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Calls for civility feature prominently in public discourse, and the concept has received growing attention by political philosophers recently. But what does it mean to be civil? The existing literature distinguishes between two main understandings of civility: civility as politeness and civility as public-mindedness. The objective of this article is to show that these conceptions and the different normative claims associated with them can all fit together. We argue that civility and incivility should be disaggregated in order to uncover fruitful connections between different aspects of the concept. We introduce a distinction between two dimensions of civility as public-mindedness (moral and justificatory), as well as a new distinction between the means and ends of civility. We examine the complex connections between the different dimensions of (in)civility and show that the disaggregation of civility and incivility tells us what kind of (in)civility matters, as well as when and why.

Research in the field of workplace aggression has rapidly developed in the last two decades, and with this growth has come an abundance of overlapping constructs that fall under the broad rubric of workplace aggression. While researchers have conceptually distinguished these constructs, it is unclear whether this proliferation of constructs is adding appreciably to our knowledge, or whether it is constraining the questions we ask. In this paper, I consider five example constructs (i.e., abusive supervision, bullying, incivility, social undermining, and interpersonal conflict) and argue that the manner in which we have differentiated these (and other) aggression constructs does not add appreciably to our knowledge of workplace aggression. I then provide supplementary meta-analytic evidence to show that there is not a predictable pattern of outcomes from these constructs, and propose a restructuring of the manner in which we conceptualize workplace aggression. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Customer civility is an established construct in the study of ethical consumption. However, scholars have paid insufficient attention to customer civility in relation to the flourishing peer-to-peer (P2P) economy. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to develop and test a theoretical framework which examines the antecedents of the customer civility in the P2P economy. We use social exchange theory to develop a model that posits customer interaction experiences with property owners, properties, and P2P platforms (e.g., Airbnb) as antecedents of customer civility in the P2P economy. Two studies were used to test our framework: Study 1 comprises a survey of Chinese customers (n = 476); Study 2 involves secondary data crawled from the Web site of Xiaozhu, one of China's largest P2P accommodation platforms. OLS regression analysis was used for hypothesis testing. Results demonstrate three antecedents of customer civility in the P2P accommodation sector: interpersonal trust, property experience, and platform governance. In addition, the positive effect of interpersonal trust on customer civility is stronger when customers have high economic incentive, while the effect of property experience is significantly stronger when customers have low economic incentive.

Abstract Civility and etiquette underpin how we are expected to move, where the mobile subject—particularly in transit mobilities—is conditioned and expected to perform in certain manners. In this article, I consider civility and etiquette as more than fixed codes of conduct but a contested and situated process that is both infrastructurally mediated and affectively charged. In the context of transit mobilities, etiquette is closely entangled with not only the ways mobile subject interacts with the infrastructures of mobilities but also the bodily and affective experiences of mobilities. Drawing on the intersecting conceptual lenses of affect and infrastructure, I seek to rethink civility and etiquette in relation to the politics of the body, investigating how socio-cultural norms of mobility are materialized or transgressed at the level of the body. Moreover, I argue that attention to transgression is crucial to uncovering the power dynamics that underlie and construct the norms of civility in transit, revealing an uneven geography of bodily comportment as well as a politics of mobility across intersecting social differences.

Research in the field of workplace aggression has rapidly developed in the last two decades, and with this growth has come an abundance of overlapping constructs that fall under the broad rubric of workplace aggression. While researchers have conceptually distinguished these constructs, it is unclear whether this proliferation of constructs is adding appreciably to our knowledge, or whether it is constraining the questions we ask. In this paper, I consider five example constructs (i.e., abusive supervision, bullying, incivility, social undermining, and interpersonal conflict) and argue that the manner in which we have differentiated these (and other) aggression constructs does not add appreciably to our knowledge of workplace aggression. I then provide supplementary meta-analytic evidence to show that there is not a predictable pattern of outcomes from these constructs, and propose a restructuring of the manner in which we conceptualize workplace aggression.

This article is a conceptual scoping of the notion and practice of everyday peace, or the methods that individuals and groups use to navigate their way through life in deeply divided societies. It focuses on bottom-up peace and survival strategies. The article locates everyday peace in the wider study of peace and conflict, and constructs a typology of the different types of social practice that constitute everyday peace. While aware of the limitations of the concept and the practice, the article argues that everyday peace can be an important building block of peace formation, especially as formal approaches to peacebuilding and statebuilding are often deficient. An enhanced form of everyday peace (everyday diplomacy) has the potential to go beyond conflict-calming measures to encompass more positive actions linked with conflict transformation. The article can also be read as an exploration of ‘the local’ and ‘agency’ in deeply divided societies. It provides a counterweight to accounts of conflict-affected societies that concentrate on top-down actors, formal institutions and conflict resolution ‘professionals’. The apparent ‘banality’ of the everyday challenges us to think creatively about perspectives and methodologies that can capture it.

Despite the efforts to enhance knowledge transfer in organizations, success has been elusive. It is becoming clear that in many instances employees are unwilling to share their knowledge even when organizational practices are designed to facilitate transfer. Consequently, this paper develops and investigates a novel construct, knowledge hiding. We establish that knowledge hiding exists, we distinguish knowledge hiding from related concepts (knowledge hoarding and knowledge sharing), and we develop a multidimensional measure of this construct. We also identify several predictors of knowledge hiding in organizations. The results of three studies, using different methods, suggest that knowledge hiding is comprised of three related factors: evasive hiding, rationalized hiding, and playing dumb. Each of these hiding behaviors is predicted by distrust, yet each also has a different set of interpersonal and organizational predictors. We draw implications for future research on knowledge management.

How grave is the threat that populist leaders pose to democracy? To elucidate the prospects of the United States under president Donald Trump, I conduct a wide-ranging comparative analysis of populism's regime impact in Europe and Latin America. The investigation finds that the risks have been overestimated. Populist leaders manage to suffocate democracy only when two crucial conditions coincide. First, institutional weakness, which comes in various types, creates vulnerabilities to populist power grabs. Second, even in weaker institutional settings populist leaders can only succeed with their illiberal machinations if acute yet resolvable crises or extraordinary bonanzas give them overwhelming support which enables them to override and dismantle institutional constraints to power concentration. Because none of these conditions prevail in the United States, an undemocratic involution is very unlikely. First, the federal system of checks and balances, rooted in an unusually rigid constitution, remains firm and stable. Second, President Trump encountered neither acute crises nor a huge windfall; consequently, his mass support has remained limited. Facing strong resistance from an energized opposition party and a vibrant civil society, the U.S. populist cannot destroy democracy. Instead, Trump's transgressions of norms of civility have sparked an intense counter-mobilization that may inadvertently revitalize U.S. democracy.