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"Collective Behavior"
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Copycats & contrarians : why we follow others... and when we don't
\" multidisciplinary exploration of our human inclination to herd and why our instinct to copy others can be dangerous in today's interlinked world\"--Publisher's description.
Book
Rational ritual
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge.
Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form \"common knowledge.\" Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know. For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way.
By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
In a new afterword, Chwe delves into new applications of common knowledge, both in the real world and in experiments, and considers how generating common knowledge has become easier in the digital age.
eBook
Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America
This is a bold new study of the recent emergence of democracy in Latin America. Leonardo Avritzer shows that traditional theories of democratization fall short in explaining this phenomenon. Scholars have long held that the postwar stability of Western Europe reveals that restricted democracy, or \"democratic elitism,\" is the only realistic way to guard against forces such as the mass mobilizations that toppled European democracies after World War I. Avritzer challenges this view. Drawing on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, he argues that democracy can be far more inclusive and can rely on a sphere of autonomous association and argument by citizens. He makes this argument by showing that democratic collective action has opened up a new \"public space\" for popular participation in Latin American politics.
Unlike many theorists, Avritzer builds his case empirically. He looks at human rights movements in Argentina and Brazil, neighborhood associations in Brazil and Mexico, and election-monitoring initiatives in Mexico. Contending that such participation has not gone far enough, he proposes a way to involve citizens even more directly in policy decisions. For example, he points to experiments in \"participatory budgeting\" in two Brazilian cities. Ultimately, the concept of such a space beyond the reach of state administration fosters a broader view of democratic possibility, of the cultural transformation that spurred it, and of the tensions that persist, in a region where democracy is both new and different from the Old World models.
eBook
Coordination of movement via complementary interactions of leaders and followers in termite mating pairs
In collective animal motion, coordination is often achieved by feedback between leaders and followers. For stable coordination, a leader's signals and a follower's responses are hypothesized to be attuned to each other. However, their roles are difficult to disentangle in species with highly coordinated movements, hiding potential diversity of behavioural mechanisms for collective behaviour. Here, we show that two
Coptotermes
termite species achieve a similar level of coordination via distinct sets of complementary leader–follower interactions. Even though
C. gestroi
females produce less pheromone than
C. formosanus
, tandem runs of both species were stable. Heterospecific pairs with
C. gestroi
males were also stable, but not those with
C. formosanus
males. We attributed this to the males' adaptation to the conspecific females;
C. gestroi
males have a unique capacity to follow females with small amounts of pheromone, while
C. formosanus
males reject
C. gestroi
females as unsuitable but are competitive over females with large amounts of pheromone. An information-theoretic analysis supported this conclusion by detecting information flow from female to male only in stable tandems. Our study highlights cryptic interspecific variation in movement coordination, a source of novelty for the evolution of social interactions.
Journal Article
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract (which won the prestigious Lakatos Award) has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much greater. Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms's characteristic clarity and verve, this intriguing book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, economics, sociology and evolutionary biology.
eBook
Information structure of heterogeneous criticality in a fish school
Integrated information theory (IIT) assesses the degree of consciousness in living organisms from an information-theoretic perspective. This theory can be generalised to other systems, including those exhibiting criticality. In this study, we applied IIT to the collective behaviour of
Plecoglossus altivelis
and observed that the group integrity (Φ) was maximised at the critical state. Multiple levels of criticality were identified within the group, existing as distinct subgroups. Moreover, these fragmented critical subgroups coexisted alongside the overall criticality of the group. The distribution of high-criticality subgroups was heterogeneous across both time and space. Notably, core fish in the high-criticality subgroups were less affected by internal and external stimuli compared to those in low-criticality subgroups. These findings are consistent with previous interpretations of critical phenomena and offer a new perspective on the dynamics of an empirical critical state.
Journal Article