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This article analyzes the sketches of Ernesto “Che” Guevara and fellow guerrillas made by the Argentine Ciro Bustos during his captivity in Bolivia in 1967. Many of the references to Bustos in biographies of Guevara and in writings about the latter’s failed Bolivian campaign depict Bustos, because of those sketches, as “the man who betrayed Che.” The tensions and discrepancies in those accounts suggest instead that Bustos’s sketches should be seen not merely as documents of betrayal but as artworks embedded in the period’s wider revolutionary visualities. The article argues that Bustos’s drawing of Che Guevara, who is usually depicted visually as “heroic guerrilla” or “saintly martyr,” introduces an affective, intimate gaze of armed struggle in all its complications. En este artículo se analizan los retratos que el argentino Ciro Bustos hizo durante su cautiverio en Bolivia en 1967 de sus compañeros guerrilleros, entre los que se encontraba Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Muchas de las biografías de Guevara y los escritos sobre su fallida campaña en Bolivia señalan a Bustos como “el hombre que traicionó al Che” y justifican la acusación refiriéndose precisamente a esos dibujos. Pero la falta de acuerdo en el rol que ocuparon los retratos en la captura de Guevara habilita la posibilidad de que los bocetos de Bustos sean abordados no como meros documentos de una traición sino como imágenes complejas del régimen visual de aquella época revolucionaria. Sostenemos aquí que el retrato hecho por Bustos del Che Guevara, históricamente representado como “guerrillero heroico” o “mártir sagrado,” introduce una mirada afectiva, íntima y compleja de la lucha armada.

\"I can't explain why the press did this but it's like the Argentinian writer Tomas Eloy Martinez said: 'Whenever there's a hero, there's a traitor.' So that's what the press created.\" [Ciro Bustos] emerged from the jungle to carry on building a revolutionary network in Argentina. Three years later, in 1967, [Che Guevara] asked him to join his guerrilla band in Bolivia, where he hoped to detonate a \"continental revolution\". But, like the Argentinian operation, the mission was doomed to failure: the Bolivian army soon got wind of their presence and began closing in. Bustos and the French Marxist theoretician Regis Debray, who was in the country to meet Guevara, left the guerrilla force with Che's blessing but were soon captured by the Bolivian army. Bustos kept his interrogators at bay for three weeks. But when it became clear that the CIA and the Bolivian army already knew everything he changed tack. Bustos confirmed that he was an Argentinian artist and agreed to sketch some of the fighters to prove that he was not lying. \"I took the opportunity and drew,\" says Bustos. \"If the guerrillas were dead anyway, what difference would it make? None. But the people who were working clandestinely [in Argentina] had to be protected.\"

Both of these works are primarily concerned with the last gasp of [Che Guevara]'s career: his ill-fated guerrilla campaign in Bolivia in 1967 But they approach the subject from radically different perspectives, which makes these accounts especially interesting and sometimes contradictory. [Ciro Bustos] was an Argentine artist and Marxist who had participated in Che's earlier, failed effort to instigate a revolution in Argentina.

Reports that Che Guevara met with Jules Régis Debray and Ciro Roberto Bustos at guerrilla camp in Bolivia.

Presents summaries of news articles on death of Che Guevara.

Forwards intelligence information cables describing Bolivian army raid that resulted in death of nine guerrillas and capture of José Castillo Chávez.

Recounts description of Ciro Roberto Bustos's meeting with Che Guevara in Bolivia, including Guevara's plan to embroil U.S. in \"many Vietnams\" in Latin America.

Summarizes details from Che Guevara's diary about establishment of guerrilla camp in Bolivia, participating guerrillas, contacts with rural populations, confrontations with Bolivian forces, and difficulties faced by insurgents.

Assesses capability, objectives, and ideology of Bolivian guerrilla movement; reviews support from Cuba and international leftist organizations; evaluates Bolivian military's response; and estimates domestic and regional impact of insurgency.