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Despite the relevance of nationalism for politics and intergroup relations, sociologists have devoted surprisingly little attention to the phenomenon in the United States, and historians and political psychologists who do study the United States have limited their focus to specific forms of nationalist sentiment: ethnocultural or civic nationalism, patriotism, or national pride. This article innovates, first, by examining an unusually broad set of measures (from the 2004 GSS) tapping national identification, ethnocultural and civic criteria for national membership, domain-specific national pride, and invidious comparisons to other nations, thus providing a fuller depiction of Americans' national self-understanding. Second, we use latent class analysis to explore heterogeneity, partitioning the sample into classes characterized by distinctive patterns of attitudes. Conventional distinctions between ethnocultural and civic nationalism describe just about half of the U.S. population and do not account for the unexpectedly low levels of national pride found among respondents who hold restrictive definitions of American nationhood. A subset of primarily younger and well-educated Americans lacks any strong form of patriotic sentiment; a larger class, primarily older and less well educated, embraces every form of nationalist sentiment. Controlling for sociodemographic characteristics and partisan identification, these classes vary significantly in attitudes toward ethnic minorities, immigration, and national sovereignty. Finally, using comparable data from 1996 and 2012, we find structural continuity and distributional change in national sentiments over a period marked by terrorist attacks, war, economic crisis, and political contention.

While it was traditionally accepted that Hongkongers shared a form of pan-Chinese cultural identification that did not contradict their local distinctiveness, over the last decade Hong Kong has seen the rise of new types of local identity discourses. Most recently, “localists” have been a vocal presence. Hong Kong has – quite unexpectedly – developed a strong claim for self-determination. But how new is “localism” with respect to the more traditional “Hong Kong identity” that appeared in the 1970s? The present study takes a two-dimensional approach to study these discourses, examining not only their framework of identification (local versus pan-Chinese) but also their mode of identification (ethno-cultural versus civic). Using three case studies, the June Fourth vigil, the 2012 anti-National Education protest and the 2014 Umbrella movement, it distinguishes between groups advocating civic identification with the local community (Scholarism, HKFS) and others highlighting ethnic identification (Chin Wan). It argues that while local and national identification were traditionally not incompatible, the civic-based identification with a local democratic community, as advocated by most participants in recent movements, is becoming increasingly incompatible with the ethnic and cultural definition of the Chinese nation that is now being promoted by the Beijing government. 根据一般理解, 香港虽然有自己的地方特点, 但同样认同大中华文化。可是, 近十年, 香港出现了新类型的香港身份认同话语。最近 “本土” 论述经常出现, 甚至 “自决” 需求都浮出水面。那么, 这种论述与 1970 年代的传统 “香港人” 论有多大差别? 本文试图从两重角度探索本土身份认同论, 不仅探讨它的认同框架 (地方/大中华), 又分析它的认同方式 (文化–族裔认同/公民认同)。通过三个个案——六四纪念会、2012 年的反国民教育运动、2014 年的雨伞运动——, 本文区分本土认同的两种类型: 基于政治与公民 (civic) 的身份认同 (例如学民思潮, 学联的论述), 和基于族裔与文化 (ethno-cultural) 的身份认同(如陈云等人论述)。如果在过去地方与国家层次的身份认同不矛盾, 那么最近的冲突来自哪里? 本文提出这样的问题: 除了中港 (框架) 矛盾之外, 存在于本地公民的民主群体与北京当局促成的族裔文化民族群体之间的冲突, 是否更加重要?

Many authors have written about the ‘civic turn’ in European immigrant integration politics and policies that began in the late 1990s, but few have focused on the conceptual or normative dimensions of this turn. The purpose of this special issue is to help correct this situation. In this substantive introductory article, we begin with a discussion of the ‘convergence or national models’ debate that dominated early work on the subject. The next section presents the argument that civic integration is best understood as an ideological turn. It expands ‘good citizenship’ into personal conduct and values, shifts the responsibility for integration from the state to individuals and institutionalizes incentivizing and disciplining integration processes, which are often really just a means of migration control. This is accompanied, we argue, by a civic nationalist conception of membership that appeals to shared political values but defines those values through the culture of the state’s national majority. We then move on to the mechanisms and effects of civic integration, followed by a discussion of its normative analysis, before finally summarizing the articles included in this special issue and how they address the concerns that we have raised.

Many of the political debates in Europe call for the strengthening of a national identity that is, somewhat paradoxically, described in universal liberal terms. Yet previous research has not been able to tell to which extent these conceptions of national identity are indeed liberal. This is because we lack an analytical tool that allows liberal conceptions of national identity to be separated from, for example, conservative ones. There is also a pervasive yet questionable assumption that the more liberal a national identity is, the less it can per definition be truly national. This paper seeks to remedy this gap, by bridging the literature on these empirical trends of civic integration with the normative debates surrounding liberal nationalism. The result is a tripartite typology for the conceptions of national identity in conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism and constitutional patriotism, respectively. Each is specified along the following dimensions: (1) whether the sense of national belonging is defined by vertical or horizontal ties; (2) whether the national history is to be revered, taken as a starting point or critically scrutinised; (3) whether the legitimate place for the shared activity by which the national identity is upheld excludes the private or even the public non-political sphere; (4) whether we are asked to cultivate feelings of piety or loyalty to the homeland; and (5) whether or not the shared public culture of the nation is considered changeable and enforceable. Policy implications for individual rights, immigration and cultural minorities are also discussed.

