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19,232 result(s) for "Collective Action"
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Collective action and market formation: An integrative framework
Research summary: While extant research recognizes the importance of collective action for market formation, it provides little understanding about when and to what extent collective action is important. In this article, we develop a novel theoretical framework detailing what collective action problems and solutions arise in market formation and under what conditions. Our framework centers on the development of market infrastructure with three key factors that influence the nature and extent of collective action problems: perceived returns to contributions, excludability, and contribution substitutability. We apply our framework to diverse market formation contexts and derive a set of attendant propositions. Finally, we show how collective action problems and solutions evolve during market formation efforts and discuss how our framework contributes to strategic management, entrepreneurship, and organization literatures. Managerial summary: This article lays out the key considerations that players operating in new markets should contemplate when making nontrivial investments in those spaces. As collective action problems can thwart efforts to establish new markets, we ask: When and under what conditions should market players collaborate rather than act independently? And if players collaborate, how should they coordinate to establish a new market? To address these research questions, we develop a novel generalizable framework of collective action in market formation. Our framework assesses the presence and type of collective action problems that hinder market formation and identifies potential solutions tied to those collective action problems.
Strangers at the gates : movements and states in contentious politics
\"This book contains the products of work carried out over four decades of research in Italy, France and the United States, and in the intellectual territory between social movements, comparative politics, and historical sociology. Using a variety of methods ranging from statistical analysis to historical case studies to linguistic analysis, the book centers on historical catalogs of protest events and cycles of collective action. Sidney Tarrow places social movements in the broader arena of contentious politics, in relation to states, political parties and other actors. From peasants and communists in 1960s Italy, to movements and politics in contemporary western polities, to the global justice movement in the new century, the book argues that contentious actors are neither outside of nor completely within politics, but rather they occupy the uncertain territory between total opposition and integration into policy\"-- Provided by publisher.
Collective Action Theory and the Dynamics of Complex Societies
Collective action theory, as formulated in the social sciences, posits rational social actors who regularly assess the actions of others to inform their own decisions to cooperate. In anthropological archaeology, collective action theory is now being used to investigate the dynamics of large-scale polities of the past. Building on the work of Margaret Levi, collective action theorists argue that the more principals (rulers) depended on the populace for labor, tribute, or other revenues, the greater the agency (or \"voice\") a population had in negotiating public benefits. In this review, we evaluate collective action theory, situating it in relation to existing theoretical approaches that address cooperation, consensus building, and nonelite agency in the past. We draw specific attention to the importance of analyzing agency at multiple scales as well as how institutions articulate shared interests and order sociopolitical and economic interaction. Finally, we argue for a new synthesis of political economy approaches with collective action theory.
Protest on the Fly: Toward a Theory of Spontaneity in the Dynamics of Protest and Social Movements
This article reexamines spontaneity as an important, albeit neglected, mechanism in collective action dynamics, and elaborates on its operation and effects in protest events and social movements. We do not presume that spontaneity is routinely at play in all collective actions. Rather, based on our grounded analysis of historical and ethnographic data, we contend that spontaneity is triggered by certain conditions: nonhierarchical organization; uncertain/ambiguous moments and events; behavioral/emotional priming; and certain ecological/spatial factors. We conclude by elaborating why the activation of spontaneous actions matters in shaping the course and character of protest events and movements, and we suggest that spontaneity be resuscitated in the study of collective action and everyday life more generally.
Groups Reward Individual Sacrifice: The Status Solution to the Collective Action Problem
One of sociology's classic puzzles is how groups motivate their members to set aside self-interest and contribute to collective action. This article presents a solution to the problem based on status as a selective incentive motivating contribution. Contributors to collective action signal their motivation to help the group and consequently earn diverse benefits from group members—in particular, higher status—and these rewards encourage greater giving to the group in the future. In Study I, high contributors to collective action earned higher status, exercised more interpersonal influence, were cooperated with more, and received gifts of greater value. Studies 2 and 3 replicated these findings while discounting alternative explanations. All three studies show that giving to the group mattered because it signaled an individual's motivation to help the group. Study 4 finds that participants who received status for their contributions subsequently contributed more and viewed the group more positively. These results demonstrate how the allocation of respect to contributors shapes group productivity and solidarity, offering a solution to the collective action problem.
On the preconditions for large-scale collective action
The phenomenon of collective action and the origin of collective action problems have been extensively and systematically studied in the social sciences. Yet, while we have substantial knowledge about the factors promoting collective action at the local level, we know far less about how these insights travel to large-scale collective action problems. Such problems, however, are at the heart of humanity’s most pressing challenges, including climate change, large-scale natural resource depletion, biodiversity loss, nuclear proliferation, antibiotic resistance due to overconsumption of antibiotics, and pollution. In this paper, we suggest an analytical framework that captures the theoretical understanding of preconditions for largescale collective action. This analytical framework aims at supporting future empirical analyses of how to cope with and overcome larger-scale collective action problems. More specifically, we (i) define and describe the main characteristics of a large-scale collective action problem and (ii) explain why voluntary and, in particular, spontaneous large-scale collective action among individual actors becomes more improbable as the collective action problem becomes larger, thus demanding interventions by an external authority (a third party) for such action to be generated. Based on this, we (iii) outline an analytical framework that illustrates the connection between third-party interventions and largescale collective action. We conclude by suggesting avenues for future research.
Are collective political actions and private political actions substitutes or complements? Empirical evidence from China's private sector
This paper examines the circumstances under which collective and private corporate political actions are more likely to be substitutes or complements. Using data based on a series of nationwide surveys conducted on privately owned firms in China, I find that firms that are engaged in collective political actions are more likely to pursue private political actions. This positive relationship is stronger in less economically developed provinces and when there are greater opportunities for the state to redistribute economic resources in product and capital markets. Meanwhile, this relationship is weaker in the presence of heavier regulatory burdens and for firms in which the state has some equity or owned by individuals who had prior political careers. These findings contribute to the corporate political action literature.
Political Economy in the Archaeology of Emergent Complexity: a Synthesis of Bottom-Up and Top-Down Approaches
Political economy approaches have been criticized for their focus on top-down processes with insufficient attention to non-elite agency. Here, we expand archaeological applications of political economy by integrating a bottom-up perspective on the construction of social power, drawing mainly from collective action theory and anarchist theory. An array of interacting agents, diverse interests, and decentralized powers exists in non-state societies. Social segments with countervailing interests and strategies confront, limit, and co-opt elite power. These countervailing forces are fundamental to political economies in these societies, and focusing on them illustrates the ways in which social power and cooperation actually work as differing interests and objectives exist in perpetual tension. The significance of these bottom-up forces is illustrated with synthetic summaries of three historically independent, long-term archaeological sequences—Northwest Coast hunter-gatherer-fisher societies (case 1), Early Neolithic expansions into Europe (case 2), and the Island Southeast Asia and Pacific region (case 3). We draw together relevant theoretical threads to conceptualize how dialectical relationships exist among a diversity of social interests that stem from the material conditions that structure labor and resource flows.