from easing out the U.S. as East Asia's strategic offshore balancer. Contrary to expectations, the 2016 election of Donald Trump, did not spell the end of the strategic rebalancing to Asia. For the Trump Administration, the Asia-Pacific remains a top security priority because of China's naval expansion, island-building activities, and militarization efforts in the South China Sea threaten not only the freedom of navigation but also the rules-based international order. Consequently, the Trump Administration has directed the U.S. military to proceed with the rebalancing of its forces and their capabilities to the Asia-Pacific region. This decision indicates that, despite its initial opposition to the rebalancing policy to Asia, the current administration believes that on the basis of geography, interests and values, the U.S. is a Pacific power which plays an important role in shaping the future of this dynamic region. This is because the Trump Administration has engaged China in a strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region. In conclusion, this article warns that the Trump Administration's policy of engaging China in a strategic competition will set back the hands of time to the U.S.-Sino conflict in the early years of the Cold War, when American and Chinese values, interests and polices were simply adversarial without any convergence. However, this 21st Sino-U.S. competition is different because both countries' materiel/technological capabilities and global reach are considerably greater than they were in the 1950s.
Journal Article
Japan's strategic challenges in a changing regional environment
2012,2013
Japan faces significant challenges in both traditional and non-traditional areas of national security policy as the economic resurgence of China and the loss of US hegemonic clout significantly transform the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific region. How is Japan coping with this new global and regional politico-security environment? What strategic moves has it taken to best position itself for the future to maximize its global and regional influence? More importantly, how is Japan perceived within the region by traditionally close regional partners such as the US and Australia, by supporters in Southeast Asia, and by new competitors — most prominently China and India? What international role do these nations wish Japan to play? In this comprehensive volume, these crucial questions are explored in-depth by a group of scholars both distinguished and diverse.