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214,809 result(s) for "Coalitions"
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Network Structures within Policy Processes: Coalitions, Power, and Brokerage in Swiss Climate Policy
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) is a prominent approach to investigate the formation of coalition and their impact on policy outputs. Although the ACF combines both the network structures of a political process with actors' values and belief systems, most empirical tests focus mainly on beliefs rather than network structures. Considering a relational approach makes particular sense when one wants to investigate the structural patterns of a subsystem and to assess coalition formation and maintenance. The author therefore proceeds by taking two steps to study the existence of coalitions, power relations, and policy preferences: first, social network analysis frames the empirical study of network structures, based on the assumption that common beliefs are reflected in relations among actors involved in policy processes. Second, using a sophisticated mathematical algorithm, the multicriteria analysis furnishes a systematic evaluation of the elite's belief system. This methodological combination constitutes the added value of this research and allows for testing to establish if common beliefs are reflected in network structures.
Perceptions of Partisan Ideologies: The Effect of Coalition Participation
Recent scholarship in comparative political behavior has begun to address how voters in coalitional systems manage the complexity of those environments. We contribute to this emerging literature by asking how voters update their perceptions of the policy positions of political parties that participate in coalition cabinets. In contrast to previous work on the sources of voter perceptions of party ideology in parliamentary systems, which has asked how voters respond to changes in party manifestos (i.e., promises), we argue that in updating their perceptions, voters will give more weight to observable actions than to promises. Further, coalition participation is an easily observed party action that voters use as a heuristic to infer the direction of policy change in the absence of detailed information about parties' legislative records. Specifically, we propose that all voters should perceive parties in coalition cabinets as more ideologically similar, but that this tendency will be muted for more politically interested voters (who have greater access to countervailing messages from parties). Using an individual-level data set constructed from 54 electoral surveys in 18 European countries, we find robust support for these propositions.
Multiethnic coalitions in Africa: business financing of opposition election campaigns
Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. Summary reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press
Allies that count : junior partners in coalition warfare
What qualities make an ally useful in coalition warfare, and when is an ally more trouble than its worth? This book analyzes the utility of junior partners in coalition warfare and reaches surprising conclusions. Olivier Schmitt conducts detailed case-study analysis of several US allies in the Gulf War, the Kosovo campaign, the Iraq War, and the war in Afghanistan. He also does a broader analysis of 204 junior partners in various interventions since the end of the Cold War. Schmitt aims to bridge a gap in previous studies about coalition warfare, while also contributing to policy debates about a recurring defense dilemma. Previous works about coalition warfare have focused on explaining how coalitions are formed, but little attention has been given to the issue of their effectiveness. At the same time, policy debates, have framed the issue of junior partners in multinational military operations in terms of a trade-off between the legitimacy that is allegedly gained from a large number of coalition states vs. the decrease in military effectiveness associated with the inherent difficulties of coalition warfare. Schmitt determines which political and military variables are more likely to create utility, and he challenges the conventional wisdom about the supposed benefit of having as many states as possible in a coalition.
Policy Narratives and Policy Processes
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) has influenced a generation of policy scholars with its emphasis on causal drivers, testable hypotheses, and falsification. Until recently, the role of policy narratives has been largely neglected in ACF literature partially because much of that work has operated outside of traditional social science principles, such as falsification. Yet emerging literature under the rubric of Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) demonstrates how the role of policy narratives in policy processes is studied using the same rigorous social science standards initially set forth by Paul A. Sabatier. The NPF identifies theories specifying narrative elements and strategies that are likely useful to ACF researchers as classes of variables that have yet to be integrated. Examining this proposition, we provide seven hypotheses related to critical ACF concepts including advocacy coalitions and policy beliefs, policy learning, public opinion, and strategy. Our goal is to stay within the scientific, theoretical, and methodological tradition of the ACF and show how NPF's empirical, hypotheses, and causal driven work on policy narratives identifies theories applicable to ACF research while also offering an independent framework capable of explaining the policy process through the power of policy narratives. In doing so, we believe both ACF and NPF scholarship can contribute to the advancement of our understanding of the policy process.
Barack Obama's America : how new conceptions of race, family, and religion ended the Reagan era
\"The election of Barack Obama to the presidency marks a conclusive end to the Reagan era, writes John Kenneth White in Barack Obama's America. Reagan symbolized a 1950s and 1960s America, largely white and suburban, with married couples and kids at home, who attended church more often than not. Obama's election marks a new era, the author writes. Whites will be a minority by 2042. Marriage is at an all-time low. Cohabitation has increased from a half-million couples in 1960 to more than 5 million in 2000 to even more this year. Gay marriages and civil unions are redefining what it means to be a family. And organized religions are suffering, even as Americans continue to think of themselves as a religious people. Obama's inauguration was a defining moment in the political destiny of this country, based largely on demographic shifts, as described in Barack Obama's America.\" -- Publisher's description.
THE FARSIGHTED STABLE SET
Harsanyi (1974) criticized the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set for its presumption that coalitions are myopic about their prospects. He proposed a new dominance relation incorporating farsightedness, but retained another feature of the stable set: that a coalition S can impose any imputation as long as its restriction to S is feasible for it. This implicitly gives an objecting coalition complete power to arrange the payoffs of players elsewhere, which is clearly unsatisfactory. While this assumption is largely innocuous for myopic dominance, it is of crucial significance for its farsighted counterpart. Our modification of the Harsanyi set respects \"coalitional sovereignty.\" The resulting farsighted stable set is very different from both the Harsanyi and the vNM sets. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a farsighted stable set containing just a single-payoff allocation. This condition roughly establishes an equivalence between core allocations and the union of allocations over all single-payoff farsighted stable sets. We then conduct a comprehensive analysis of the existence and structure of farsighted stable sets in simple games. This last exercise throws light on both single-payoff and multi-payoff stable sets, and suggests that they do not coexist.