Do nationalist political parties violate human rights more than others or are they the protectors of their people's rights when they are in power? I argue that nationalist political actors have the duty of protecting national unity at any cost and prioritizing national interests over any other concerns. These goals jeopardize certain types of human rights. In contrast to the view that civic nationalism can be more benign compared with ethnic nationalism, I argue that they both have similar effects on human rights. However, democratic institutions can tame nationalism and limit its effects on human rights. I test my theory by using a large-N sample including forty-nine countries between 1981 and 2011, and supplement my findings with a short case study. The findings show that nationalism has negative effects on certain types of human rights only in partial democracies. This article contributes to the literature by presenting a causal mechanism relating the core elements of nationalism to human rights practices and providing the first large-N empirical test of this relationship. The findings of this article can help scholars, politicians, and citizens better understand a potentially dangerous consequence of the rise of nationalism around the world.

This article surveys nation-building efforts in post-Soviet Russia. There have been five main nation-building projects reflecting the dominant ways of imagining the 'true' Russian nation but each has been fraught with contradictions and therefore have been unable to easily guide state policies. At the same time, a solution to the Russian nation-building dilemma may be emerging. This solution does not resolve the contradictions associated with each of the nation-building agendas but instead legalises the ambiguous definition of the nation's boundaries in the 1999 law on compatriots and the 2010 amendments to it. The fuzzy definition of compatriots in the law allows Russia to pursue a variety of objectives and to target a variety of groups without solving the contradictions of existing nation-building discourses.

Nationalism in China emerged through historical experiences of greatness and humiliation. Until the 19th century, the Chinese were proud of its civilization and considered themselves as the centre of the world. Humiliation in the wars with Britain and Japan created new feelings of nationalism in China. The nature of the nationalism changed according to variation in its relation with western countries. This paper analyzes four stages in the development of nationalism in China, i.e. socialist-oriented state control nationalism, liberal nationalism, Patriotic Nationalism and cyber-nationalism. It analyzes major features of each stage, and the causes lead to change from one stage to another. It examines top-down and bottom-up aspects in the development of nationalist feeling and concludes that even though the communist party has major role in creating a civic nationalism through its restriction on media and education system, the Chinese people show highly nationalist feeling even in abroad where they can access international media.

In recent work, Geoffrey Brahm Levey has argued that we can distinguish various schools of multiculturalism on the basis of their methodology (in particular, how they relate theory to practice), and their substantive normative commitments (in particular, their normative commitments regarding liberalism and nationalism). In this article, I offer some reservations about Levey’s analysis. I suggest instead that the various authors Levey discusses in fact share a surprisingly similar diagnosis and remedy. They all seek to expose the selectivity in liberals’ self-understanding of core liberal concepts such as impartiality, colour-blindness, equality, anti-discrimination, secularism, citizenship, civic nationalism, or constitutional patriotism. This selectivity operates in a way that impugns minority claims as always already sectarian, partial and exceptional, while rendering majority claims as always already universal, impartial, and normal. And these authors also broadly agree on the proper remedy to this bias, which is not to reject these core liberal values, but to reinterpret them in a more even-handed way. I offer several examples of how this shared mode of argument is found across the different authors that Levey identifies, and how Levey’s attempt to put authors into distinct schools is potentially distorting.

Ethnic identities often solidify in response to perceived or actual injustices endured by groups. Historically, Amharic-speaking people in Ethiopia have resisted ethnic identification, aligning instead with broader Ethiopian nationalism. However, the rise of extreme ethnonationalist forces in the country has subjected the group to negative narratives, violence, and marginalisation, associating them with past state domination. In response, the Amhara have increasingly embraced ethnic identity as a form of self-defence. This study employs thematic analysis to explore the experiences of the Amhara people and the subsequent emergence of their collective identity, including the rise of resistance movements. Despite this new alignment, Amhara elites and activists paradoxically maintain a strong commitment to Ethiopian unity, reflecting a complex duality in their socio-political stance. This balancing act illustrates their struggle to survive while remaining loyal to national unity. The article argues that sustained violence and marginalisation have catalysed the rise of Amhara group consciousness, transforming Ethiopia’s political landscape. This study offers broader insights into how group mentality can emerge as a response to systematic and sustained injustice and the implications this has for redefining power politics in Ethiopia and beyond, providing insights for policymaking and future research.

What is the origin of South Korea's North Korea policy under the Moon Jae-in presidency? Are there any underlying assumptions and perspectives behind this policy? What kind of ideas and values have played out in South Korea's policy toward North Korea? By both exploring the idea of nationalism in current world politics and showing its influence on South Korea's policy discourse and orientation, in this article we argue that nationalism is still a powerful political ideology that affects state foreign policy and plays out as a strong variable in trying to make sense of South Korea's North Korea policy. To test this argument, we analyze recent inter-Korean interactions and illustrate how ethnic nationalism shaped the Moon administration's North Korea policy. As long as ethnic nationalism dominates policy debates and affects the policy orientation, the prospect of inter-Korean relations will not be promising.